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Article
The Memorial Culture of Early Modern
English Lawyers: Memory as Keyword,
Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640
Richard J. Ross*
Between 1580 and 1640, memory became increasingly important in
diverse areas of English legal culture: in education, in historical and
antiquarian writing, in the bar's understanding of its social role, in the
organization of legal literature, in political argument, in mediation
between national courts and local remembered law, and in the
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conceptualization of the ideal structure of legal knowledge. A
"memorial culture" coalesced in early modern English law. It was a
composite-in part self-conscious theorizing about recollection, in part
a growing attention to the challenges of remembrance that spread as
a byproduct of innovations in the profession's work and styles of
argument and education. To English lawyers, memory became an
intellectual keyword,1 a shelter, and a badge of guild identity no less
than a subject of lawyerly manipulation and a repository of infor-
mation. The centrality of memory to the thought and practices of this
legal culture created forensic advantages and vulnerabilities for a
profession at the center of political, jurisdictional, and dignitary
conflicts. Sketching the causes, lineaments, uses, effects, and sig-
nificance of memorial culture is the ambition of this Article.
One could construe the common law's frequent invocation of what
had gone before-precedent, history, tradition-as an appeal to
memory, which in some sense it was. But this Article pursues
something more specific. It focuses on discussions of the mental
faculty of memory, employment of metaphors of remembrance
(including the description of the common law as an oral tradition),
and changes in what lawyers remembered and how they did so. An
English lawyer of, say, 1620 found lengthy discussions in educational
manuals on the cultivation of memory, with digressions on its
humorial and physiological foundations. Constructing and challenging
lineages of local and constitutional customs extending back beyond
memory into "immemorial" antiquity occupied his practice. So did
discovering and assessing local remembered law. His colleagues
complained that the recollection of precedents had worn away at a
salutary reliance on "reason" and general principles. Through his
participation in the burgeoning study of legal antiquarianism, he
offered a distinct style of access into the national past and com-
manded a key route back into England's medieval and Saxon
heritage. He imagined his lawbooks as extensions of porous memory
1. Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, rev. ed. (New York,
1983). Williams championed the historical study of "keywords." He explored the intellectual
lineage-the rise, fall, and overlaying of meanings-of such terms as democracy, genius, liberty,
pragmatic, romantic, and violence, to name a few. Ever in flux, keywords surprise their users,
as much in their ascent and descent as in their proliferating implications. Williams quoted an
eighteenth-century letter: "What ... is the meaning of the word sentimental, so much in vogue
among the polite ... ? Everything clever and agreeable is comprehended in that word .... I
am frequently astonished to hear such a one is a sentimental man; we were a sentimental party;
I have been taking a sentimental walk." Williams, Keywords, 16. Following Williams's lead,
Daniel Rodgers has inquired into the keywords of American politics, though putting the
spotlight less on genealogy than on forensics. How were political concepts like utility or natural
rights used-for what ends, with what appropriations, with what consequences? Daniel T.
Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics Since Independence (New York,
1987), esp. 3-16 (for Rodgers's methodological ambitions).
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and strove to improve the movement of knowledge between
remembrance and text. For this he compared pedagogic schemes, with
their attendant philosophical justifications, competing in the "Method
Wars" underway in late Renaissance Europe. Out of such disparate
political, intellectual, pedagogical, and professional elements; out of
lawbook design and constitutional argument, the appropriation of the
logician Peter Ramus and classical tropes of recollection, the
operation of venire facias writs and sewer commissions-out of all this
crystallized memorial culture. It was a configuration of many pieces.
This Article explores and conjoins element after element to show
their common participation in a whole. The relationship among them
is associative more than chronological and causal (though, to be sure,
timing and cause inform each of the topically organized parts). As we
shall see, the effect of print on the learning exercises of the Inns of
Court did not precede or cause immemorialist constitutional ar-
gument, which did not precede or cause the impact of Ramism or the
Method Wars, which did not precede or cause local memory
"brokering" or legal antiquarianism, and so on. To transpose this
essentially synchronic approach to a visual image, memorial culture
appears as a lattice. Sensibilities favoring "lumpers" over "splitters,"
Julia Child over Martha Stewart, will feel most at home here.
Consider, by way of comparison, the concept of "standardization"
in the early decades of the twentieth century. That was a time
simultaneously bewitched and appalled by standardized industrial
production; standardized labor routines; standardized, reproducible
cultural products (films, phonographic records, advertising); standard-
ized treatment of recruits during the Great War; standardization in
the urban public schools; and so on. The experience of standardization
in one realm (say, factory production) made standardization in other
realms (say, education or entertainment) seem more natural, or more
irritating. Men and women perceived themselves living through an
Age of Standardization in a way their grandparents had not, and we,
their grandchildren, no longer do, standardization having become our
expectation. 2 "Memory," this Article contends, similarly organized
2. This style of syncretism mixes seemingly unconnected bits of the past into a new and, one
hopes, revealing pattern, the alluring ambiguity of the method serving as a heuristic and
scholarly catalyst. This method does have its perils. An historian might chase merely phonetic
associations. Imagine a paper claiming a cultural prominence for the concept "cold" in 1950s
America, citing frequent references to "Cold War," "cold cream," "cold fronts," and "cold
coffee." But the danger of abuse does not invalidate the core insight: that historical actors
assumed affinities among the uses of a concept in different contexts, the deployment of the
concept in one arena influencing its meaning elsewhere and changing the connotations and felt
importance of the term. Legal cultures typically have such words of diverse and energizing
meaning, identifying problems or challenges with multiple ramifications-perhaps "equality" and
"efficiency" in recent decades, "legal science" and "class justice" a century ago.
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diverse realms of thought and experience for the late-Elizabethan and
early-Stuart lawyer.
One of this Article's key sources, Francis Bacon, advocated
definition by negation, the clarification of what a thing is by the
specification of what it is not.3 My study of memorial culture is not
two things the reader might suspect. First, much recent intellectual
history has explored how states and communities remember the past.
What do monuments, textbooks, parades, anthems, and participants'
stories recall, distort, and elide about a critical event-the Holocaust,
the founding of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the French Wars of
Religion, Masada, the American Revolution?4 By contrast, this
Article asks in what ways memory was central to legal culture, not
how lawyers "memorialized" an important incident. Second, I do not
explore the distinctive political and social structures and habits of
mind that new forms of communication engender-as when writing
pervades a formerly oral society, or print enters a mixed verbal and
manuscript culture.5
To be sure, the increasing influence of legal publishing plays an
important role in my story. Between 1500 and 1700, lawyers relied on
a combination of speech, manuscript, and print, with the latter
growing in importance over the period. The years after 1590 saw a
large increase in the number, variety, and accessibility of printed
lawbooks.6 As print slowly began displacing oral tradition and
recollection as a repository of the law in the latter sixteenth century,
as legal knowledge moved from instantiation in distinguished persons
to encapsulation in printed texts, the configuration of "memorial
culture" began crystallizing partly in response. At the center of this
3. Francis Bacon, "Reading on the Statute of Uses" [MS 1600], in The Works of Francis
Bacon, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath (London, 1858-74),
7:398.
4. Of this vast literature, a few personal favorites include: David M. Scobey, "Revising the
Errand: New England's Ways and the Puritan Sense of the Past," William and Mary Quarterly
41 (1984): 3-31; Diane C. Margolf, "Adjudicating Memory: Law and Religious Difference in
Seventeenth-Century France," Sixteenth Century Journal 27 (1996): 399-418; Alfred Young,
"George Robert Twelves Hewes (1742-1840): A Boston Shoemaker and the Memory of the
American Revolution," William and Mary Quarterly 38 (1981): 561-623; Yosef Hayin
Yerushalmi, Zakhor, Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle, 1982).
5. Superb studies in this vein include: M.T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record:
England, 1066-1307, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1993); Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an
Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe, 2
vols. (Cambridge, 1979); Jack Goody and Ian Watt, "The Consequences of Literacy," in Literacy
in Traditional Societies, ed. Jack Goody (Cambridge, 1968); Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing
and the Organization of Society (Cambridge, 1986); Brian Stock, The Implications of Literacy:
Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton,
1983).
6. See Richard J. Ross, "The Commoning of the Common Law: The Renaissance Debate
over Printing English Law, 1520-1640," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 146 (1998): 323-
461.
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Article lies this two-sided development: that memory's growing
salience and complexity as a cultural discourse ran parallel to its
diminishing importance as a carrier of legal knowledge, with print
contributing to both parts of the process.
To perceive a memorial culture among early modern English
lawyers is to contribute both to legal history and to the flourishing
scholarship on the relation of communications and intellectual life in
early modern Europe. Indeed, it is to revise both. Most legal
historians assume that law moved from a largely oral system in Anglo-
Saxon England, to the mixed oral and manuscript system of the
Middle Ages, to the combined oral, manuscript, and print system of
the early modern period, to the ascension of print, and finally toward
the growing role of electronic media at the close of the twentieth
century. This model assumes successive stages of legal com-
munications, later ones working in tandem with and increasingly
superseding earlier ones. Whether scholars focus on the social and
political structures, or mentalities, engendered by distinctive forms of
communication,7 or whether they probe the terms of interaction
among different media,' they have presupposed a forward movement
along this axis. Yet the decline of memory and oral tradition as
carriers of legal knowledge went hand in hand with, indeed provoked,
the development of a cultural discourse of memory. These disparate
trajectories suggest the methodological importance of separating for
heuristic purposes the functional and cultural sides of forms of legal
communications. Doing so complicates the commonly assumed
forward movement of legal communications from anterior to later
stages.
To the student of intellectual history, memorial culture might be
written about, or written off, as an effervescence of theorizing about
the fading oral tradition within the law. The phenomenon is familiar.
As colonies revolt or are on the verge of independence, the
metropolis erects Pharaonic administrative buildings, commissions
7. As examples of this approach, see M. Ethan Katsh, The Electronic Media and the
Transformation of Law (Oxford, 1989); Goody and Watt, "The Consequences of Literacy";
Goody, The Logic of Writing; Walter J. Ong, Ramus: Method, and the Decay of Dialogue
(Cambridge, Mass., 1958); id., Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of
Expression and Culture (Ithaca, 1971); Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record (on the
"literate mentality"); Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, "Paratexts," Stanford Law
Review 44 (1992): 509-52.
8. As examples of this approach, see Harold Love, Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century
England (Oxford, 1993); Stock, Implications of Literacy; Mary J. Carruthers, The Book of
Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge, 1990); Michael Warner, The
Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth Century America
(Cambridge, Mass., 1990); Adam Fox, "Custom, Memory and the Authority of Writing," in The
Experience of Authority in Early Modern England, ed. Paul Griffiths, Adam Fox, and Steve
Hindle (New York, 1996), 89-116.
Ross
5
Ross: The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1998
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 229
monuments to empire builders, and links its imperial to its national
identity. Hymns to the face-to-face community, and celebration of the
nation as a "community of communities," are sung out at the
perceived death of the community every thirty years or so. But
memorial culture was no mere Indian summer, still less a eulogy. For
it offers a new way to categorize early modern English legal culture.
To ask what was distinctive about Elizabethan and early-Stuart
English legal culture is to reveal a number of answers, of storylines,
proposed by scholars. Institutional and doctrinal historians have
stressed the revivification of the sixteenth-century common law from
late-medieval lassitude. The courts, engaging in intense competition
for business, provided a host of new pleading fictions and remedies
against the backdrop of a more active and commercialized land
market, fiscal feudalism, severe inflation, and growing domestic and
overseas trade.9 The common law reinforced, eliminated, and
reshaped local prescriptive rights, particularly of property and
governance. It provided the terrain on which Englishmen contested
alternative conceptions of these rights.1" The decades around 1600
appear as a key period in the "rise of the bar," the socioeconomic and
political ascent of the legal profession. 1 The Whig interpretation of
English constitutionalism held up the common law as "a barrier
against absolutism," to borrow Charles Mcllwain's most forthright
phrasing."t Defined jurisprudentially against Continental civil and
canon law and extended historically into Saxon antiquity, the common
9. John Baker spoke of the "internal revolution" of the sixteenth-century common law. John
Baker, ed., The Reports of Sir John Spelman, Selden Society, vol. 94 (London, 1978), esp. 46.
See also S.E. Thorne, "Tudor Social Transformation and Legal Change," in Essays in English
Legal History (London, 1985), 197-210.
10. See, e.g., Christopher Hill, "Customary Liberties and Legal Rights," ch. 2 of Liberty
Against the Law: Some Seventeenth-Century Controversies (New York, 1996); id., "Forests and
Venison, Game Laws and Poachers," ch. 7 of Liberty Against the Law; Eric Kerridge, Agrarian
Problems in the Sixteenth Century and After (New York, 1969), esp. 54-114; Richard Hoyle, ed.,
The Estates of the English Crown, 1558-1640 (Cambridge, 1992); Roger B. Manning, "The
Purlieu Men and the Ancient Constitution," ch. 4 of Hunters and Poachers: A Social and
Cultural History of Unlawful Hunting in England, 1485-1640 (Oxford, 1993); id., Village Revolts:
Social Protest and Popular Disturbances in England, 1509-1640 (Oxford, 1988), esp. 132-54
(conflicts over customary land tenures and rents); Buchanan Sharp, In Contempt of All
Authority: Rural Artisans and Riot in the West of England, 1586-1660 (Berkeley, 1980), esp. 175-
200 (mining law); David Levine and Keith Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society:
Whickham, 1560-1765 (Oxford, 1991), 117-34 (copyholders versus coal miners).
11. Wilfred R. Prest, The Rise of the Barristers: A Social History of the English Bar, 1590-
1640 (Oxford, 1986); C.W. Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth: The "Lower
Branch" of the Legal Profession in Early Modern England (Cambridge, 1986).
12. Charles H. McIlwain, "The English Common Law, Barrier against Absolutism,"
American Historical Review 49 (1943): 23-31. For more sophisticated and nuanced versions of
this interpretation, see Margaret A. Judson, "Parliament Defends Rights, the Law, and the
Constitution," ch. 6 of The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essay in Constitutional and Political
Thought in England, 1603-1645 (New Brunswick, 1988 [1949]); Charles Ogilvie, "The Direct
Attack on the King's Government," ch. 17 of The King's Government and the Common Law,
1471-1641 (Oxford, 1958).
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law fostered a sense of English distinctiveness and hence national
identity. 3 Turning from creation to containment, it deflected and
domesticated challenges from civilians, Protestant Biblicists, and
humanists; from populist or proto-Leveller critiques of the "Norman
Yoke"; and from the critical rather than apologetic or illustrative uses
of Continental philology and historicism."
The construct of memorial culture offers another way to periodize
English law by identifying an early modern "custodial moment." To
speak of a custodial moment is to identify a distinctive phase in the
sensibility of legal culture that adds to, rather than supersedes, these
other narratives. Custodianship has always been central to the
precedent-based common law. Yet the increasing salience and
theoretical sophistication of memory-talk in its various forms coupled
with the growing awareness of legal mutability and loss attending late-
Renaissance historicism changed custodianship. It became not only a
necessity but an intellectual problematic. By the eighteenth century,
an Enlightenment rhetoric of purifying law of inherited "barbarities"
made guardianship of tradition a more contested stance. The early
modern custodial moment stood between uncongenial late-medieval
and Enlightenment periods. This argument, only hinted at here, will
be developed in the concluding part of this Article.15
13. Richard Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England (Chicago,
1992), 63-101; Christopher Hill, "Sir Edward Coke-Myth-Maker," in Intellectual Origins of the
English Revolution (Oxford, 1991), 257-58; Charles M. Gray, The Writ of Prohibition:
Jurisdiction in Early Modern English Law, 2 vols. (New York, 1994), 1:22-24; Peter Goodrich,
"Poor Illiterate Reason: History, Nationalism and Common Law," Social and Legal Studies 1
(1992): 7-28.
14. Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood, 63-101; Brian P. Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England,
1603-1641: A Political Study (Oxford, 1973), 140-50; Peter Goodrich, Languages of Law: From
Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks (London, 1990), esp. 70-71, 82-89, 112-13.
15. Peter Goodrich has also underscored the "custodial" ambitions of the early modern
common law tradition, though our accounts differ significantly. To Goodrich, the common law's
self-conception as a "system of memories" suppressed a critical account of the changes and
ambiguities of its real past, memory serving "as the means of forgetting." The common law
monographs and jurisprudential texts proliferating in the early seventeenth century were "signs"
or "representations" of an underlying oral tradition, understandable only to its professional
initiates. This purposely nonrevelatory writing, and its accompanying "apologetic and defensive"
jurisprudence, arose in reaction to popular printed criticism of the law's inaccessibility and
deflected the systematizing ambitions of Continental philosophy and civilian jurisprudence.
Goodrich, Languages of Law, esp. vii, 70-72, 87, 112. Goodrich's argument recalls Richard
Helgerson's perception of the looming influence of Justinian's Institutes and the civilian tradition
of systematized ratio scripta upon Coke, Davies, Cowell, Fulbeck, Dodderidge, and other
lawbook writers around 1600. Coke in particular produced "a writing against the written, a
writing against the Roman imperial tradition and all that it stood for," a writing that
presupposed and maintained the primacy of oral tradition. Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood, 63-
101, esp. 100.
My constructions of "memorial culture" and the "custodial moment" in jurisprudence build
upon Goodrich's and Helgerson's work but ultimately describe different phenomena. First,
Goodrich is interested in jurisprudence, the structure and ambitions of legal thought. I have
pursued the relationship of lawyers to memory across a wide range of activities: antiquarian
writing, constitutional politics, local memory brokering, styles of courtroom argument, legal
7
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Part I of this Article explores the contours of memorial culture.
Part II attends to a likely objection: Was memorial culture but a
continuation of medieval practice? Beginning here and continuing for
the rest of the Article, the distinctiveness of late-Elizabethan and
early-Stuart memorial culture emerges through comparison to legal
culture a century away on either side, around 1500 and around 1700.
Part III inquires after the forensic advantages of emphasizing
memory. Part IV develops the concept of a "custodial moment" and
suggests the historiographical and jurisprudential implications of this
Article.
I. THE LINEAMENTS OF MEMORIAL CULTURE: MEMORY IN
ENGLISH LEGAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE
Tracing the multifarious appearances and interrelationships of
memory talk and practice in early modern English legal culture is akin
to viewing the different facets of a gem. Not only does no one
perspective allow sight of the whole, but no one facet is the logical
place to begin. It is the very turning from facet to facet that suggests
the connections and the complexity. But a starting point is necessary.
John Davies's depiction of lawyers as specialists in remembrance
presents a point of entry into the role of memory in early modern
legal culture and allows movement from one view of the problem to
another, the task of Part I of this Article.
A. Lawyers as Remembrancers
The subtlety of logicians, the wisdom of philosophers, the words of
poets, the memory of lawyers.
-Edward Waterhouse, Fortescutus Illustratus (1663)16
education, and legal literature design as well as jurisprudence. I have taken legal thought as an
element of the wider category of "legal culture." Second, Goodrich keeps his focus on early
modem jurisprudence. By contrast, I have tried to show the distinctiveness of Elizabethan and
early Stuart memorial culture comparatively: first, by alluding to mnemonic practices outside the
law; and second, by comparison to the late Middle Ages, the baseline for charting early modern
developments. Third, Goodrich's lawyers embraced a custodial relationship to law in opposition
to a critical, interpretive, or historicist understanding of it. Their "insular tradition" was
deadening; the ambition of their "legal dogmatics" was to repress challenges. By contrast, my
construct of memorial culture highlights not only the suppressions possible in remembering but
the creative forensics it empowered (as in assessing ancient constitution(s) and local memory
brokering) and the disseminations of law that it encouraged (as in legal antiquarianism and the
implied popular "interiorization" of a lex non scripta). For Goodrich, by contrast, the common
law "tradition is one of decay; it exists not as an historical form but as the decaying sense of the
institution, a mute pattern of emulation and of imitation." Goodrich, Languages of Law, 68, vii-
viii.
16. Edward Waterhouse, Fortescutus Illustratus: or, Commentary on that Nervous Treatise
De Laudibus Legum Angliae (1663), 142. Waterhouse here recounted Cicero's requirements for
an orator in book one of De Oratore.
8
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol10/iss2/1
19981
The common law, wrote John Davies in the preface to his Irish
Reports (1615), was a law "preserved in the memory of man," its
books "but comments or interpretations" upon an underlying
tradition. In whose memory did this unwritten law reside? Davies
gave two answers in some tension. As the "common custom of the
realm ... consisting in use and practice," the common law "can be
recorded and registered nowhere but in the memory of the people."
Yet the lawyers also "kept in memory the rules of the law."" For
if no man knew the form of pleading or the course of proceeding
in the law, what would become of the public justice in a short
time? Or how should the benefit of the Law be derived and com-
municated unto the people?... Therefore though Jupiter... did
first invent and give the law, yet was Mercury sent with that
heavenly gift, to deliver it over unto mankind. So as it is
manifest, that without the ministry of these Mercuries,...
namely the learned professors thereof, there can be no use or ap-
plication of the law, and consequently the law or justice it self
cannot consist without them. 18
The legal profession was not only a teacher but an archive, retaining
"in memory the best antiquities of our nation," preserving "ancient
customs and form of government."
[I]s not a worthy Professor of the Law a Star in the firmament of
the Commonwealth? Is he not lux in tenebris wheresoever he
dwells? Is not his house as it were an oracle, not only to a town
or city, but to a whole country.19
Davies's preface displayed a double artfulness. First, he made legal
remembering an honorable calling. It need not have been. Lawyers
often treated mnemonics as a necessary craft of no particular nobility,
a matter of repetition, proper diet, commonplacing, and organization.
Critics of the profession saw its perishable "moth-eaten decrees" and
"old prescriptions laid up in the trench/ of rusty time" as a sad
counterpoint to the eternal law of love emanating from God.2" The
remembering lawyer fought against the oblivion of time, and all in the
service of records of strife, preserved in "peddler's French," as the
poet Roger Tisdale acidly put it.21 But Davies's barristers, weighed
down with prescriptions and decrees, perhaps absent the moths,
17. John Davies, preface to Irish Reports [1615], in The Complete Works in Verse and




20. Roger Tisdale, The Lawyers Philosophy: or Law Brought to Light. Poetized in a Divine
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became tutors and archives. Lawyers used to hearing themselves
described as parasites and stokers of discord learned that popular
knowledge of the law, indeed its very preservation, depended on their
teaching it. While pleasant to hear, this was in some tension with
Davies's placement of the law "nowhere but in the memory of the
people." Yet it served a purpose, for by making lawyers "conduits"
to the people instead of surveyors of a law generated by them, Davies
deradicalized the latent populism of having a customary common law
"recorded and registered" among the people. Finally, lauding lawyers
as an archive of governmental antiquities gave them the interpretive
privilege of custodianship, an important advantage as late-Elizabethan
politics took an historical turn.
Second, Davies imagined remembering as a political and intellectual
duty, an office or calling of the profession as well as a burden for the
individual lawyer. From the Middle Ages through Davies's day, of
course, practitioners put great effort into remembering. Their
mnemonic verses survive at the end of monographs. They entered
Chaucer's poetry in the person of a serjeant who knew every statute
"pleyn by rote.'22 They collectively recalled the course of the royal
courts, their "common erudition," and a distinctive legal "reason."
Yet Davies conceived of lawyers as an order of remembrancers with
social and political as well as professional responsibilities, custodians
of civic history and wisdom as well as legal craft. 3 They preserved
a national customary law of popular birth, retained the "genius" or
mores of a people legally expressed, and maintained antiquities as a
route into national history (indeed, were themselves "oracles"). This
broad understanding of a remembrancing profession plays little role
in the work of leading jurisprudential writers from 1450 to 1550 such
as John Fortescue, Christopher St. German, John Hales, Thomas
Elyot, and Thomas Starkey. It was a rhetorical artifact of Elizabethan
and early-Stuart legal culture. 4
22. J.H. Baker, ed. A Catalogue of English Legal Manuscripts in Cambridge University
Library (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1996), xxvi-xxix; id., occasional notations on selected manuscripts
in English Legal Manuscripts in the United States of America: A Descriptive List, 2 vols. (London,
1985); Geoffrey Chaucer, Canterbury Tales, bk. 1, line 327, in The Complete Poetry and Prose
of Geoffrey Chaucer, ed. John H. Fisher (New York, 1977).
23. By "remembrancer" I do not mean the official attached to the City of London and the
Exchequer. Rather, I mean a person or group that views the retaining and interpreting of
memories as central to their jobs, identity, and social role.
24. These writers praised lawyers as educators, bridges between center and periphery, and
mediators between disparate sources of law but not as remembrancers in the way Davies
suggested. John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae [In Praise of the Laws of England] [MS
c.1468-71], ed. S.B. Chrimes (Cambridge, 1942); Christopher St. German, Doctor and Student;
or, Dialogues Between a Doctor of Divinity, and A Student in the Laws of England [1523-31], ed.
T.F.T. Plucknett and J.L. Barton, Selden Society, vol. 91 (London, 1974); John Hale[s], "Oration
in Commendation of Laws" [MS c.1540], MS LC 14:32.1, Free Library of Philadelphia, Carson
Collection; Thomas Elyot, The Book Named the Governour [1531], ed. R.C. Alston (London,
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Why did it become popular and plausible, then? Three develop-
ments in English legal thought and practice, usually considered
separately, combined to encourage Davies's lawyers to imagine
themselves a caste of remembrancers. In the decades between 1570
and 1640, lawyers increasingly investigated, assessed, and "brokered"
local remembered law and served as intermediaries between these
manor and parish recollections and the national tribunals in London.
They were specialists in generating and contesting immemorial
pedigrees within constitutional argument and in providing ancient
ancestors for existing rules and institutions. And they participated as
readers, writers, and documentary guardians in a politicized legal anti-
quarianism that reconstructed the past in a distinctive fashion.
1. Legal Antiquarianism: Styles and Routes of Access into the Past
There "is no study or learning so fit and necessary for a lawyer, as
the study of antiquities," wrote the barrister William Burton in his
Description of Leicestershire (1622) .25 The importance of anti-
quarianism within late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart legal culture has
been argued by two generations of historians of historiography, of
political thought, and of law.26 A few reminders from that scholar-
ship are in order before offering some fresh observations on the style
of access into the past that legal antiquarianism offered, and on how,
specifically, it figured lawyers as remembrancers.
During the sixteenth century, Tudor lawyers became more
concerned with explaining the historical origins and development of
the law. The late-fifteenth century bar perpetuated medieval fantasies
in their yearbooks and Readings (Inns of Court lectures). Julius
Caesar's contemporaries, they said, heard common pleas at the Tower
of London; Aeneas's great-grandson Brutus established the Marshal-
sea as the first royal court; nay, the common law was as old as the
created world.27 Thomas Littleton's Tenures (1481) did not discuss
1907); Thomas Starkey, A Dialogue Between Reginald Pole and Thomas Lupset [MS 1533], ed.
K.M. Burton (London, 1948).
25. William Burton, "To the Reader," in Description of Leicestershire (1622), [9].
26. On the intensification and political use of antiquarian studies in the late sixteenth
century, see, for example, J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study
of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century, rev. ed. (Cambridge, 1987); F. Smith
Fussner, The Historical Revolution: English Historical Writing and Thought, 1580-1640 (New
York, 1962), 92-104, 118-43, 275-98; F.J. Levy, Tudor Historical Thought (San Marino, 1967), 79-
166; Kevin Sharpe, Sir Robert Cotton, 1586-1631: History and Politics in Early Modern England
(Oxford, 1979); D.R. Woolf, The Idea of History in Early Stuart England: Erudition, Ideology,
and "The Light of Truth" from the Accession of James I to the Civil War (Toronto, 1990), 35-44,
200-42; Graham Parry, The Trophies of Time: English Antiquarians of the Seventeenth Century
(Oxford, 1995), 130-56; Herbert Butterfield, The Englishman and His History (Cambridge, 1944),
31-40.
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how the law he so carefully recounted had come to be. Nor did
Readings of the same period. 8 By the opening of the seventeenth
century, however, historical accounts of customs, laws, and institutions
had become common features of legal lectures, treatises, and par-
liamentary and judicial arguments. They ranged from the densely
argued tracts of John Selden to perfunctory three-paragraph leaps
from Eden to Elizabeth. The humanist attention to original sources,
etymology, anachronism, and the compilation and critical examination
of records provided the foundation for this historical turn in legal as
well as in political and religious writing. The fashionable image of
antiquarian studies after the publication of William Camden's
Britannia (1586) helped too, particularly among the au courant gentry
trained in humanist secondary schools who entered the Elizabethan
Inns of Court.29
Lawyers were disproportionately active among Elizabethan and
early-Stuart antiquarian and historical writers. They produced town
annals, county chorographies, and regnal histories.3" About thirty of
the forty members of the London-based Society of Antiquaries spent
time at the Inns of Court.3 Along with antiquaries, politicians,
bureaucrats, and ambassadors, lawyers copied and abridged historical
records, corresponded about documents of mutual concern, and made
use of Robert Cotton's unparalleled library of manuscripts. The
"search of records and other exotic monuments of antiquity, being the
most ravishing and satisfying part of human knowledge," Simonds
D'Ewes filled his diary with his pursuits of the Doomsday Book and
Fleta, plea rolls and parliamentary journals.32 On "Thursday, the 4th
day of September, in the afternoon, I first began studying records at
the Tower of London," he recalled of his 1623 baptism in
parchment.33 In the archives of the Tower and the four treasuries at
28. See, e.g., the Readings collected in Samuel E. Thorne, ed., Readings and Moots at the
Inns of Court in the Fifteenth Century, vol. 1, Selden Society, Publications 71 (London, 1954).
29. Henry Peacham expected his "compleat gentleman" to read histories and understand
antiquities (coins, statues, and inscriptions) as well as pursue music, poetry, fishing and
soldiering. Henry Peacham, Compleat Gentleman [1634 ed.], ed. G.S. Gordon (Oxford, 1906),
esp. ch. 12. See generally Woolf, The Idea of History, 24-25.
30. Prest, Rise of the Barristers, 195-200, 207.
31. From 1586 to 1608, the lawyers, heralds, churchmen and gentry of the Society collected
and critically examined documentary records to explain the beginnings and progress of English
institutions, offices, and customs. Members of the Society admitted to the Inns of Court included
such luminaries as: Francis Bacon, William Camden, Simonds D'Ewes, John Davies, John
Dodderidge, William Fleetwood, William Lambard, James Ley, John Selden, Henry Spelman,
and James Whitelocke. See R.J. Schoeck, "The Elizabethan Society of Antiquaries and Men of
the Law," Notes and Queries 199 (1954): 417-21; Fussner, Historical Revolution, 93-99; Prest, Rise
of the Barristers, 196-97; Mary McKisack, Medieval History in the Tudor Age (Oxford, 1971), ch.
7.
32. Simonds D'Ewes, The Autobiography and Correspondence of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, ed.
James Orchard Halliwell (London, 1845), 1:197.
33. Two years later he was slipping out of Common Pleas, when his interest flagged, to
12
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol10/iss2/1
19981 Ross
Westminister, energetic keepers-several of them lawyers-organized
and calendared the locked chests and bags thrown into corners to
make the national records more accessible to researchers.3" After
1580, antiquarian studies became increasingly politicized. Jurisdictional
conflicts among common law, ecclesiastical, and prerogative tribunals,
the debate over the uneasy compromises in the Church of England,
and tensions between parliamentary opponents of royal policies and
the Crown all called forth antiquarian support for disputing positions.
As F Smith Fussner has observed, the "argument from records
became the characteristic form of English political debate.
' 35
The growing presence and political importance of legal anti-
quarianism naturally brought out the recollective calling of the bar.
But beyond this general, if important, connection-perhaps overdeter-
mined at a time when educators could hardly forebear citing the
Ciceronian fusion of history with the life of memory-the specific
methodological commitments of legal antiquarianism reinforced the
emerging image of lawyers as remembrancers. "Antiquarian" studies
defined themselves in relation and in opposition to "historical" writing
as those categories were understood in the Renaissance.36 In com-
mon with other antiquarians, lawyers emphasized the unearthing and
examination of records in the service of correcting and supplementing
rather than reordering and polishing received historical accounts.37
transcribe Cotton's bountiful stores. Ibid., 1:235; see generally on his study of records, ibid.,
1:268-69, 293-94, 300, 406, 409, 418-19, 431; and ibid., 2:73, 77-78, 80, 83, 87, 90-91, 94-95, 101,
105. For another look at a lawyer transcribing records, see Bulstrode Whitelocke, The Diary of
Bulstrode Whitelocke, 1605-1675, ed. Ruth Spalding (Oxford, 1990), 108, 112, 204.
34. Thomas Powell, in the preface to The Repertory of Records, by Arthur Agard (1631),
offers a priceless glimpse at the state of the national records: "There is a little room adjoining
to the same courts, wherein are three chests, in which are records placed, viz. the first chest next
to the door, contains pleadings of quo warranto .. .and placita corona, and placita de iur ......
"[I]n the second treasury, which is in the palace of Westminster locked with three locks, and
containing one room or chamber, there are these records placed in presses of wainscot, viz. in
a press on the right hand, in the middle, a black bag, entitled, 'concerning the insurrection of
Yorkshire,' being within a bag entitled, 'treasons."' Ibid. On the reorganization of the national
records during the reigns of Elizabeth and the early Stuarts, see McKisack, Medieval History,
ch. 4; R.B. Wernham, "The Public Records in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in
English Historical Scholarship in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. Levi Fox (Oxford,
1956), 11-30; Fussner, Historical Revolution, 33-34, 69-82.
35. Fussner, Historical Revolution, 83. The debate over impositions in the 1610 parliament
provides a good example of this phenomenon, especially the speeches by Hedley, Dodderidge,
Hobart, James Whitelocke, and Heneage Finch. See ibid.; Levy, Tudor Historical Thought, 165-
66; Arthur B. Ferguson, Clio Unbound: Perceptions of the Social and Cultural Past in the English
Renaissance (Durham, N.C., 1979), 30-32.
36. My definition of antiquarianism relies on Woolf, Idea of History, 18. See also J.G.A.
Pocock, "The Sense of History in Renaissance England," in William Shakespeare: His World,
His Work, His Influence, ed. John F. Andrews (New York, 1985), 156.
37. William Lambard compared an antiquary digging in "old books hoarded up in corners"
to a miner uncovering ore "within the bowels of the earth" for smelting into usable metal. He
left the fashioning of the metal into crafts to the ingenuity of the antiquary's readers. William
Lambard, preface to A Perambulation of Kent, 3d ed. [c.1596-1640] (Bath, 1970), v.
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The historian's duty of offering rhetorically powerful moral lessons
and analyses of exemplary conduct, inherited from classical forebears
and models, was not part of the antiquary's calling. Concentrating on
the commencement and early development of offices, institutions, and
customs, they downplayed social and political roots and consequences.
The organizing characteristics that in combination distinguished
legal antiquarianism, rather than the ones it shared with other
antiquarian and historical studies, figured it as a special project or
style of remembrance. These characteristics emerge through com-
parison to other kinds of antiquarianism and forms of access into the
national past-chronicles, heraldry, genealogy, and church, regnal, and
"politic" history.38 To begin with, legal antiquarianism employed
nonprovidential causation, in contrast to its ecclesiastical cousin. In
support of the Church of England's polemical claims against its
Catholic adversaries, scholars from Matthew Parker and John Foxe to
James Ussher sifted through ecclesiastical antiquities to recover, or
invent, a largely autonomous church in Romano-Britain and Saxon
England developing with minimal guidance and less corruption from
the pope.39 Bishop James Ussher's A Discourse of the Religion
Anciently Professed by the Irish and British (1623), for example,
marshalled "records of the former ages" to witness that the British
and Irish before the Norman Conquest maintained the essentially
Augustinian theology that the present Church of England restored.n'
The ecclesiastical antiquities that Ussher carefully assembled
illuminated, as so many irregularly spaced torches, the church
traveling a path through time chosen by God. Working within the
providential historical scheme laid out by John Foxe at the opening
of Acts and Monuments [The Book of Martyrs] (1563), Ussher
imagined the progress of Christianity as a movement through a series
of divinely ordained stages from primitive purity through decay and
papal contamination to Reformation and toward the Millennium.at
In Britain as on the Continent, Ussher wrote, "corruptions did creep
38. I have excluded foreign histories since I am concentrating on the English past.
39. In the paragraphs that follow, I treat ecclesiastical antiquarians who wrote on behalf of
the Church of England rather than for Catholics, Puritans, or Separatists.
40. James Ussher, A Discourse of the Religion Anciently Professed by the Irish and British
[1631; originally printed, 1623], in The Whole Works of the Most Rev. James Ussher, ed. Charles
R. Elrington (Dublin, 1864), 4:235-381, esp. 238-39 ("[T]he religion professed by the an-
cient ... Christians in this land, was for substance the very same with that which now by public
authority is maintained therein, against the foreign doctrine brought in thither in latter times by
the bishop of Rome's followers. I speak of the more substantial points of doctrine, that are in
controversy betwixt the Church of Rome and us at this day" such as predestination, grace, free
will, works, justification, sanctification, purgatory, and the clergy's permission to marry).
41. John Foxe, Acts and Monuments [1563] (New York, 1965), 1:viii (ecclesiastical history
gives "examples of God's might working in his church, to the confirmation of their faith, and the
edification of Christian life"). On Foxe's historical schema, see ibid., 1:xix-xxiv.
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in by little and little, before the devil was let loose to procure that
seduction which prevailed so generally in these last times."4 Anti-
quities allowed a glimpse of the divine plan. And not only in church
history. Providence also guided the events recounted in chronicles and
humanist-inspired regnal histories. The victory of Henry VII that
ended the War of the Roses was, in the estimation of Polydore Vergil,
"an event of which foreknowledge had been possible."43 Eight
centuries before, an "apparition with a heavenly appearance" had
predicted the ascension of the Tudor dynasty to Cadwallader, last
king of the Britons.'
Legal antiquarianism, by contrast, traced man's doings rather than
God's. Legal antiquarians never explicitly denied God's providential
role in ordering history, so their studies, at some foundational level,
were of "secondary causes." Yet unlike ecclesiastical antiquarianism
and church history and unlike the chronicles and political histories
organized by reigns, God's putative direction of affairs remained
unconsidered, leaving charters, deeds, and monarchs alone on the
surface of the page. The contentions of Jesus and Antichrist pressing
church history forward did not drive the development of Kentish
gavelkind or Cornish mining law in Lambard's Perambulation and
Camden's Britannia; the hand of Providence that lifted Henry VII
over Richard III at Bosworth field and the English fleet over the
Spanish Armada did not shape the progress of Spelman's admiralty
jurisdiction or Coke's copyhold tenure.45 Muting the providential
underpinnings of legal development underscored its factitious charac-
ter. The actors in legal antiquarianism-kings, parliaments, judges,
lawmaking communities-were not borne along on a divine plan. The
realm made its common custom, Kent its gavelkind, localities their
borough-English and estover customs. To the legal antiquarian, God's
revealed law and His natural law stood as boundaries or as a distant
font of original principles that were, in John Selden's parlance,
"limited" and defined by the positive laws communities adopted in
the wide sphere of legal adiaphora.46
42. Ussher, "Discourse," 238. On the appropriation of Foxe's historical schema by Ussher
and other advocates of the Church of England, see Parry, Trophies of Time, 141-42; F.J. Levy,
Tudor Historical Thought, 97-105.
43. Polydore Vergil, The Anglica Historia ofPolydore Vergil [1534], ed. Denys Hay, Camden
Society Publications, series 3, vol. 74 (London, 1950), 5.
44. Ibid. Francis Bacon styled Henry VII's defeat of Richard III a "divine revenge." Francis
Bacon, "The History of the Reign of Henry the Seventh" [1622], in Works, 6:27.
45. Henry Spelman, "Of the Admiral-Jurisdiction and the Officers Thereof" in Reliquiae
Spelmannianae: The Posthumous Works of Sir Henry Spelman, Kt., Relating to the Laws and
Antiquities of England (London, 1723), 217-32; Edward Coke, The Complete Copyholder [1630]
(1673), § 32.
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One purpose of Protestant ecclesiastical antiquarianism and history
was to open a window to an ancient moment of purity, shining in the
primitive church tolerably visible in early British Christianity, that the
present church could reclaim. In this mission, ecclesiastical anti-
quarianism and church history resembled the chronicles, the humanist-
inspired regnal histories in the style of Polydore Vergil, and the
"politic" histories concerned with tactical effectiveness in statesman-
ship rather than fidelity to the Christian virtues-for all strove to
display exempla (whether religious, moral or political). Like classical
historians, these various styles of writing about the past held up
models of good and bad conduct, ideals to strive for, and obstacles to
avoid.47 Legal antiquarianism, by contrast, portrayed the normative
rather than the aspirational. It told what Englishmen by law could or
must do rather than what the virtuous, extraordinary, or elect person
should strive to do. From Henry Spelman's careful antiquarian
demonstration that the English system of land tenures arose after the
Conquest, for example, came a lesson, but not one with the godly
aura of imitatio Christi or the grandeur of the hard course of virtii.
Rather, one learned that knights-service tenure did not exist before
the Conquest, so that present-day tenants in ancient demesne could
not hold land by it; they held by socage tenure.48
Because legal antiquarianism's didactic agenda was normative
rather than exemplary, because it used the origins and developments
of an institution, custom, or practice to suggest its current scope and
powers, it characteristically sought continuity in the subject under
study. The hospitality of Abraham and the subtle politics of Rome
could stand as lessons despite the passing away of those civilizations.
But only the existence in the current polity of the peerage's summons
to Parliament or the Lord Chancellor's office gave the early history
of these topics a normative importance. Taking as his province the
early traces of the still living (the Inns of Court, a country manor, the
Star Chamber), the lawyer partly deflected the insinuations of
irrelevance and pedantry whispered about antiquaries of the classical
47. See, e.g., John Foxe, Acts and Monuments [1563], 1:viii (Christian history displays "God's
great mercies and judgments ... in relieving the godly, in bridling the wicked .... [W]herein
is to be seen ... perjuries, extortions, covetous oppression, and fraudulent counsels come to
nought ..... [Tihe observing and noting whereof in histories minister to the readers thereof
wholesome admonitions of life, with experience and wisdom both to know God in his works, and
to work the thing that is godly."); John Hayward, "Dedicatory," in The Lives of the Three
Norman Kings of England (1613), A4r; Hugh Dick, ed., "Thomas Blundeville's The True Order
and Methode of Wryting and Reading Hystories (1574)," Huntington Library Quarterly 3 (1940):
159, 165-66, 168-70; F.J. Levy, Tudor Historical Thought, 7, 9-32, 60-62, 237-85; J.G.A. Pocock,
"The Sense of History," 146.
48. Henry Spelman, "Original of Feuds and Tenures by Knights Service," in Reliquiae
Spelmannianae, 44.
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world, ancient Israel, and Britain and Romano-Britain, whose critics
sniffed about them the scent of the ossuary.49 More than a millen-
nium separated the classical world and ancient Israel from Renais-
sance England, and the upheavals of the Saxon conquest only allowed
for a severely attenuated continuity from the present back into the
(largely mythic) history of Britain.
The legal antiquarians's disparate studies favored a recognizable
plotline. The passage of a statute, formation of a court, or evolution
of a custom in antiquity began a timeline that they pursued into the
present. The first mention of a custom, office, or practice found in
extant documents was taken as evidence of its birth or of an earlier,
unrecorded genesis, its original purpose inferred from the records or
from the intimations of etymology. The antiquarian worked from this
point into the present, noting the existence and function of his subject
in records widely and irregularly spaced in time, touching the stream
of history intermittently like a stone skipping across the face of water.
The whole concoction strongly emphasized continuity over discon-
tinuity by linking origination to current function and by eschewing
development in favor of the formal identity of the subject over time
("the" Marshall, "the" Court of Requests).5 ° The legal antiquarian
in effect treated his subject as an ongoing "essence" with variable
"accidents."51 This was an easier task for him than for his ecclesias-
tical compatriot trying to establish the continuity of the English
49. Coke observed that in the dispute over the jurisdiction of the court of Marshalsea, the
"true original institution and fountain itself lay somewhat deep and obscure, until it was brought
out by antiquity, which has so manifested the true sense of the ancient acts of Parliament....
[A]nd therefore they are worthy of reprehension which condemn or neglect the study of
antiquity (which is ever accompanied with dignity) as a withered and back-looking curiosity."
Edward Coke, preface to Reports, pt. 10 [1614] (London, 1826), xii-xiii. John Selden commented:
"For, as on the one side, it cannot be doubted but that the too studious affectation of bare and
sterile antiquity, which is nothing else but to be exceeding busy about nothing, may soon
descend to a dotage; so on the other, the neglect or only vulgar regard of the fruitful and
precious part of it, which gives necessary light to the present, in matter of state, law, history, and
the understanding of good authors, is but preferring that kind of ignorant infancy, which our
short life alone allows us, before the many ages of former experience and observation .... John
Selden, dedication to Robert Cotton in History of Tithes [1618], in The Works of John Selden
(London, 1726), 3:1067.
50. As representative examples, see John Selden, "A Brief Discourse Touching the Office
of the Lord Chancellor" [MS 1617], in Works, 3:1466-70; id., "The Privileges of the Baronage
of England" [1642], in ibid., 1476-1586; id., "Judicature in Parliament," in ibid., 1588-1660;
Spelman, "Of the Admiral-Jurisdiction," 217-32; Robert Cotton, Cottoni Posthuma: Divers
Choice Pieces of that Renowned Antiquary Sir Robert Cotton, ed. James Howell (1672); and the
essays composed by the Society of Antiquaries collected in Thomas Hearne, ed. A Collection
of Curious Discourses, 2 vols. (London, 1775) (especially John Dodderidge, "Of the Antiquity,
Power... and Proceedings of the High Court of Parliament in England," 1:281-93: Robert
Cotton, "The Antiquity, Authority, and Succession of the High Steward of England," 2:1-12; and
William Camden, "The Antiquity and Office of the Earl Marshall of England," 2:90-103).
51. On "essences" in Renaissance historicism, see Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient
Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642 (University Park, 1993),
13-14.
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national church with Saxon, British, patristic, and apostolic forebears.
To trace the descent of the English church as a national church (an
especially important task given the non-Scriptural, historicist elements
of the Anglican via media) was to confront three challenges: the
limitation on the autonomy of the national churches through their
common pre-Reformation link to Rome; their shared descent from
apostolic Christianity; and the ambiguity of the proper subject for
study because of the threading of the transnational, invisible church
of the elect within the visible churches organized by nation.52 The
legal antiquarian, by contrast, faced no division between the common
subject and the invisible fellowship of the law-worthy to fracture his
focus. To the extent he considered the civil, canon, and trans-
European feudal law, he characteristically treated them as influences
upon the common law rather than as its parents or as the genus to its
species. This facilitated his habit of taking slices of the common law
and polity as distinguishable and internally unified essences with
continuous identities from origins through the present.
Legal antiquarianism, whether organized geographically (as town
memoirs and county studies) or by institution or office (concerning
Parliament, the Court of Requests, the Star Chamber, or the Lord
Chancellor), maintained a "public" rather than a familial or personal
focus. The burgeoning genealogical studies of the latter sixteenth
century, by contrast, plotted the descent of individuals and family
groups. Heraldry traced lineages and honors for the select class of the
armigerous.53 Styling legal antiquarianism "public" invites ter-
minological imprecision. It suggests a greater practical and conceptual
division of the "public" from the "private" in early modern England
than the many imbrications of families, communities, churches,
corporations and the state allowed. Conversely, were heraldic blazons
and armory "private"? Henry Peacham advised young gentlemen to
study them not only as "ornament," but as a tool to assess the
legitimacy of claimants to office and to discover the kin relationships
of the nobility and local gentry that moved politics. 4 Still, the notion
of "public" retains heuristic value in suggesting why the antiquaries'
imagined or implied addressees exceeded their actual readership.
52. In this more complicated fashion, ecclesiastical antiquarians and historians needed to
demonstrate the continuity of the Church of England with apostolic and patristic forebears to
rebut Catholic accusations that the Henrician Reformation had severed the national church's
descent from Jesus by offering up a new form of worship.
53. Michael MacLagan, "Genealogy and Heraldry in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Cen-
turies," in English Historical Scholarship in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. Levi Fox
(Oxford, 1956), 31-48.
54. Peacham, Compleat Gentleman [1634], 154-61, esp. 160 (during the Wars of the Roses,
"with which party in equity and conscience could I have sided, had I been ignorant of the
descent and pedigree royal?").
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Legal antiquarians distributed their writings to a variety of limited
groups. The Society of Antiquaries's manuscripts reached an exclusive
coterie of lawyers, heralds, and churchmen; printed chorographies
aimed at featured counties through a national book market. But
beyond the actual readers lay, at least potentially, an audience as
broad as the class "governed" by the antiquary's subject, an audience
defined less by the writer's estimation of an "ideal" or "typical"
reader than by the boundaries of the power exerted by his topic. The
audience for genealogical or heraldic studies was curious about the
subject; the audience for legal antiquarian tracts on Parliament or the
Chancellor was governed by the subject. Herein lay the tacitly
"public" nature of even antiquarian manuscript works circulated
within restricted circles.
Nonprovidential, factitious legal development; tutelage of normative
rather than exemplary conduct; continuity from origins to the present;
an implicitly "public" focus-in combination, these organizing
characteristics marked legal antiquarianism as an especially practical
and, with no hint of paradox, especially "presentist" style of
remembrancing that located readers politically and culturally. The
political importance of legal antiquarianism, as historians often remind
us, rested on the pronounced late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart
tendency to take the antique form of a custom or institution as the
measure of and as security for its contemporary successor. The
purported Saxon Parliament vouched for its Jacobean descendant's
necessary role in the polity; the primeval Court of Requests shored up
the barricades of its late-Elizabethan incarnation beleaguered by Writs
of Prohibition; the medieval charter reinforced the shallowly rooted
power of the parvenu manorial lord still dusty from the livery of
seisen.55 Both Coke and John Davies entrusted the legal profession
with educating the subject in his "ancient and undoubted patrimony"
in the laws of England, of which "he had for some time by ignorance,
false persuasion, or vain fear, been deceived or dispossessed."56 This
was legal tutelage of a particular sort: tutelage as recovery, the
extraction from antiquities of the "best inheritance that the subjects
of this realm have," but for "want of understanding of their own
evidence, do want the true knowledge of their ancient birth-right."57
The contestation of customary property rights in the half century
55. Sir Julius Caesar, The Ancient State Authoritie, and Proceedings of the Court of Requests,
ed. L.M. Hill (Cambridge, 1975); R.W. Southern, "Aspects of the European Tradition of History
Writing: 4. The Sense of the Past," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 23, 5th ser.
(1973): 243-63. William Burton delighted in citing the royal grants initially founding ancient
manors. William Burton, Description of Leiscestershire (1622).
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before the Revolution made antiquarian scholarship quite literally
profitable, encouraging its cultivation. Sir Robert Cotton mined his
library of antiquities for precedents to revive lapsed privileges and
dues on his manors as part of a generational commitment to what
Roger Manning has termed "fiscal seigneurialism."58 Conflicts over
deforestation, fen drainage, mining projects, tax and rent increases,
jurisdictional poaching, and enclosure were also fought on the terrain
of prescriptive right.5 9 Appealing to antiquity was, of course, an
ancient strategy. But the quantity of records and critical skills in their
handling expected in a "proper" argument had greatly increased since
the late Middle Ages, heightening the importance of legal anti-
quarianism as a scholarly project and forensic resource.
The historiographical attention given, understandably, to politics has
overshadowed the cultural dimensions of legal antiquarianism. The
early modern penchant for labeling custom a "second nature" strongly
underscored law's role as a constituent and carrier of culture as well
as a regulator of society. Legal antiquarianism organized geographical-
ly (rather than by institution or office) suggested what it meant to be
a Kentish gentleman, a townsman of Exeter, or a Cornish tin miner
as a species of the genus Englishman. Rules of property and govern-
ance served as a strand of local identity.6" Readers from outside the
featured geographical area did not stand aside as mere spectators, for
they too acquired a sharper understanding of the customary foun-
dations of their own local mores though comparison. In a preface
addressed to the gentry of Kent in William Lambard's Perambulation
of Kent, "T.W." hoped that the book might inspire in "the rest of the
gentlemen of this realm" a better appreciation of the history and
importance of "what things in their own countries are of greatest fame
now. ,,61
Institutional legal antiquarianism cultivated a national rather than
local identity in the reader, though in a more diffuse way. Antiquarian
studies of Parliament, of the Chancellor and the Marshall, of trade
58. R.B. Manning, "Antiquarianism and the Seigneurial Reaction: Sir Robert and Sir
Thomas Cotton and their Tenants," Historical Research 63 (1990): 277-88.
59. See, e.g., Richard Hoyle, "'Shearing the Hog': The Reform of the Estates, c. 1598-1640,"
in id., ed., Estates, 204-62 (depiction of the early seventeenth century as the "heroic age" of
surveying boundaries and customs on royal lands); Peter Large, "From Swanimote to
Disafforestation: Feckenham Forest in the Early Seventeenth Century," in ibid., 389-417 (revival
of the forest laws); Manning, "The Purlieu Men"; id., Village Revolts, esp. 132-54 (conflicts over
customary land tenures and rents); Sharp, In Contempt, esp. 175-200 (mining law); Levine and
Wrightson, Industrial Society, 117-34 (copyholders versus coal miners); Thorne, "Tudor Social
Transformation," esp. 199-200.
60. Andy Wood's study of English miners argues that specialized mining courts played a
similar role. Andy Wood, "Custom, Identity and Resistance: English Free Miners and their Law,
c. 1550-1800," in The Experience of Authority, 277.
61. T.W., preface to Perambulation, by Lambard, x.
20
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol10/iss2/1
1998]
impositions, and habeas corpus, illuminated in pointillist fashion bits
of the common law increasingly becoming a symbol of Englishness. In
late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart England, the common law posed as
a bulwark of English liberty against the foreign: against union with
Scotland, against the absolutist rhetoric of the Scottish-born King
James I, against the civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions applying the
trans-European civil law.62 To write and read legal antiquarianism
was to participate in what Charles Gray has styled a "nativist revival"
in late-Elizabethan culture and common law. It was to turn inward
from the cosmopolitanism of Henrician humanism and Protestantism
to dwell on English distinctiveness, apparent not only in legal anti-
quarianism but in studies of the Anglican via media, topography and
chorography, navigation, and ancient British mythology.63
The organizing characteristics of legal antiquarianism--
nonprovidential, normative rather than exemplary, continuous, and
public-figured readers not merely as spectators satisfying a distant,
and distanced, curiosity but as the heirs, the beneficiaries, or the
dispossessed of the accounts. The antiquary's recoveries helped define
the legal and political expectations and cultural identity of his readers.
The legal antiquarian was the remembrancer of these before he was
the remembrancer of God, or of the king alone, or of the great or the
saintly, or of an honored family, or of a civilization long passed away.
Not merely the proliferation of legal antiquarianism, then, but the
very form of access into the past it offered helped mark Davies's
lawyers as an order of remembrancers.
At a more basic level, the historical turn itself in late-Elizabethan
and early-Stuart intellectual life and political culture-that inten-
sification of interest in, availability of, and credence toward record
citation-reinforced the bar's emerging role as remembrancers. To
seek documentary access to the medieval and Saxon period was to
work through legal sources: Lambard's compilation of Saxon laws,
parliamentary statutes and yearbook cases, treaties, Chancery writs
and royal orders, deeds and charters, and the legal monographs of
62. Apologists of the common law had long contrasted it favorably to caricatured, debased
foreign rivals, such as John Fortescue's dystopian France and the "Roman" law of the pope and
Continental Catholic powers. In this fashion, the internationalism of civil and canon law, the
foreignness of Scotland, and the purportedly Spanish, French, and Machiavellian credentials of
absolutistism served as a convenient foil for common lawyers' elevation of their "municipal law"
into the precious inheritance of free Englishmen.
63. Gray, Writ of Prohibition, 1:23-25; Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood.
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Glanvill, Bracton, Fleta, Britton, and Littleton. Legal records, of
course, held no monopoly. Englishmen examined burgesses' annals of
town affairs, monks' chronicles, epithets and inscriptions, the treatises,
disputations, correspondence, histories, and sermons of the church
and, increasingly by the late sixteenth century, the physical evidence
of coins, ruins, and roadways.' But legal records played a leading
role, particularly in constitutional and political history. And with
varying degrees of self-regard, lawyers presented themselves as the
preferred interpreters of these sources. Coke pointedly advised the
"grave and learned writers of histories" to "meddle not with any point
or secret of... the laws of this realm, before they confer with some
learned in the profession."'6 John Selden's recitation of precedents
in Parliament against the Crown's purported right to imprison on the
king's "special command" began with:
[A] general key for the opening and true apprehension of all...
[precedents] of record; without which key, no man, unless he be
versed in the entries and course of the King's Bench, can possibly
understand them.6'
Irrespective of the purposes and conclusions for which Englishmen
summoned legal records, their very strategic importance enhanced
their professional custodians' role as national remembrancers. This
was as true when legal records afforded a glimpse of the ecclesiastical,
political, linguistic, genealogical, heraldic, and military pasts as when
they illuminated the "legal" past.
Lawyers displayed a certain testiness toward routes into the
medieval and Saxon era that did not pass through their professional
terrain-for instance, through monks' chronicles. Disseminated by
sixteenth-century printers feeding the market for history, chronicles
offered an archive of documents otherwise inaccessible.67 Yet as
lawyers drew on this resource, they also accused the monks of writing
poor accounts of statecraft and worse of law, mistaking the details of
legislation and government. Francis Bacon, Edward Coke and John
64. On archaeological and numismatic evidence, see Stuart Piggott, "Antiquarian Thought
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in English Historical Scholarship, 93-114.
65. Coke, Preface to Reports, pt. 3, xxiii. In reaction to Coke's strictures, the Kentish
antiquarian Roger Twysden prefaced an exploration of the powers of the Saxon kings with an
apology for historians writing about law. Roger Twysden, Certain Considerations upon the
Government of England [MS c.1648], ed. John Mitchell Kemble, Camden Society Publications
45 (London, 1849), 23-26.
66. See Selden's speech against the decision in the Five Knights' Case at a conference of the
Lords and Commons, April 7, 1628, in Selden, Works, 3:1959.
67. On the printing history of chronicles and lawyers' use of them, see D.R. Woolf, "Genre
into Artifact: The Decline of the English Chronicle in the Sixteenth Century," Sixteenth Century
Journal 19 (1988): 321-54, esp. 354, for Selden's praise of Henry Knighton's Compilatio de
Eventibus Angliae.
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Selden looked suspiciously at precedents and laws that passed through
time outside of the "traditions" of the courts and the judges. "For it
is a misfortune even of the best historians," wrote Bacon, "that they
do not dwell sufficiently upon laws and judicial acts; or if by chance
they use some diligence therein, yet they differ greatly from the
authentic reporters."6 William Lambard's sketch of early parliamen-
tary history in Archeion positively celebrated the thirteenth-century
onset of parliamentary records that freed him from reliance on the
chronicler Matthew Paris.69 The medieval chroniclers, however, were
not only laymen but Catholics in orders who were susceptible to
posthumous enlistment in the historiographical brigades of the
Counter-Reformation. Legal records interpreted by Protestant lawyers
proved safer tools of the post-Reformation invention of an English
church historically subordinate to the Crown than did the chronicles
with their inconvenient notations of papal authority. The Jesuit
controversialist Robert Parsons mined the chronicles to attack Coke's
report of Caudrey's Case as an anachronistic reading of the constitu-
tional history of English ecclesiastical/crown relations preceding the
Elizabethan Act to Restore to the Crown the Ancient Jurisdiction
over the Estate Ecclesiastical.7" The "divinity and histories" that
Parsons cited, Coke pronounced irrelevant (though not following his
own advice). His was part of a larger lawyerly indictment of the
chronicles for mistake and bias that demeaned them as a source for
reconstructing the constitutional past, directing disputants instead to
the strongest alternative source of evidence: to the records of the
''municipal laws of England" and to their professional interpreters and
remembrancers.71
68. Francis Bacon, Aphorisms 27 and 29, in De Augmentis, in Works, 5:93-94. Coke warned
of the "chronicle law reported in our Annals, for they will undoubtedly lead thee to error."
Coke, Preface to Reports, pt. 3, viii. Selden asked, rhetorically: "Why, who think you is the
greater for the certainty of the practiced law in England? Are our yearbooks, or Hollingshed,
or Polydore Vergil?" John Selden, "An Admonition to the Reader of Sir James Sempil's
Appendix," in Works, 3:1351.
Bacon also attacked the style and judgment of political history recorded in the chronicles.
Ministers of state wrote history best, he contended, because they understood the perils and
challenges of statecraft. Levy, Tudor Historical Thought, 254 (citing Francis Bacon, "On the
Fortunate Memory of Elizabeth," in Works, 6:305).
69. William Lambard, Archeion or a Commentary Upon the High Courts of Justice in
England [MS 1591; printed 1635], ed. C.H. Mcllwain and P.L. Ward (Cambridge, Mass., 1957),
265.
70. 1 Eliz. ch. 1 (1558).
71. Coke, preface to Reports, pt. 6, xiii-xvii; Robert Parsons, An Answer to the Fifth Part of
Reports Lately Set Forth by Sir E. Coke (St. Omer, 1606); Parsons, A Quiet and Sober Reckoning
with M. Thomas Morton (1609), 500-42 (dispute over interpretation of sources).
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2. Assessing Immemorial Constitution(s) and Ancient Provenances
One of the political uses of legal antiquarianism deserves a closer
look: the generation and dissolution of immemorial pedigrees. J.G.A.
Pocock's seminal work, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law
(1957), placed at the center of Stuart historiography the "common law
mind," the widespread belief percolating from Elizabethan and early-
Stuart lawyers into the political nation that the common law was a
body of custom that provided the foundation and lineaments of the
constitution. The common law's ancient origins were unrecorded,
unknown and hence "immemorial," and its existence continuous. In
the political language of the ancient constitution that Pocock
explored, a claim of immemorial origins deflected the royalist
argument that a present king enjoyed a special privilege to amend or
abolish customs, rights, and institutions that his predecessors in the
past had summoned into existence or made effective by their
imprimatur. Building on its Elizabethan predecessor, the early-Stuart
Parliaments cited this theory to constrain royal prerogative and to
support their own purported liberties. Existence "before memory"
also gave a presumption of validity to practices challenged in
bureaucratic and interjurisdictional rivalries, a favorite argument of
common lawyers.
7
Forty years of scholarship reacting to and criticizing Pocock has
whittled away his overstated claims while endorsing the importance
of the immemorial pedigree as a constitutional resource. Pocock
portrayed the legal profession as the parent and carrier of a widely
shared commitment to the ancient constitution and the immemorial
law. The "common law mind" now appears less as Pocock's "men-
talit6" than as a position chosen from among alternatives, a political
72. Pocock, Ancient Constitution. Pocock opened a debate over the place of the ancient
constitution in English political and legal thought. The leading scholarship elaborating,
criticizing, and revising Pocock's thesis includes: Burgess, Politics of the Ancient Constitution;
Paul Christianson, "Royal and Parliamentary Voices on the Ancient Constitution, c. 1604-1621,"
in The Mental World of the Jacobean Court, ed. Linda Levy Peck (Cambridge, 1991), 71-95;
William Klein, "The Ancient Constitution Revisited," in Political Discourse in Early Modern
Britain, ed. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, 1993), 23-44; John Phillip
Reid, "The Jurisprudence of Liberty: The Ancient Constitution in the Legal Historiography of
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient
Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of the Rule of Law, ed. Ellis Sandoz (Columbia,
Mo., 1993), 147-231; Christopher W. Brooks, "The Place of Magna Carta and the Ancient
Constitution in Sixteenth-Century Legal Thought," in ibid., 57-88; Corinne C. Weston, "England:
Ancient Constitution and Common Law," in The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-
1700, ed. J.H. Burns with Mark Goldie (Cambridge, 1991), 374-95; J.P. Sommerville, Politics and
Ideology in England, 1603-1640 (New York, 1986), ch. 3; id., "The Ancient Constitution
Reassessed: The Common Law, the Court and the Languages of Politics in Early Modem
Europe," in The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Political Culture, ed. R.
Malcolm Smuts (Cambridge, 1996), 39-64.
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strategy, a "move., 73 And the extent of opposition to the ancient
constitution has become clearer, particularly to the extreme continuity
asserted by Coke, Pocock's leading source, who imagined that the
outlines, if not the details, of the law and constitution descended from
the mists of Saxon or even British antiquity.74 The civilians John
Cowell and Thomas Ridley, the Catholic controversialist Robert
Parsons, the French legal humanists Bodin and Hotman, the historians
Polydore Vergil and John Hayward, the medieval monk-chronicler
Matthew Paris, and a bevy of high-royalist clerical critics believed that
the Norman Conquest reconstituted the common law or, more
radically, originated it. The "Bastard of Normandy came into
England" and "gave the law, and took none, changed the laws,
inverted the order of government," concluded Scotland's James VI
five years before ascending the English throne as James 1.75 Within
the legal profession, John Selden and William Hakewill spoke for
mainstream lawyers unwilling to assent to either Coke's excessive
claims of continuity or the expansion of royal power that
presumptively followed from grounding the constitution in the
Norman Conquest. They elaborated Lambard's evolutionary picture
of the law as slowly amalgamating Saxon, Danish, and Norman
customs before and after the Conquest. 76 Following Continental legal
humanists, Crown servants Francis Bacon and Thomas Egerton under-
mined the supposed antiquity of English law by depicting it as
developing over time in response to changing economic, social, and
political conditions. "[A]ll human laws," wrote Egerton, "are but leges
temporis."
77
73. Pocock decried his critics' employment of this "historiographical strategy typical of our
times." Pocock, Ancient Constitution, 262. John Phillip Reid has offered the most thoroughgoing
depiction of the ancient constitution as a "forensic" tactic, a "form of historical utilitarianism."
Reid, "Ancient Constitution," esp. 166.
74. Coke did have his followers. References to a pre-Conquest common law appeared
sporadically in early-Stuart Parliaments; as a sentence or two in such popular works as Michael
Dalton, Country Justice (1622 ed.), 1; and John Stow, ed., Annales; or A General Chronicle of
England (1631), 1037; and in monographs by George Saltern, Roger Owen, and Robert Hills.
See George Saltern, Of the Ancient Laws of Great Britain (1605); Klein, "Ancient Constitution,"
35-41 (discussing Owen and Hills).
75. James VI, The True Law of Free Monarchies [Edinburgh, 1598; reprinted in London,
1603], in Charles Howard McIlwain, ed., The Political Works of James I (New York, 1965), 63;
Hayward, Lives of the Three Norman Kings (1613), 96; Parsons, An Answer (1606), 12-13
(English laws were "brought in principally by ... a Conqueror, and such a one as intended to
bridle the English by that means, and to bring them under by those laws, and the insolent
dominion of the Normans"); Johann P. Sommerville, "History and Theory: The Norman
Conquest in Early Stuart Political Thought," Political Studies 34 (1986): 255-56; Klein, "Ancient
Constitution Revisited," 39-40.
76. John Selden, The Reverse or Back-face of the English Janus [Latin ed. 1610], trans.
Redman Westcot (1682); John Selden, "Notes on Fortescue's De Laudibus Legum Angliae"
(1616), in Works, 3:1887-88; Hakewill, "The Antiquity of the Laws of this Island," in Hearne,
ed. A Collection, 1, 1-8; Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution, 57-69.
77. "The Speech of the Lord Chancellor of England, in the Exchequer Chamber, Touching
1998] 253
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The theory of an immemorial constitution inspired contrary antique
traditions along with disagreement. In conflicts over jurisdiction and
dignity, common lawyers claimed that their courts existed im-
memorially, unlike the ecclesiastical and prerogative courts and
tribunals employing civil law. The civilians retorted that if their
tribunals were not more ancient than the common law, perhaps the
civil law itself was. Or they took the concept of "immemorial" in a
looser sense to mean terribly old rather than without known origin.
By that token, the civilian tribunals qualified.78 So did the royal
prerogative, "more ancient than the customary law of the realm," in
the opinion of John Davies.79 And so did the pre-Reformation
Catholic polity. Its roots began "with the first very planting of
Christian religion in our country and continued for more than nine
hundred years" before the interruption of Henry VIII, according to
Jesuit Robert Parson's counterhistory of its "antiquity, priority,
universality, continuance, and succession."8 George Saltern ap-
propriated the immemorial constitution for royalist purposes. In
support of James I's proposed unification of English and Scottish law,
Saltern found the headwaters of the two laws in a common British
spring, their division beginning only in the reign of Henry 111.81
Harnessed to a variety of political projects, and sometimes denied
outright, the ancient constitution and immemorial law commanded
scrutiny rather than assent.
This fracturing of Pocock's mentalit6 of the "common law mind"
heightened the importance of remembrancing to the early modern
legal profession. Far more than Pocock's consensus, the collision of
rival historical trajectories of the law and the efforts of partisans to
dispel or prove disputed immemorial pedigrees made memory a
the Post-Nati" [1608], in Louis A. Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England: The Tracts of
Lord Chancellor Ellesmere (Cambridge, 1977), 223 and 49-50. Egerton went on to say: "And the
wisdom of the judges found them to be unmeet for the time they lived in, though very good and
necessary for the time wherein they were made." For Bacon's depiction, see, for example,
Francis Bacon "Aphorisms" [MS c.1603-1622], in Mark S. Neustadt, "The Making of the
Instauration: Science, Politics and Law in the Career of Francis Bacon" (Ph.D. diss., Johns
Hopkins University, 1987), 272-82.
78. William Fulbeck, A Parallel or Conference of the Civil Law, the Canon Law, and the
Common Law (1601), [13]-[17]; William Hudson, "A Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber,"
in Collectanea Juridica [MS c.1621], ed. Francis Hargrave (London, 1792), 2:10; Caesar, The
Ancient State; Brian P. Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England, 1603-1641: A Political Study
(Oxford, 1973), 146-150; Knafla, Tracts of Ellesmere, 137-139, 160. Tribunals using civil law
included Admiralty, the church courts, Councils of Wales and the North, Marshalsea, Requests,
Chancery, and Star Chamber.
79. John Davies, "The Question Concerning Impositions" [MS after 1610], in Works, 3:26-27.
80. Parsons, An Answer, 21-22. Parsons offered his account to rebut Coke's report of
Caudrey's Case.
81. Saltern, Of the Ancient Laws, esp. K4-LAv. The consonance of the twelfth-century
treatise attributed to "Glanvili" with the Scottish regiam majestatem demonstrated the similarity
of the medieval English and Scottish laws.
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terrain of conflict and a prize. Henry Spelman, whose depiction of the
rise of feudalism after the Conquest challenged the continuities of the
ancient constitution, ushered in his contrary periodization of English
history with a methodological admonition: "When states are departed
from their original constitution, and that original by tract of time
worn out of memory; the succeeding ages viewing what is past by the
present, conceive the former to have been like to that they live in;
and framing thereupon erroneous propositions, do likewise make
thereon erroneous inferences and conclusions."' Robert Parsons
became so dismayed at Coke's citation of the pre-Reformation law of
Catholic England to justify Jacobean persecution of priests that he
dismissed the ancient constitution as an "idea Platonica ... to cover
and color" inconvenient changes like the break with Rome.83 A
telling jibe, it suggested how Coke's specious continuities elevated the
law from mutable history into Platonic idea, effacing memory in the
guise of preserving it. For Parsons and Spelman, to recapture change
was to liberate memory as, for Coke and the ancient constitutionalists,
to establish continuity was to honor memory. The common lawyers,
then, did not embrace the ancient constitution and the myth of their
immemorial law as a shared historical account or political strategy so
much as participate in a disputation about them, having taught the
terms of the conversation to the political nation. The common lawyers
were specialists in weaving immemorial lineages out of the threads of
legal records and in tearing them apart.' Their skill in the process
rather than their commitment to a conclusion figured them as
constitutional remembrancers.
82. Henry Spelman, "Of Parliaments" [MS c.1640], in Reliquiae Spelmannianae, 57.
83. Parsons, An Answer, 373-74.
84. John Selden's History of Tithes (1618) demonstrated the destructive power of antiquities
all too clearly to Anglican divine Richard Montagu. "[Y]ou shake, as much as possibly you can,
the ground of the" church's title to tithes, Montagu accused Selden, and "plead them out of
possession beyond the memory of man." You pretend that your history is "a mere narration of
fact and nothing else," yet the purpose is clear: a "non right, inferred from a non practice,"
undermining the clergy "in their inheritance, by vouching prescription against our claim."
Richard Montagu, Diatribe upon the First Part of the Late History of Tithes (1621), 14, 18. For
other instances, see Spelman, "Of Parliaments" and Parsons, "An Answer"; Bacon, Aphorisms
22-24, 27-28, 30, and 86, in De Augmentis, in Works, 5:92-94, 106 (Bacon's rules for admitting
and discarding "ancient examples"); William Hakewill, The Liberty of the Subject Against the
Pretended Power of Impositions [MS 1610], (New York, 1979, originally published, 1641), 21-98
(Hakewill's attack on the historical case for the royal privilege to lay trade duties); and Robert
Holborne, argument in the Case of Ship Money (1637), in Thomas Bayly Howell, ed., Cobbett's
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The great historiographical impact of Pocock's work has made it the
place to begin thinking about the immemorial in English law. Yet the
very intensity of historians' debates over the role of the ancient
constitution in late-Tudor and early-Stuart political culture has
implicitly overstated its prominence in legal culture. As the im-
memorial constitution was but one of a number of interlinked political
languages, it was but one of several inspirations for the workaday
lawyer to conjure aged lineages. The common law's requirement that
proffered customs demonstrate existence "before memory" was
another, related reason for chasing the immemorial (more on this
later). But much talk of antiquity did not aim at satisfying this test or
at affirming or contesting the ancient constitution. Or, at least, much
of the talk also aimed at something more.
A digression on the "great antiquity" of water law began Robert
Callis's 1622 Reading on Parliament's 1531 "Bill of Sewers." The
Register of Writs and fourteenth-century royal commissions, Callis
noted, contained orders to survey rivers and protective walls. Water
law grew out of prerogative before Parliament legislated upon the
subject. But legal regulation of water was more ancient than that.
Callis cited William Camden's Britannia to remind readers that the
sea had always borne in on England, requiring organized defense.
Noah's flight to the Ark implied that the very "laws of God and
nature" expected man to defend himself and his country from the
water.' John Manwood's treatise on the forest laws similarly
extended his subject's provenance millennia into the past. The
statutes, yearbook cases, and charters treated in the book only dated
back a few centuries. But Manwood found antecedents in the Bible
and classical antiquity by shifting his focus from the lineage of
common law enactments to the lineage of function-the regulation of
forests, for instance, which Queen Elizabeth and King Philip of
Macedonia both undertook, if by different laws. The Psalms told that
God laid claim to the bullocks running in the woods of King David's
Israel, much as the King of England's timberlands sheltered his
venison. Before Christ, Fuluius Herpinus invented warrens, and Philip
of Macedonia hunted in his forests as did his mighty predecessors
Esau and Nimrod.'
What was the purpose of illustrating one's chosen law arcing
backwards toward carefully selected glimpses of antiquity? The search
for the immemorial common law behind the ancient constitution, by
way of comparison, used a specific technique for a discernible political
85. Robert Callis, The Reading of the Famous and Learned Robert Callis, esq; Upon the
Statute... of Sewers [MS 1622], 2d ed. (1686), 23-25.
86. John Manwood, A Treatise and Discovery of the Laws of the Forest (1598), 15-16, 28-29.
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end. It restrained the claims of the Crown and non-common law
tribunals by setting them within an immemorial customary polity
validity of which rested, ironically, on an absence: on a lack of
historical evidence for origination through royal midwifery or
command. Callis and Manwood lectured on statutes, charters, and
yearbook cases, which derived their constitutional authorization from
parliamentary, royal, and judicial consent, not from immemorial
descent. These genealogists of faux antiquity did not use it to efface
origin. What were they doing?
To begin with, the provision of classical and Biblical analogical
ancestors helped demonstrate the consonance of English law with
natural and divine law. This was one of the great ongoing legitimation
projects of the common lawyers. English laws, Callis announced,
"received their primam essentiam from the divine laws of the
Almighty, and have fetched their pedigree from the law of nature. '
The law of water and forest regulation, taken as a branch of human
positive law concerned with those problems, stood closer to the laws
of God and nature further back in time. The passage of years had
carried English law away from the divine infusion of "primam
essentiam" and downward in the "pedigree" from the law of nature.
Regression back through time, if only through the analogy of function,
pointed to the harmony of English, divine, and natural law, as though
the connection of rays emanating from a common source could best
be shown by backing down toward the point of origin.as The tech-
nique recurred in English legal writing. Told that the common law
was not a science but "a skill consisting of many particulars," the
lawyer-dialogist in John Ferne's Blazon of Gentry (1586) invoked the
foundation of law in Eden. God gave law to Adam and Eve, tried
them for eating of the apple, and heard Adam's "feeble defense"
casting blame upon the serpent. "Thus we borrow the form of
pleading from Adam. And the antiquity of laws, from Paradise, which
are both sacred and heavenly."' George Saltern traced the origins
of English laws back to the founding of Britain by the Trojan Brutus.
He treated the story skeptically, only to embrace a more ancient
settlement by the children of Gomer (of Genesis 10:1-3), who spread
through all Europe after the division of tongues at Babel.9 ° Gomer's
immediate progeny
87. Callis, Reading, 23-25.
88. Selden, "Notes upon Sir John Fortescue," in Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum, 17-20. This
image was implicit in Selden's understanding of positive law as a limitation or specification of
the law of nature, the most ancient source of commands.
89. John Ferne, Blazon of Gentry (1586), 39.
90. Saltern, Of the Ancient Laws, C2v, C4v.
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had at the first the knowledge of God: it stands with reason, and
with best warrant of authority, to think they were governed by
such laws and institutions derived from the principles of the first
age, that is from the law of God written in nature.91
Through the centuries they overlaid positive law upon the divine and
natural rules of this "first age."
Manwood's portrayal of Philip of Macedonia and King David
hunting and overseeing the woods also hinted at who should govern
contemporary English forests. Classical and Biblical monarchies were
an important font of analogy for the prerogatives of kingship. Did not
ancient royal stewardship of the forests suggest a like power for the
English Crown? Coke's treatment of the "Courts of the Forest" in his
Fourth Institute (1644) labored to rebut that logic. He advised the
reader "to beware to give credit to our new authors," naming
Manwood in the margin note. "[W]e dare not fetch our kind of forest,
as some do, from the holy history of scripture, for therein we find no
such forests as we have." Instead, Coke characteristically linked
contemporary English forests to their Saxon antecedents. An
immemorial English forest law "allowed and bounded by the common
laws" and declared by the Carta de Foresta governed them.92 Coke
and Manwood, then, deployed antiquity to different ends-Coke to
embed forest law in immemorial custom; Manwood to pry it out of
this national story and place it in a transcultural one, complicating
prescriptive logic by alluding to powers historically intrinsic to
kingship.93
Finally, and most generally, the association of age with goodness
and honor invited English lawyers to conjure hoary beginnings and
predecessors. Legal prescription, the establishment of right through
time, went hand in hand with the reassurance, enhancement of status,
and presumption of honor that lengthy ancestry brought. Charles
Calthrope argued that copyhold tenure predated the Conquest not
only to provide the proper historical justification for royal court
enforcement of "immemorial" manorial custom. He also found the
"dignity and estimation of copyholders" in their antiquity.94 William
91. Ibid., C4v-Dlr.
92. Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1644), 319-20,
289. See generally Manning, Hunters and Poachers, 83-93.
93. Manwood's technique, of course, was not limited to augmenting kingly powers. The
civilian Thomas Ridley found the predecessors of Bishop's chancellors not only in England, but
in Justinian's empire, back perhaps to the time of Constantine. Thomas Ridley, A View of the
Civil and Ecclesiastical Law (1607), 103-04.
94. Charles Calthrope, The Relation Betweene the Lord of a Manor and the Copyholder his
Tenant [1635] (London, 1917), 2-3. D'Ewes, Autobiography, 2:33. D'Ewes lectured his tenants
at a manorial court baron on the antiquity of copyhold tenure.
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Burton's Description of Leicestershire (1622) strained to find the
earliest record of the surveyed manors, a common strategy of the
county historians and chorographers. Coke's Complete Copyholder
admitted that copyholders evolved after the Conquest from villeins,
"very meanly descended," then added, "yet they come of an ancient
house." 95 A common law jury accepted that a prebendary's shepherd
had immemorially separated his flock from the sheep of Thomas Earl
of Suffolk. Upholding the judgment on other grounds, the Court of
Common Pleas commented that the victorious flock could not have
been kept "time out of mind from the sheep of the Earl of Suffolk,
being but one man's life." The "prescription was senseless," the court
concluded.96 Perhaps it was senseless legally. But alongside or
outside of the proof of legal prescription lay the quest for
psychological prescription, the tilting of the terms or the ambiance of
debate in one's favor, the conversion of disdain into grudging
consideration, of indifference into interest. The temptation to
exaggerate the antiquity of claimed rights must have been strong in
Elizabethan and early-Stuart England. So many social conflicts were
fought on the terrain of prescriptive right between social unequals.
The tincture of importance that antiquity brought was no less
welcome to Burton's manorial lords than to Coke's copyholders.97
They shared the impulse that made lawyers find the inauguration of
water regulation in Noah's Ark and find warrens and royal forests
before Christ. As advocates, writers of monographs, and interpreters
of ancient documents, lawyers offered themselves as specialists in the
evocation of antiquity in the service of dignity and in the pursuit of
psychological as well as constitutional advantage.
3. "Brokering" Local Remembered Law: Lawyers as Intermediaries
Early modern jurisprudence distinguished the general customs of
the realm (the common law proper) from the "particular customs"
(such as the rules of copyholds and tithes) alive in boroughs, manors,
and villages. Dominant opinion among Jacobean lawyers held that
valid customs were ancient. The "memory of man runs not to the
contrary" of a legally enforceable custom; not so, of a pretender.98
Since judges were presumed to know the common law, proof of the
95. Coke, Complete Copyholder, § 32, p. 62.
96. Napper v. Jasper & George, in Henry Hobart, Reports (1641), 163.
97. For examples of flexible, adjustable custom represented as ancient in the heat of forensic
conflict, see R.W. Hoyle, "An Ancient and Laudable Custom: The Definition and Development
of Tenant Right in North-Western England in the Sixteenth Century," Past and Present 116
(1987): 51-53.
98. Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1628), 113a-114b
(citing Thomas Littleton, Tenures (1481)), § 170; id., Complete Copyholder, § 33.
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immemoriality of its tenets was an intramural affair among the
profession. The immemoriality of a particular custom, by contrast,
needed to be specifically established by records or the testimony of
witnesses unless the custom had been "of record known and ap-
proved" in a court.99 A particular custom resting on "immemorial"
practice could be rebutted by written evidence dating as far back as
the accession of Richard I in 1189, the common law's line dividing too
remote and hence unacceptable evidence from valid evidence within
the "time of memory." '
Written evidence from steward's rolls, deeds, charters, bylaws,
recorded custumals, and other sources carried part of the burden of
establishing particular customs-but only part. Remembered tradition
was indispensable. Documents could not be found in many cases.
When extant, they might only state the bare existence of a custom
without setting forth the details of its operation, the very matter in
doubt in a dispute. Lawyers and judges heard frequent allegations of
forgery and understood that uncorroborated records misled."0 ' Even
when documents were available, the Masters of the Court of Requests
preferred the combination of oral testimony plus records to records
alone."0 2 So did Lord Chancellor Thomas Egerton. Scrutinizing old
99. St. German, Doctor and Student, 71. Common law courts took notice of the law of the
other royal courts as well as courts of general jurisdiction, such as the Court of Exchequer in
Wales and the courts of the counties palatine. Lane's Case, 2 Coke's Reports 16, 16 (C.P., 1596);
Broughton v. Randall, Croke's Reports, Elizabeth 502, 503 (K.B., 1596); Worlich v. Massy,
Croke's Reports, James 67, 68 (K.B., 1605). The courts did not take cognizance of the customs
and proceedings of inferior courts of limited jurisdiction. Day v. Savage, Hobart's Reports 116,
117-120 (C.P., c.1615) (customs of the City of London need be established by jury rather than
by certification of the mayor and aldermen if the City is an interested party). The validity of a
copyhold custom "ought to be adjudged by the judges, and the truth of that by the jury, and
when it is found true by a jury, and that it has such antiquity that exceeds the memory of man,
then this obtains such privilege as the prerogative of a prince, and is part of law." Rowles v.
Mason, Brownlow's Reports, 194 (C.P., 1612).
100. See Charles M. Gray, Copyhold, Equity, and the Common Law (Cambridge, 1963), 199-
201, n. 18, for cases. This point was disputed. Copyhold customs "must be of such antiquity, that
no man living doth know the contrary, either out of his own memory, or by any record or other
proof." A Commentary on the Tenures of Littleton; Written Prior to the Publication of Coke upon
Littleton [MS c.1620], ed. Henry Cary (London, 1829), 166. To prove a manorial custom, "you
must not show the beginning of it, that within time of memory the thing was not so. True, if the
time had been long, and I cannot show when it had not been, that is time out of mind." Robert
Holborne, argument in the Case of Ship Money (1637), in Howell, ed., State Trials, 3:1009.
101. Fox, "Custom," 102, 105, 96-97
102. Courts preferred written records to the testimony of remembered law, though of
necessity they had to accept the latter in many cases, and they valued both together over either
alone. Compare Kerridge, Agrarian Problems, 67, with R.H. Tawney, The Agrarian Problem in
the Sixteenth Century (1912; reprint, New York, 1967), 131. See Tim Stretton, "Women, Custom
and Equity in the Court of Requests," in Women, Crime and the Courts in Early Modern
England, ed. Jenny Kermode and Garthine Walker (Chapel Hill, 1994), 170-89, esp. 174
(husbandmen presenting "anecdotes from memory"), 176 (Masters of Requests "reluctant to
pass judgment on the basis of documentary proof alone"), 177 (Requests records suggest that
"'time out of memory' effectively meant not much longer than the 60 or 70 years of living
memory"); L.M. Hill, introduction to The Ancient State Authoritie, and Proceedings of the Court
of Requests by Julius Caesar (Cambridge, 1975), xxxvii-xxxviii.
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documents in a dispute over manorial boundaries, he ordered the case
to a jury, "and they to find as the contents of the manor had gone by
usual reputation sixty years last, and not to have it paired, and
defalked by such ancient deeds."1 °3 Legal monographs discussing the
proof of particular custom placed aged recollectors in central, not
vestigial, roles. What "measure of time shall make a custom," asked
Charles Calthrope in his Reading on the law of copyhold (1574).
Some say seventy-six years, others one hundred, but "the true
measure" is
that no man then in life, has not heard any thing, nor know any
proof to the contrary.... If lands have been demised by copy by
the space of 60 years, and yet there be some alive, that remem-
ber the same occupied by indenture, this is not a good
copyhold.... And if lands have been demised by copy but 40
years, and there is none alive that can remember the same to be
otherwise demised, this is a good copyhold, for the number of
years makes not the matter, but the memory of man .... But if
any chance to be alive, that remember the contrary, then such
prescription must give place to such proof.14
John Cowell's Interpreter (1607) reported that common lawyers
accepted a custom "if two or more [witnesses] can depose, that they
heard their fathers say, that it was a custom all their time, and that
their fathers heard their fathers also say, that it was likewise a custom
in their time." ' 5 Detractors of these remembering grandfathers
thought their testimony only too persuasive to common law juries. In
a 1621 parliamentary committee looking into a copyhold dispute, John
Walter pronounced juries "apt to be swayed by such oaths
and ... less able to judge of the court rolls," so that "every Lord
would be outsworn by his tenants and they would conspire to make
new customs for their own advantage.""
As the sixteenth gave way to the seventeenth century, lawyers
increasingly needed to locate and prepare these witnesses of remem-
bered local customary law.1" 7 Both the common law courts and
103. Egerton in Anonymous, Cary 24, in English Reports, Chancery 21 (London, 1902), 13.
104. Calthrope, Copyholder, 15-16. When Calthrope lists examples of particular customs, he
sometimes includes a reference to witnesses, as in the following: "If the lord have used to have
certain work days of his tenants, and that has not been used by the space of twenty years last
past; yet that non-user is no discharge to the tenants, so that there be any in life that can
remember the same." Ibid., 20-21.
105. John Cowell, The Interpreter (1607), V4.
106. Walter made this comment before the committee for the cause between Lady Stafford
and her copyholders of the manor of Thornbury and Oldbury. See Wallace Notestein, Francis
Helen Relf, and Hartley Simpson, eds., Commons Debates, 1621 (New Haven, 1935), 5:178-79.
The copyholders "proved their customs for 60 years by witnesses not interested in the cause."
The manorial court records were unavailable, remaining "with the Lord or his officers." "Brief
of the Customary Tenants of Thornbury and Oldbury," in ibid., 7:185.
107. Lawyers also prepared witnesses of fact who testified to their memories. In the next few
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national equitable tribunals (Chancery, Requests, Star Chamber, the
equity side of Exchequer) that lawyers served were becoming more
active in recruiting disputes from inferior jurisdictions. After hesitant
beginnings in the 1550s and 1560s, copyhold cases began to flow into
the common law courts in the 1570s as they offered writs of trespass
to protect copyhold against manorial lords, expanding in the 1580s
and 1590s as writs of ejectment also became available.0 8 Tithe cases,
long heard in ecclesiastical tribunals, entered the royal courts in 1588
when common law judges began allowing plaintiffs to recover tithes
using writs of debt. °9 Faced with the hostility of ecclesiastical courts
toward the restriction of tithing duties by custom, early-Stuart
common law courts claimed exclusive jurisdiction to determine tithing
customs and used writs of prohibition to steer cases away from church
tribunals.n0 Prohibitions also brought disputes over parish rates into
the common law courts, requiring pleading of customs regulating
church governance. The national equitable tribunals, which had been
investigating, amending, and enforcing custom throughout the Tudor
period, became far more active in the work by the end of the
sixteenth century. The growing caseload of the equity side of
Exchequer suggests the rapidity of the influx given that a large
proportion of the docket involved disputes over customary rights,
tithes, manorial boundaries, and common rights. The average number
of bills filed jumped from 84 in the 1570s and 1580s to 334 in the
1590s."'
The upsurge of national equitable work and the arrival of copyhold,
tithe, and parish rate cases in the common law courts increased the
number and diversified the range of particular customs that lawyers
needed to prove. The picture on the common law side remains
somewhat hazy because the scarcity of evidence about what happened
at nisi prius trials before juries precludes a direct assessment. But
inferential evidence suggests that particular customs played a greater
role around 1600 than a century before. Fortescue, writing in the late
paragraphs I will concentrate not on the continuity of fact witnessing but the growing importance
of customary law witnessing to the late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart legal profession.
108. Gray, Copyhold, 63-66, 93; A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law, 2d ed.
(Oxford, 1986), 163-64.
109. Richard H. Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England (Cambridge, 1990),
93.
110. Ibid., 51, 95-96, 99-100, 176.
111. Fox, "Custom," 95. See William J. Jones, "A Note on the Demise of Manorial Jurisdic-
tion: The Impact of Chancery," American Journal of Legal History 10 (1966): 297-318, esp. 317
(Chancery oversight of manorial custom); id., The Elizabethan Court of Chancery (Oxford,
1967), 264-304 (determination of customary rights), 395-99 (tithes); Wood, "Custom," in
Experience of Authority. 264 (growing intervention into miners' courts in the decades around
1600).
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fifteenth century, barely mentioned them."2 Littleton in 1481 and
St. German in 1530 gathered a corpus of examples repeated by later
writers-customs of dower and inheritance (such as Kentish gavelkind
and borough English) that amended common law norms, and the
commercial customs of London and other towns.11 3 These frequently
appeared in the early- to mid-sixteenth-century common law, which
docket focused on trials of title to land, trespass against the King's
peace, and debt on an obligation." 4 Recurrence increased the
chance of notation in the records of the central courts or
enshrinement in authoritative legal writings such as Littleton,
eliminating the need to prove them anew in each trial."5
Copyhold, tithe, and parish governance cases focused lawyers'
attention downward from familiar inheritance and commercial
customs in counties and cities toward variegated and highly local
particular customs. These cases called for microlevel investigations.
The copyholders of one manor paid double rents every fourth year,
those of another took so much wood for fuel and fences, those of
another pastured no more than three beasts on the lord's soil.
Customary compositions of tithes created a variety of regimes not
only between but within parishes: These five acres of pastureland paid
a shilling to lift tithes, the neighboring meadow did not; custom
valued a lamb at one penny here, four pennies a mile away."6 As
for church governance: What was the customary procedure for
electing the churchwardens of a given parish? Did a group of
ratepayers have the customary right to support a chapel outside the
parish?" 7 Law reports bear the mark of these questions. Comparing
the Henrician, Marian, and early-Elizabethan reports of John Spelman
and James Dyer to the late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart law reports
of Edward Coke, Henry Yelverton, George Croke, and Henry Hobart
reveals a heightened attention to finding particular customs and
situating them within the broader common law framework." 8 And
112. Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum [MS c.1468-71].
113. Thomas Littleton, Tenures [original printing in French, 1481] (London, 1813); St.
German, Doctor and Student.
114. The centrality of these kinds of cases has been suggested in Baker, Spelman, 51, and
DeLloyd J. Guth, "Enforcing Late-Medieval Law: Patterns in Litigation During Henry VII's
Reign," in Legal Records and the Historian, ed. J.H. Baker (London, 1978), 86-87.
115. Two qualifications are in order. First, that the courts recognized a particular custom
without pleading, such as gavelkind, still left open a range of subordinate incidents (such as its
intersection with dower customs) that needed to be pleaded. Launder v. Brooks, Croke's
Reports, Charles 561,562 (K.B., 1640). Second, that the courts recognized the meaning and effect
of a particular custom, such as borough English, still left open in what localities it obtained.
116. Christopher Hill, Economic Problems of the Church (Oxford, 1956), 92-96.
117. 1 have drawn my examples of church governance cases from Gray, Prohibition, 1:xliii-
xliv.
118. Copyhold and tithe cases did not turn on particular customs alone. They mixed national
principles drawn, respectively, from common law and canon law with local practices expressed
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the latter reports display a greater fussiness over venue and the
proper "address" of venire facias writs summoning juries, perhaps
driven, at least in part, by the mounting importance of witnesses
proving local law."9 The more particular customs rather than the
in particular or "special" customs. Gray, Copyhold, ch. 3; Helmholz, Roman Canon Law, 8-9.
And they established local customary, perhaps memorial, substantive law by invoking the
common law's procedural machinery.
119. This argument about venue is, I caution, speculative. The slow transformation of the
medieval self-informing jury into a passive, fact-judging institution had, by the mid-sixteenth
century, relaxed judges' rigor about drawing jurors from the correct locality (hundred, parish,
manor, viii). The yearbooks at the turn of the sixteenth century demonstrated, in the opinion
of Charles Gray, a "growing acquiescence in the practical conclusion that where juries came
from made little difference, since personal cognizance rarely figured in their verdicts anyhow."
Judges less expected jurors to be "direct cognizers" of fact. Charles Gray, "Domestic Venue,"
3-4 (unpublished MS 1997) (on file with author). John Baker has suggested that the jurors of
this period seldom enjoyed personal knowledge of the disputes before them, citing Thomas
More's judgment in 1533 that "jurors were not to be regarded as witnesses, but as judges of
fact." Baker, Spelman, 109. A statute of 1585 reduced from six to two the number of
"hundredors" (jurors from the hundred where the venue lay) necessary on the twelve man jury
in personal actions. It implicitly recognized the fading role of the jury as bearer of private
knowledge. 27 Eliz. ch. 6 (1585) revised 35 Hen. VIII ch. 6 (1543). The Henrician, Marian and
early-Elizabethan reports of James Dyer typically (though not exclusively) treated venue at the
level of the county rather than the manor, parish, or hundred. They asked which county should
supply the jury and whether a jury drawn from one county could find facts or locate assets in
another. See, for example, in Dyer's Reports, the cases of Gawen v. Hussee and Gibbes, 73 Eng.
Rep. 84, 86, Dyer 39b (1538); Untitled, 73 Eng. Rep. 100, 100, Dyer 46a (1540); Martyn's Case,
73 Eng. Rep. 568, 568-69, Dyer 256b (1567); Untitled, 73 Eng. Rep. 594, 594, Dyer 267b (1567);
Untitled, 73 Eng. Rep. 602, 602, Dyer 270b (1568); Hare v. Butler, 73 Eng. Rep. 604, 604-05,
Dyer 271b (1568); Fleyer v. Crouch, 73 Eng. Rep. 636-637, Dyer 284a (1569).
Yet in the next two generations of reports after Dyer, those of the late-Elizabethan and early-
Stuart period, disputes about the proper "address" for venirefacias writs proliferate. Judges from
around 1600 treated venue not only at the level of Dyer's counties but at the level of the parish,
vill, and manor. Their scrutiny intensified as it looked downward. Typical was the Earl of
Bedford's Case (1614) in the Jacobean reports of George Croke. A copyholder of Lanygame,
a parcel of the manor of Bishop Taunton, claimed by custom of the manor the right to take
wood from a "great waste" in Lanygame. Should the venire facias go to the parcel of Lanygame
or to the manor of Bishops Taunton? Edward Coke and a majority of King's Bench held that
"the venue ought always to be of the place as large as the extent of the issue; and the issue
being, whether there were such a custom within the manor, &c, the manor may extend into
divers vills: therefore the venire facias ought to be of the manor, and not of the particular vill
within the manor. But if the issue had been, whether the custom were for such copyholders
within the vill, there it ought to have been otherwise." Judge John Dodderidge disagreed,
thinking that Lanygame could suffice as the venue, "for the one part of the manor may well
know the customs of the other part." Earl of Bedford's Case, Crok. Jac. 327, 327-28 (K.B., 1614).
This intensely local superintendence of venue appears frequently in Croke's late-Elizabethan and
Jacobean reports, for instance: Horseman v. Johnson, Cro. Eliz. 260, 261 (K.B., 1591) (venire
facias to one or two manors); Bedell v. Stanborough, Cro. Eiz. 538, 538 (Exchequer, 1596)
(venire facias to parish or village); Acton v. Barham, Cro. Eliz. 620-621 (K.B., 1599) (effect of
issuing venire facias to too many vills); Wrey v. Vesper, Cro. Jac. 263, 2633 (K.B., 1611) (venire
facias to parish or vill); Moore v. Goodgame, Cro. Jac. 327, 327 (K.B., 1614) (which manor
should properly serve as address for venirefacias); Symonds v. Burlow, Cro. Jac. 404, 405 (K.B.,
1614) (venire facias to a manor); Vale v. Field, Cro. Jac. 340, 340-41 (K.B., 1615) (venire facias
to parish or vill); Tharold v. Spight, Cro. Jac. 676, 676 (C.P., 1624) (venire facias to parish or to
subordinate place within parish); Philips v. Slade, Cro. Jac. 676, 676-77 (C.P., 1624) (venirefacias
must go to both manor of tithepayers and rectory of recipients); see generally Coke, First
Institute, § 193, 125a-b. More examples can be found in the reports of Edward Coke and Henry
Hobart.
As Coke and Dodderidge suggested in the Earl of Bedford's Case, the judges were trying to
figure out which locality best knew the particular customs at issue. Copyhold, tithe, and parish
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common law supplied the substantive law of disputes, the more the
establishment of the existence and immemoriality of law moved to a
witness-driven process instead of an intramural affair among lawyers
and judges. 2' As lawyers increasingly needed to round up, inves-
tigate, and present witnesses' recollections of custom, they became the
brokers of actual local memory as well as of the "artificial" memory
of records and professional convention. 21
Brokering took forms beyond advocacy. By the late sixteenth
century, lawyers assessed remembered local law as judges, agents, and
investigators. Their growing numbers made them available for a
plethora of local offices, some newly created by the Tudor monarchy.
Sitting on royal sewer commissions, they sifted through customs to
assign responsibility for bridge and channel repairs.' 2 Chancery and
the Court of Requests designated them to investigate local law under
dedimus potestatem writs.123 They took over from laymen as
manorial court stewards and city recorders and became more widely
used as agents in the burgeoning land market. All these roles required
interviews of witnesses to define communal and seigniorial cus-
toms.'24 Lawyers negotiated those statements of manorial, parish,
and trade custom proliferating around the turn of the seventeenth
century, sometimes encapsulated in a private agreement, sometimes
governance cases raising a multiplicity of particular customs in the courts may have elevated the
importance of local jurors as "direct cognizers" of local law even as the ongoing decline of the
self-informing jury eroded their importance as witnesses of fact. This is speculative, but it offers
a reason for the revived concern at the turn of the seventeenth century over the localist
credentials of the jury.
120. For a glimpse of this process under the aegis of a Chancery suit, see Welbore St. Clair
Baddeley, A Cotteswold Manor, Being the History of Painswick (London, 1907), 178-83 (during
1614 dispute over manorial customs of wardship, a Chancery commission appointed a master of
Chancery and the counsel for both lord and tenants as a committee to examine records and
witnesses).
121. For the sake of expository clarity, I have distinguished perhaps too sharply between the
challenges of proving common law and local custom. The early modern common law impressed
contemporaries and historians as an oral tradition or caste custom imperfectly reduced to texts,
which it was, compared to modern common law or the civil law. But next to the customary law
of the English manors and parishes, the common law overflowed with yearbooks, reports,
commentaries, and monographs. Establishing the validity and antiquity of a point of common
law required more textual than mnemonic detective work. Put another way, the balance between
records and supporting tradition tilted in favor of text in the common law, in favor of memory
in the parishes and manors.
122. Edith G. Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law: Certiorari and
Mandamus in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 29.
123. Jones, Chancery, 240, 272; Hill, introduction to The Ancient State, xxxvii-xxxviii.
124. Though lawyers had served as stewards and recorders at the turn of the sixteenth
century, the latter part of the century saw an increase both in the number of lawyers so
employed and the percentage of these offices held by lawyers. E.W. Ives, The Common Lawyers
of Pre-Reformation England: Thomas Kebell: A Case Study (Cambridge, 1983), 11-15; Brooks,
Pettyfoggers, 114; Peter Clark, English Provincial Society from the Reformation to the Revolution:
Religion, Politics and Society in Kent, 1500-1640 (Hassocks, Sussex, 1977), 281; Prest, Barristers,
240-46. See Day v. Savage, Henry Hobart, Reports (1641), 116, 119-20 (C.P., c.1615) for a
depiction of the Recorder as the mouthpiece of his city's customs.
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recorded in manorial courts or in equity tribunal examinations in
perpetuam rei memoriam, sometimes enrolled in Chancery, Requests,
or Exchequer under the auspices of a feigned or real lawsuit.125
Sixteenth-century price inflation and the speedier turnover of manors
in the vigorous Elizabethan land market increased the importance of
ascertaining customary entry fines and leasing practices as well as
produced a cadre of manorial lords unfamiliar with the rules on their
own manors.126 Lawyers, then, offered their services as evaluators
of local customs and legal memories in their various roles as stewards
and recorders, as agents in land sales, and as gatherers of evidence for
real and feigned lawsuits.121 These were not unprecedented roles,
unknown to the medieval bar. But the Tudor and Stuart expansion of
the numbers and local presence of lawyers, their recruitment into
national commissions, their partial displacement of laymen in the
work of assessing local customs, and the growing role of local customs
as substantive rules in national tribunals all made the oversight and
brokering of remembered law critical to the profession. Stuart lawyers
served as intermediaries between manor and parish legal recollections
and the national tribunals in London far more extensively and
intensively than did their forbears of a century before.
As a result, lawyers' work and the broad, overall trajectory of legal
regulation moved at cross purposes. On the one hand, local customs
were slowly receding in importance between the Middle Ages and the
nineteenth century as a source of law. On the other hand, in contrast
to this long-term trend, the proof of particular customs became more
central to late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart lawyers. With this
"jurisdictional" change in the site for contesting remembered law
came a cultural change in the profession. The same generations of
lawyers who took up this work also busied themselves generating or
125. Kerridge, Agrarian Problems, 54-58, 112-14; Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group
Litigation to the Modern Class Action (New Haven, 1987), 139-40; W.J. Jones, The Elizabethan
Court of Chancery (Oxford, 1967), 260; Brooks, Pettyfoggers, 200; Fox, "Custom," 99-100, 106.
Proposals for the establishment and redaction of manorial and tithe customs floated around the
Elizabethan parliament and the privy council. The anonymous "Reformations proposed in Par-
liament by the Queen's majesty, in favour of justice" [MS c.1572-76], which G.R. Elton argues
provides a good index to lay Elizabethan opinion, proposed that: "Local customs concerning the
payment of tithe should be established by enquiry and recorded for the future." G.R. Elton, The
Parliament of England, 1559-1581 (Cambridge, 1986), 278.
126. I am indebted to Prof. Mark Kishlansky for suggesting this point.
127. To be sure, lawyers played these roles before the Elizabethan period. See Deborah
Marsh, "'I See by Sizt of Evidence': Information Gathering in Late Medieval Cheshire," in
Courts, Counties, and the Capital in the Later Middle Ages, ed. Diana E.S. Dunn (New York,
1996), 71-92. My claim is about degree and extent: first, more lawyers were playing these roles,
displacing laymen and locally trained "men of law"; and second, a greater share of the
profession's business involved brokering local customs and memories out in the counties,
manors, and parishes and between the localities and the institutions of the national state (for
example common law courts, Chancery, sewer commissions).
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contesting immemorial pedigrees and participating as readers, writers,
or documentary custodians in a politicized legal antiquarianism. Local
memory brokering was part of a larger configuration. Long guardians
of a professional tradition, lawyers emerged as Davies's order of
remembrancers.
Meanwhile, the individual practitioner's responsibility to recall legal
principles and authorities had not gone away. But between 1500 and
1620 it had changed. And the way it had changed deserves
examination.
B. How Print Decreased the Profession's Collective Memorial
Burden While Increasing the Practitioner's Individual Burden
Concern yourself with much more than much reading;
Is he forgetting while he reads? then reading, he is negligent.
They know what they remember, what slips away is not useful,
Know that time was idle to those who forget.
-Common Pleas Judge John Croke, translation of Latin poem
preceding Keilway's Reports (1602)128
Here I present to your clear judgment's eye;
Which the law's knots and riddles both discern;
And to your rich and copious memory
Which never lost the thing it once did learn.
-John Davies, dedicatory verse presented to Edward Coke on a
manuscript presentation copy of Davies's
Nosce Teipsum (c.1598)129
Like their medieval predecessors, early modern common lawyers
supported arguments with both authorities and the profession's
distinctive "reason." But over the sixteenth century the balance began
to tilt-away from general principles and toward case and monograph
citations. Henrician lawyers relied on the collective "learning" of the
bench and Inns of Court mixed with personal recollections of cases
and allusions to the yearbooks, sometimes consisting of no more than
a gesture to "nos livres." Lacking a standardized corpus of texts free
of the variations and silent redactions of manuscript transmission, and
lacking a doctrine of binding precedent that made previous cases
128. This poem followed Croke's preface to Keilway's Reports (1602; reprint 1688), blv. It
appeared in Latin: "Sit tibi cura magis multum, quam multa legendi;/ Immemor anne legit?
Negligit ipse legens./ Quae meminere sciunt, quod labitur utile non est;/ Nosce quod oblitis
tempus inane fuit." I owe the translation to the generosity of Professor Daniel Klerman.
129. The Poems of Sir John Davies, ed. Robert Krueger (Oxford, 1975), 4.
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more than an index to past conventions, the Henrician lawyers'
"common erudition" was, in the judgment of E.W. Ives, "more a
consensus of approach than a catalogue of specific rulings."' 3° Over
the course of the sixteenth century, printing and changes in pleading
and procedure increased the attractiveness of specific citation as a
forensic strategy, increasing its status vis-?a-vis general principles.
Anthony Fitzherbert's Abridgment (1514-1516) and its successors
provided ready indices to the newly printed and standardized
yearbooks, making it easier for practitioners to identify and cite cases.
Where Thomas Littleton's Tenures (1481) slighted particular
authorities in favor of his signature "it is said that," which purported
to encapsulate professional opinion, Fitzherbert's new Natura Brevium
(1534) put the discussion of yearbooks in the foreground. He
inaugurated a citation-heavy style of legal literature made heavier by
John Perkins and William Staunford. The substitution of written for
oral pleading and the use of procedural devices that isolated legal
questions for consideration reoriented law reporting away from the
tentative, exploratory pleas of the yearbooks toward the firmly
decided legal points of the nominate reports.131 By the early seven-
teenth century, bouquets of citations adorned law reports, Readings,
monographs, and legal arguments in royal courts and Parliament. The
excesses of the new style provoked an exasperated aside from Coke:
The ancient order of arguments by our serjeants and apprentices
of law at the bar is altogether altered. 1. They never cited any
book, case, or authority in particular, as is holden in 40 E. 3. &c.
but est tenus ou agree in nr'e livres [it is held or agreed in our
books] .... 2. Then was the citing general, but always true in the
particular; and now the citing is particular, and the matter many
times mistaken in general. 3. In those days few cases in law were
cited, but very pithy and pertinent to the purpose; and those ever
pinch most; and now in so long arguments with such a farrago of
authorities, it cannot be but there is much refuse, which ever
does weaken or lessen the weight of the argument. 132
130. As Ives comments, "But loose though it was, this common agreement was there and
woe betide counsel who alleged un erudition without justification .... To minds familiar with
stare decisis, such a general understanding and no more seems an invitation to uncertainty, but
it was, in fact, a recipe for vitality. Authority lay in the collective mind of the profession, past
and present." Ives, Common Lawyers, 155-60, 161. See also Baker, Spelman, 161-62.
131. On the transformation of sixteenth-century concepts of legal authority, see William
Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London, 1966), 5:355-74; Baker, Spelman, 161-63; id.,
"English Law and the Renaissance," in The Legal Profession and the Common Law: Historical
Essays (London, 1986), 471-76; S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 2d
ed. (Toronto, 1981), 70-78; Percy H. Winfield, The Chief Sources of English Legal History
(Cambridge, Mass., 1925), 157-58; Howard Jay Graham and John W. Heckel, "The Book that
'Made' the Common Law: The First Printing of Fitzherbert's La Graunde Abridgment," Law
Library Journal 51 (1958): 100-16.
132. Coke, preface to Reports, pt. 10 [1614], xxi-xxii. Coke generally spoke warmly of "our
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The rise of a precedent-centered style of legal argument has been
a prominent theme in studies of the early modern profession. Yet
historians have not discussed its contribution to the salience of
memory talk. The growing number and diversity of printed and
manuscript reports, abridgments, and monographs lay behind, indeed,
made possible, Coke's "farrago of authorities." Text slowly gained on
memory as the storehouse of the entire profession's collective
tradition, memory having borne more of Thomas Keeble's and John
Spelman's "common erudition" than of Coke's.'33 Yet at the same
time, the rise of what Coke termed "particular" citation around 1600
increased the strain on memory for the individual practitioner.
The advocates of 1520, as John Baker noted, used precedents in a
"rather vague way," their allusions countered by assertions of "'other
books to the contrary."' Now and then, dispute over the content of a
case provoked a "memory contest" or a threat to leave and return
with the relevant yearbooks."' The memory contests in Coke's
world of a "farrago of authorities" had a different character. As the
primary locus of authority in the profession slowly drifted from
collective lore to lawbooks, from instantiation in distinguished persons
to encapsulation in texts, advocates' representation of common
erudition became more vulnerable to the interrogation of particular
citations. "The law speaks by record," said John Selden, "and if these
records remain, it will to posterity explain the law."' 35 Preparation
for argument increasingly required the identification, memorization,
book cases," the "best proofs what the law is, Argumentum ab authoritate est fortissimum in
lege." Id., First Institute (1628), 254a. Bacon disapproved scatter-shot citation at least as strongly
as Coke. He offered up his "Maxims" [MS 1597] as a work in the tradition of Littleton rather
than Staunford, "without any glory of affected novelty, or of method,... or of quotations and
authorities, dedicated only to use." Bacon, Works, 7:322-23. Bacon disapproved of lawyers who
"without laying any foundation of a ground or difference or reason, do loosely put cases, which,
though they go near the point, yet being put so scattered, prove not; but rather serve to make
the law appear more doubtful than to make it more plain." Bacon, "Maxims," in Works, 7:320-
21.
Matthew Campbell Mirow argues that by the latter sixteenth century, Readings "demonstrate
much reliance on year-book sources and frequently cite specific cases. Furthermore, recently
reported cases, usually printed, sometimes in manuscript, are often cited, as well as cases then
pending before the courts." Matthew Campell Mirow, "Readings on Wills in the Inns of Court,
1552-1631" (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1992), 26. "Manuscripts which survive
demonstrate that those taking notes at the reading and later copyists took care to record the
case citations." Ibid., 124.
133. A century's growth in the scale and diversity of legal publications put about half of the
available written knowledge of the common law into print by the 1630s, according to the
estimate of John Baker. "The printed year books and abridgments reduced the need to learn
by ear." J.H. Baker, "The Inns of Court and Legal Doctrine," in Lawyers and Laymen, ed. T.
M. Charles-Edwards, Morfydd E. Owen, and D.B. Walters (Cardiff, 1986), 282.
134. Baker, Spelman, 162; see also T. Ellis Lewis, "The History of Judicial Precedent, III,"
Law Quarterly Review 47 (1931): 411-27.
135. Selden, Speech of Feb. 23, 1629, in Commons Debates for 1629 ed. Wallace Notestein,
and Frances Hellen Reif (Minneapolis, 1921), 62.
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and mental shepherding of a herd of precedents and authorities. The
remembrance of the structure and erudition of the law, the challenge
of 1500, did not fall away so much as become overlaid with the need
to recall a multitude of particular sources relevant to this dispute, and
then that, and then that.
These developments underlay the pained depiction of the common
law as a heap of authorities burdening the lawyer's memory, a trope
far more popular in 1600 than a century, even a half century before.
Abraham Fraunce complained that the law lay "confusedly scattered
and utterly undigested" in "vast volumes., 13 6 The "cases are many
in number which must be read, remembered, and applied, which
cannot be compassed but by extreme diligence," wrote William
Fulbeck in his manual for law students, Direction, or Preparative to
the Study of the Law (1600).137 Purveyors of advice like Fulbeck saw
a good memory as an essential "innate" quality for the would-be
lawyer. "And if memory be necessary for any science, surely to the
profession of law, it is of weighty importance, which because it does
pursue accidentia, and infinita, requires no help of nature so much as
memory, for the understanding conveys the cases to the treasury, out
of which it draws them. If the understanding be good, and the
memory nought, a man shall be a lawyer today and none tomor-
row." '138 Valorization of the lawyer's memory in part reflected the
changing shape of the "learning curve" between 1500 and 1600. Law
students of all eras have needed to master principles, doctrines, cases,
and intellectual mores. But as a legal culture heightens the value of
specific citation of authorities over "common erudition" or profes-
sional "reason," the burden of committing common law infinita to
memory increasingly becomes a challenge faced at each argument
rather than the initial phase of the novice's acculturation.
The growing importance of the particular citation qualified as it
provided a means to challenge the "oracular" status of legal
luminaries. A.W.B. Simpson has likened the common law around 1500
to a caste custom pronounced by the judges, serjeants, and benchers
who ran the Inns, self-validating in the sense that authority ultimately
136. Abraham Fraunce, The Lawyer's Logic (1588), 3.
137. William Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 35-36, see also 13 ("the law books are so huge, and
large, and ... there is such an ocean of reports, and such a perplexed confusion of opinions");
"Directions for the Orderly Reading of the law of England," [MS c.1648], Rawlinson MS 207,
fol. 263 Bodleian Library, Oxford. Works that reduced the law to order or "method" frequently
made this point. See, e.g., Terry Kevin Shaller, "English Law and the Renaissance: The Common
Law and Humanism in the Sixteenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1979)
(discussing John Hanmer's "Le Title de Assise en parte: reduce au methode, et digeste per
sections & subdivisions" [MS 1598]).
138. William Fulbeck, A Direction or a Preparative to the Study of the Law (1600), 117-18;
Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 12-23.
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inhered in these collective eminences rather than in the texts that only
imperfectly and incompletely captured professional tradition. The
combination of law printing and the tilt toward precedent-centered
over principle-centered argument weakened this gerontocratic control
of legal knowledge.139 Lawyers finding an apposite precedent or
record enjoyed for the moment the authority of what they cited rather
than of who they were. This invited a characteristic seventeenth-
century tactic not much in evidence before: the textual ambush.
Bulstrode Whitelocke, for example, preferred records to "table talk"
or "the discourses of others by hearsay only."14 He put his advice
to good use in the Long Parliament at the expense of the voluble,
error-prone William Prynne, correcting his quotations, "which
Prynne's haughtiness could not bear."14' Conscience, H.L. Mencken
caustically observed, is "an inner voice which warns us that someone
may be looking." '142 The more insistent the looking, the more active
the province of conscience. So too in the province of memory. The
"farrago of authorities" in the burgeoning printed lawbooks and
reorganized national record centers became more valuable as
argumentative resources as they became more readily available-and
more readily checkable, promising opportunity and embarrassment.
The years between 1500 and 1640, then, did not see anything so
simple as the retreat of a "mnemonic culture" before a "print
culture." The receding of memory as a repository of collective legal
tradition went hand in hand with its newly prominent role as an
individual storehouse of short- to medium-term, highly particular legal
authorities, with emphasis on the common law's infinita vexing
memory, and with valorization of remembrance as the lawyer's
professional duty.
Legal education and legal literature needed to take account of these
new demands. But there are many ways to respond to a challenge.
Schemes for organizing and remembering knowledge proliferated
throughout early modern European intellectual life. As English
lawyers wrestled with competing methods of recalling legal infinita,
they made remembering a self-conscious theoretical pursuit in a way
it had not been a century before.
139. I have drawn the idea of gerontocratic control from A.W.B. Simpson, "The Common
Law and Legal Theory," in Legal Theory and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law
(London, 1987), 359-82. My picture of legal authority instantiated in the collective lore of a
stratified, gerontocratic caste is heavily indebted to this article.
140. Bulstrode Whitelocke, Memorials of the English Affairs from the Beginning of the Reign
of Charles the First to the Happy Restoration of King Charles the Second (Oxford, 1853), 3:119.
141. Whitelocke, Diary, 590.
142. H.L. Mencken, A Little Book in C. Major (New York, 1916), 42.
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C. Legal Education and Legal Literature
1. Legal Training as Mnemonics: Bringing Art to the "Empiric"
Memory
The lidger-book lies in the brain behinde,
Like lanus' eye, which in his poll was set:
The lay-man's tables, the store-house of the mind,
Which does remember much, and much forget.
-John Davies, Nosce Teipsum (MS c.1598)143
[W]e shall the better address ourselves to the use of memory, when
we do truly comprehend the kinds, causes, and nature of the same.
-John Dodderidge, The English Lawyer (1631)1
"The most delicate and frail part of our mind," King's Bench judge
John Dodderidge called memory.145 Advice on reinforcing this
rickety storehouse, organizing its contents, and improving
memorization proliferated in late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart
lawyers' jurisprudential and educational writing. After all, a lawyer
with a poor memory, wrote William Phillips, "lays up his treasures
into a bag with holes." Edward Coke, Francis Bacon, William
Fulbeck, John Dodderidge, and Matthew Hale explained how the
right mental countenance and program of reading encouraged
memorization. Phillips brought together seventy years of their study
tips in his Studii Legalis Ratio (1662).1"
Phillips's mnemonic "do's" and "don'ts" give the flavor of this
prescriptive writing. Study with "delight" to quicken the memory. A
solid, constant mind prevents "vain fancies" from crowding out the
law.'47 Do not read haphazardly, too quickly, or too much at once.
"[G]reedy appetites are not of the best digestion. A cursory and
143. John Davies, Nosce Teipsum [MS c.1598], in Works, 1:112.
144. Dodderidge, The English Lawyer (1631), 14.
145. Ibid., 17.
146. William Phillips, Studii Legalis Ratio; Or, Directions for the Study of the Law (1662),
14-15. For advice on remembering, see, for example, passages by Coke in the prefaces to his
Reports, pt. 1 (1600) and pt. 6 (1607); id., First Institute, 70a-b, 249b, 394b; Francis Bacon,
"Novum Organum," in Works, 4: 162-63; id., "A Discourse Touching Helps for the Intellectual
Powers" [MS c.1596-16041, in Works, 7:101-03; Fulbeck, Direction (1600); Dodderidge, English
Lawyer (1631), esp. 12-23; Hale, preface to Henry Rolle, Un Abridgment des Plusieurs Cases et
Resolutions del Common Ley (1668), reprinted in Francis Hargrave, Collectanea Juridica
(London, 1791), 1:263-82.
147. Let the minds of old men serve as a warning, "full of so many figures of things, which
they have seen and heard,... that when they would bestow more therein, it ... has no void
place where to receive it." Phillips, Studii (1662), 55, and 51 (delight).
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tumultuary reading does ever make a confused memory," warned
Phillips's favorite quotable, Edward Coke.14 Record the law in
commonplace books under well-chosen headings. Engage in con-
ference with other students to clarify points in the understanding and
thereby facilitate remembrance. Attend moots, Readings, and court
sessions and "commit... the judgment thereof to writing, and not to
trust slippery memory." Meditate frequently upon the law. Call the
"memory to account for those things committed to its charge some
time before, and run it over again .... For upon the reading of a
thing, to commit it to memory without any more ado, is not the way
to fasten it so as to make it our own." '14 9 Pick the right reading
strategy. Take up the yearbooks only after mastering recent case
reporters, "as being the fittest to season our students memory
withal."'5 ° Order was critical, for
the memory is tabula rasa, a plain table, and as blank paper,
wherein nothing is written; and that it is most retentive of those
figures that are first impressed thereon. Therefore it behoves our
student to see that those first rudiments and opinions he obtrudes
by the authority of the reporters upon his judgement and
memory, be sound and wholesome principles,.... And, says the
Lord Coke, "For the most part, the latter judgments and
resolutions are the surest, and therefore fittest to season him
withal in the beginning, both for settling of his judgments, and
retaining them in memory."' 1
The best time for this regimen of study? The morning, when the mind
refreshed by sleep "is moistened with the vapors arising out of the
stomach, and so made fitter and better disposed to receive" the law.
For moisture "makes the brain pliable, and the figures are easily
imprinted."' 52
Dodderidge devoted twelve pages of his educational manual, The
English Lawyer (1631), to the physiological and psychological
dimensions of remembrance. Set in the back of the skull, the faculty
of memory required the proper balance of humors, moisture, and
temperature in the brain. 53 Unfortunately, different mental powers
148. Ibid., 100; Coke, preface to Reports, pt. 6, xviii.
149. Phillips, Studii (1662), 155-56, 182-83, 185, 188-89 On commonplacing, see, e.g., Hale,
"Preface to Rolle's Abridgment, 1:263-82.
150. Phillips, Studii (1662), 117, 127.
151. Ibid., 128.
152. Beware of studying after lunch. The fumes given off by the stomach digesting meat
"cloud and overshadow the clearness of the brain." Ibid., 191, 17, 193; accord Fulbeck, Direction
(1600), 116-17.
153. Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631). "Man's body being composed of elemental
qualities requires in the perfection thereof a temperature of humors, which also consists in the
temperate disposition of heat and moisture, for ... hereby it is made a more apt instrument and
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required dissimilar balances of moisture and temperature. As William
Phillips and Roger Coke elaborated, too sharp a wit and apprehension
"rises out of a hot and dry brain, which is of a contrary temperature
to judgment and memory."' 54 Dodderidge drew on Aquinas and
Aristotle to describe the taxonomy of mental operations grouped
within memory. People and animals alike possessed a "memory
sensitive," which retained "things comprehended by the outward
senses" such as a route between fields and a house. Humankind alone,
possessing reason, enjoyed an "intellective memory" recalling "things
conceived by the understanding and power of wit," for example,
inheritance rights to fields and a house. Paraphrasing Aristotle's On
Memory and Reminiscence, Dodderidge found in the intellective
memory two forms of recall. Memory (the actus memorandi)
immediately summoned "the representation of things past, as if they
were still present." Reminiscence (the actus reminiscendi) served as
a "discourse of memory" bringing back a "thing in a manner lost and
forgotten" by reaching for it through associations of time, place, or
company with an object or event still remembered. 5
Lawyers thought themselves more greatly dependent on the
memorial arts than their contemporaries in other intellectual fields.
They kept in mind the "infinita" of settled disputes and potential
conflicts. They lacked a focal text like Scripture or the Corpus Iuris.
They stood as custodians over a knowledge that unlike science,
medicine, astronomy, geography, and divinity did not exist in the
universe before and apart from the perceiver but rather lived on
through promulgation and recitation. Yet the content of Phillips's and
Dodderidge's mnemonic advice was neither distinctive to the law nor
new. The pedagogic, psychological, and physiological principles they
recited pervaded early modern learned culture. Students of rhetoric
organ for the operation of the power of the soul, and so consequently of memory. Natural mois-
ture must not abound as in children, whose memory is therefore in tender years most commonly
not of the best. And again, natural moisture must not on the other side be almost in a manner
exhausted, as in old men, whose memory is therefore worn, but it must hold the golden mean,
for fluid things are apt to receive but cannot long retain any impression, by reason of overmuch
moisture, which makes the impression loose, and at length utterly lost. And arid and dry things
can receive no impression for want of moisture, the one receives but retains not, the other
receives not at all. Wherefore as this golden mean must be preserved in the temperature of
moisture, so must it be held indifferent between cold and heat." Ibid., 18-19.
154. Hence the conventional opposition of men "who are very dull and yet of vast memories,
who remember all things, but can scarcely be ever made to discourse of and understand any
thing, and of men that are too light and phantastical who only talk generally, without applying
these generals to any particular." Phillips, Studii, 9-11. "The former sat like a barely-moving boat
overladen with ballast; the latter flitted like a ship without ballast tossed by every puff of wind."
Roger Coke, Justice Vindicated from the False Focus Put upon It by Thomas White, Thomas
Hobbes and Hugo Grotius (1660), 3-4.
155. Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 14-16. For another reference to actus reminiscendi,
see Phillips, Studii (1662), 55.
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came upon them in Charles Butler's Oratoriae Libri Duo (1629);
ministers encountered them in Richard Bernard's manual for
apprentice divines, The Faithful Shepherd (1607). The poet Gabriel
Harvey at Pembroke Hall, Cambridge, recorded them in the margin
of a civilian legal text he was studying. In the middle to late sixteenth
century, a young lawyer could have encountered them in the
Scholastic commentaries and original classical sources that Phillips and
Dodderidge relied upon: Aristotle, Pliny, Cicero, Galen, Quintilian,
and Aquinas.15 6 Or he might have consulted intermediaries such as
Thomas Wilson's Art of Rhetoric (1553), Peter La Primaudaye's The
French Academy (English translation, 1586), or Guglielmo Gratarolo's
The Castle of Memory (1573).157 By the early seventeenth century,
lawbooks brought together this mnemonic learning. And herein lay
the novelty-not in the substance but in the compilation.
Mnemonic principles began migrating into lawbooks from dialectic,
rhetoric and medicine around 1600. They became more accessible,
saving the student and practitioner the time and effort of research.
Their importation into the works of Dodderidge, Fulbeck, Coke, and
Bacon placed them within the law's own precincts, shielding them
from the suspicion of philosophical learning lingering among the Inns.
Their very repetition in different works and the citation of earlier
authors' advice by later ones suggested the centrality of improving
memory as a professional project. "Mainstreaming" we would call this
today. Most important, the physiological and psychological learning
that Dodderidge brought to bear suggested an ambition to tolerate
"empiric" remembrancers no more than "empiric" conveyancers or
pleaders. The rapid expansion of attorneys and solicitors by 1600
prompted barristers to proclaim loudly the inadequacies of "empiric"
practitioners who knew the law's forms without its deeper prin-
ciples.158 Learn the "kinds, causes, and nature" of memory, Dod-
deridge insisted, see beyond the surface to its "grounds"-its inner
workings, its principles of management.5 9 The disparagement of the
"empiric" remembrancer not only valorized the "art" of the barristers
156. Charles Butler, Oratoriae Libri Duo (1629), bk. 2, ch. 5, trans. Lee Hultzen in "Charles
Butler on Memory," Speech Monographs 6 (1939): 44-65; Richard Bernard, The Faithful
Shepherd (1607), 40, 82-86; Gabriel Harvey, marginalia on Dispositio Regularum Utriusque luris
in Locos Communes Brevi Interpretatione Subjecta [15701, in Gabriel Harvey's Marginalia, ed.
G.C. Moore Smith (Stratford-upon-Avon, 1913), 146-47; see generally Carruthers, Book of
Memory, 46-71.
157. Thomas Wilson, Art of Rhetoric [1553], ed. Thomas J. Derrick (New York, 1982), 415-
20; Peter La Primaudaye, The French Academy, 4th ed. (1602), 79, 83-86; Gugliemo Gratarolo,
The Castle of Memory, trans. William Fulwood (1573), Bi-Giiiii.
158. Francis Bacon, "The Advancement of Learning" (1605), Works, 3:270 (unfavorably
contrasted the "empiric' to the deeply learned expert, in law, medicine, and statecraft).
159. Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 14.
Ross
47
Ross: The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1998
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 229
against the "craft" of the attorneys and solicitors. It also underscored
the years of patient accumulation of knowledge that legitimated the
bar's claims of interpretive power under the rubric of "artificial
reason." Both a pragmatic tool and an element of self-image,
mnemonic precepts proliferated in lawbooks, forming another strand
of memorial culture.
2. Legal Texts in Memorial Contexts: "Cycling," the Method Wars,
the Art of Memory, and the Golden Chain
[A law report] signifies a public relation, or a bringing again to
memory cases judicially argued.
-Edward Coke, First Institute (1628)160
Surely method is so convenient a thing in the study of the law, that
without it neither can the understanding be well taught, nor the
memory well directed. It is not enough to have a great heap of
things that are to be read, unless the use or order and manner of
reading them be well understood: ... so the student must have a
care lest the order of his reading be confounded, lest the last things
be handled in the first place, and these things which should be in
the midst be put in the last place, which whosoever do, they cannot
only not comprehend the things which they study, but utterly
debilitate and weaken the strength of the memory.
-William Fulbeck, A Direction or a Preparative to
the Study of the Law (1600)161
Scholars of early modern and medieval intellectual life working
under the rubric of the "history of the book" have criticized
dichotomous oppositions of literacy to orality and text to memory,
preferring instead to stress the complex intertwinings of print,
manuscript, memory and oral tradition. 62 This approach can il-
luminate important aspects of legal culture. For while print was
gradually becoming a more important carrier of legal tradition
between 1500 and 1640, it remained imbricated with manuscript and
oral tradition, even in texts that polemically declared the superiority
of print to the "slippery storehouse of memory." But the story was
not one of simple continuity-the early modern survival of a classical
160. Edward Coke, First Institute, 293a.
161. Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 225-26.
162. See, e.g., David D. Hall, Cultures of Print: Essays in the History of the Book (Amherst,
1996); Harold Love, Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford, 1993); Brian
Stock, Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the Past (Baltimore, 1990).
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and medieval habit of seeing text as a derivative, or reminder, of an
original oral discourse extended through time by the artifice of
writing.'63 The advent of print and Continental agitation over
pedagogical "method" prompted reflection upon the nexus between
text and memory. Far from retreating in the face of print, memory
became a subject of more intense and sophisticated theorizing.' 1
The pervasive topos of text as custodian of an originally oral
discourse especially suited lawyers. Early modern law evolved out of
and circulated through speech in moots and Readings, in professional
conversations, and in verbal judicial rulings liable to "vanish with the
breath that uttered them., 165 Lawbooks preserved tradition from
being "wasted and worn away with the worm of oblivion., 166 But
preserved for whom? Lawyers gave two answers that usually
overlapped. First, books taught law to contemporaries and posterity
unfamiliar with a rule or the system as a whole. Texts were teachers.
Second, books recalled to lawyers what they knew or once knew,
presupposing a living tradition already shared among the writer and
readers. Texts were reminders. 67
It is striking to what extent lawyers stressed the mnemonic over the
tutorial function of lawbooks, imagining them as embedded within a
verbal and memorial context. 68 When Francis Bacon advocated
summarizing the law "under heads and titles," he warned: "But we
must take care that while they make men ready in practice, they do
not make them idlers in the science itself; for their business is to
163. Plato's Phaedrus, 275d-276b, was the classic medieval and early modern citation for
opposing "living speech" to textual "images." See generally Carruthers, Book of Memory, 8, 16,
31; D.R. Woolf, "Speech, Text, and Time: The Sense of Hearing and the Sense of the Past in
Renaissance England," Albion 18 (1986): 159-93 (presents evidence of Elizabethan Englishmen
thinking of writing as secondary to and derivative of speech).
164. Legal historians J.H. Baker and A.W.B. Simpson have stressed how print, manuscript,
and oral tradition served as simultaneous carriers of the common law. The abundance of
manuscripts and the centrality of oral tradition argues against mistaking "what happened to find
its way into print" for the early modem law. J.H. Baker, "The Dark Age of English Legal
History, 1500-1700," in The Legal Profession, 435-60, and Simpson, "The Common Law and
Legal Theory," 359-82. My Article assumes and builds on these important points by showing
how Elizabethan and early-Stuart efforts to improve "cycling" between text and oral tradition
made mnenomics a more richly-theorized problem for the profession. Print intensified rather
than supplanted "memorial culture."
165. Harbottle Grimston, preface to George Croke, Reports, pt. 3, Charles (1657). Grimston
remarked that judges' decision "being written in the memory of the hearers only" were "more
frail and fluid than human nature itself." Ibid. Law reporters, like the authors of other lawbooks,
commonly described their printed works as private aids to "slippery memory" reluctantly made
public. See William Lambard, dedication in Eirenarcha [1581] (New York, 1970); Edmund
Plowden, prologue to Reports (1578); Simon Theloall, dedication in Le digest des Briefes (1579),
iir-iiiv; Michael Dalton, "Epistle to Henry Montague," in Country Justice (1622 ed.), A3v; Coke,
preface to Reports, pt. 1 [1600] (1826), xxviii-xxix.
166. Ibid., xxvi.
167. See, e.g., ibid., xxviii-xxix, and pt. 7, iii-iv.
168. To be sure, the two roles overlapped in practice. I have distinguished them sharply for
the sake of expository clarity.
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facilitate the recollection of the law, not to teach it.' 69 Lawyers
often styled a written citation to a written source a
"remembrance."'7 ° Coke defined a law report as a "public relation,
or a bringing again to memory cases judicially argued." '71 Indeed,
memory both infused the creation and contested early modern case
reports. Royal judges did not circulate written decisions but spoke
their opinions aloud. Lacking transcripts, largely without shorthand
skills (which became prevalent during the seventeenth century), 7 2
reporters stood uncomfortably in the noisy courts taking sketchy notes
slower than the judges spoke. As they composed their accounts of
decisions hours or days later, they filled in the gaps from
memory-their own or the relations of a colleague.173 To reassure
readers, they boasted of assiduously cross-checking their recollections
against those of other witnesses. Through the late eighteenth century,
lawyers felt entitled to use oral tradition to supplement, even deny,
case reports. 74 They knew that reports bore only an imperfect
169. Bacon, Aphorism 87, De Augmentis, in Works, 5:106-07.
170. A few representative examples of this recurrent phenomena include: Edward Coke,
Third Institute (1644), 73 ("But (as we remember) the first statute making a new felony that took
away the benefit of clergy, was the Statute of 7 H. 7, concerning soldiers"); Thomas Ashe,
preface to Epieikeia (1609) (after Ashe cited a host of legal writers in his discussion of equity,
he added, "And here now I will make an end, being loth to abuse thy patience any further with
needless or unnecessary repetition of that which is remembered by others that have written very
lately of the same subject"); St. German, Doctor and Student, 73, 75; Theloall, dedication to Le
Digest (1579) iiv; Coke, "Proeme," in Fourth Institute (1644), Bi; id., Reports, pt. 3, xxv; Selden,
"Notes on Fortescue's De Laudibus," 43, 49; Thomas Ashe, preface to Abridgement
des... Plowden (c.1600); id., Promptuaries ou Repertory Generall de les Annales (1614), 4;
Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 48, 171, 185, 193, 223. 226, 231, 232, 236, 238, 239, 262, 264.
The prevalence of remembrance as a shorthand for citation is a form of the "oral residue" in
Tudor writing that Walter Ong noticed in literature and rhetoric, one of those habits of
"expression tracing back to preliterate situations or practice, or deriving from the dominance of
the oral as a medium in a given culture, or indicating a reluctance or inability to dissociate the
written medium from the spoken." Walter J. Ong, "Oral Residue in Tudor Prose Style," in
Rhetoric, Romance and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture (Ithaca,
1971), esp. 25-26; Woolf, "Speech, Text, and Time," 159-93 (discusses blending of sight and
sound metaphors in Elizabethan writing).
171. Coke, First Institute, 293a.
172. Harry M. Scharf, "The Court Reporter," Journal of Legal History 10 (1989): 191-97; G.
Kitson Clark, The Critical Historian (London, 1967), 87-89.
173. For examples and descriptions of this process, see Edmund Plowden, Commentaries
(1578), 410 (Newis v. Lark), 481 (Nichols v. Nichols), 514 (Eare v. Snow); Coke, preface to
Reports, pt. 7 [1608] (1826 ed.), iii-iv (report of Calvin's Case); Roger North, "Discourse on the
Study of Laws" [MS c.1700-1730], in Michael H. Hoeflich, ed., The Gladsome Light of
Jurisprudence: Learning the Law in England and the United States in the 18th and 19th Centuries
(New York, 1988), 31. See L.W. Abbott, Law Reporting in England, 1485-1585 (London, 1973),
64, 144-46; Percy H. Winfield, The Chief Sources of English Legal History (Cambridge, Mass.,
1925), 184-85; David Ibbetson, "Law Reporting in the 1590s," in Law Reporting in Britain, ed.
Chantal Stebbings (London, 1995), 78-80; J.H. Baker, "Records, Reports and the Origins of
Case-Law in England," in Judicial Records, Law Reports, and the Growth of Case Law, ed. J.H.
Baker (Berlin, 1989), 41.
174. Well into the eighteenth century, lawyers invoked manuscripts or their memories to
amend or overturn printed lawbooks, particularly reporters. Shaw v. Weigh (K.B., 1715), in
Fortescue, Reports, 77-78, and Backhouse v. Wells (K.B., 1703), in ibid., 135, provide represen-
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correspondence to what past courts did. Reports arose from
idiosyncratic notes and existed in multiple conflicting versions.
Though given more credence than memorial tradition, written and
even printed reports were continuous with it, rather than its
displacement.
Early modern lawbooks imagined themselves as but the tip of an
iceberg. The printed page rested upon and pointed to a mass of
implicit knowledge and experience. In the Aristotelian terminology
favored by King's Bench Justice John Dodderidge, the lawbook
prompted the mental operation of recollection through association of
"time, place, [and] company" (actus reminiscendi). The printed word
pulled tradition into remembrance as "the several links of a chain
draw and depend one upon another."'75 To understand lawbooks as
the visible links of a chain reaching down into a shared professional
erudition is to suggest why lawyers so frequently styled them
remembrancers or promptuaries, a usage that fell out of fashion
between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.1 76 The apologetic
fiction that the common law was the common custom of the realm
known to Englishmen in outline and to lawyer-oracles in detail helped
make plausible the treatment of lawbooks as prompts despite the
large gaps in the actual knowledge of readers.
In the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, the better
construction of Dodderidge's "chain" between text and memory
became a central problem in legal education and in the design of legal
literature. Sixteenth-century humanist educators inspired in lawyers
no less than divines and art faculties the ambition to reduce
knowledge to "method," to devise cogent, brief arrangements under
clear rules. Borrowing from the pedagogical reforms of Continental
legal humanists, English lawyers sought to "methodize" their
tative examples. See James Oldham, ed., The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English
Law in the Eighteenth Century (Chapel Hill, 1992), 102-05, 183-85; id., "Detecting Non-Fiction:
Sleuthing among Manuscript Case Reports for What Was Really Said," in Law Reporting in
Britain, 133-68; John William Wallace, The Reporters Arranged and Characterized, 4th ed.
(Boston, 1882) (reporters with lesser reputations for veracity more liable to amendment). A
modem law report, by contrast, presents itself as the full and final record of a judicial opinion.
The interpretive norms of our legal culture frown upon, if they do not forbid, supplements based
on oral tradition.
175. Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 16.
176. See, e.g., Ashe, Promptuaries (1614); Theloall, Le Digest des Briefes (1579), iiir
(promptuary); Dalton, "Epistle to James Lee and Thomas Spencer," in Country Justice (1622
ed.), [10] (Justice of the peace book as brief memorial of the law); William Sheppard,
Touchstone of Common Assurances (1648), A4-A5 (book as remembrancer of land law); William
Style, Practical Register (1670 ed.), 10 (remembrancer); William Brown, preface to Modus
Intrandi Placita Generalia: The Entering Clerk's Introduction (1674) (for attorneys, the book will
serve as a "constant help to their memories upon all occasions"). Plowden's prologue explained
that he styled his reports as Commentaries because the term "has the sense of a register, or
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notoriously disordered craft, widely perceived as a ramshackle mass
of particulars.'77 The topical rhetorics and logics proliferating in
Renaissance schools offered lawyers several services. Written for the
jurist Trebatius, Cicero's Topica showed lawyers how to "invent"
arguments about a legal problem by drawing it through a series of
topics (topoi) or places (loci) in the mind, prompting associations.178
The converse of this skill of "genesis" was "analysis," where topics
dissolved a case, oration or treatise to reveal the logical relations
177. Terry Kevin Shaller, "English Law and the Renaissance: The Common Law and
Humanism in the Sixteenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1979). Terry Shaller has
distinguished between the pedagogical and historicist/philological wings of Continental legal
humanism. The former advocated commonplacing, topical logic, and "method" in the service of
clearer, more effective teaching of the law. The latter hoped to purge the Corpus Iuris of textual
corruptions, demonstrate the origination of different parts of the Corpus Iuris in different stages
of Roman history, and trace the interplay of Roman, feudal and customary law in European
legal history. The pedagogical reforms of Continental legal humanists exercised an important,
and growing, influence on English legal literature and education from about the second third of
the sixteenth century, particularly their application to legal study of a revived topical tradition.
The impact of Continental philological and historicist approaches to law came later and touched
a smaller circle of eminent figures such as William Lambard, Thomas Egerton and John Selden.
My discussion in the next several pages of the influence of topics and dialectic on early modern
English law is indebted to Shaller's work. See also Neal W. Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of
Method (New York, 1960), 66, 94-95, 221-22; Donald R. Kelley, The Human Measure: Social
Thought in the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 209-11.
On the reputation of the common law as a disorganized, unmethodical heap of difficult to
remember particulars, see, for example, Fraunce, Lawyer's Logic (1588), 3-4, 57a-b; Fulbeck,
Direction (1600), 35-36, 117-18; Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 190; "Directions for Orderly
Reading," [MS c.1648], fols. 263, 268; Bulstrode, Reports, vol. 1 (1657); Edward Leigh, "Epistle,"
in A Philological Commentary (1658).
178. "It is easy to find things that are hidden if the hiding place is pointed out and marked,"
wrote Cicero. "Similarly if we wish to track down some argument we ought to know the places
or topics: for that is the name given by Aristotle to the 'regions,' as it were, from which
arguments are drawn." Cicero, Topics, 2:6-8. The "circumstances closely connected" with the
subject under inquiry, such as genus, species, similarity, difference, antecedents, consequents,
contradictions, causes, effects, and other topics, help us generate arguments "by a rational
system without wandering about." Cicero, Topics, 3:11, 1:2.
Suppose, for example, one needed to deliver an oration defining the common law. The
Aristotelian causes could serve as topics to generate ideas for the speech. Begin with the
material cause: What was the common law made of? Reason. But reason provides only the
starting point of a definition because much that reason commends is not common law. Reason
is a genus and one must determine what distinguishes the species of common law from other
species of reason. Therefore, proceed to the formal cause, the way the material of the common
law (reason) was organized, which reveals its essence. The matter of the common law was
organized, crafted, distilled by time, a lengthy time out of mind, whereof the memory of man
runs not to the contrary. Mixing matter and form together, the common law becomes reason
tried by time. Yet to what purpose? Seek the final cause, the end or telos of reason tested by
time: the good of the commonwealth (salus populi suprema lex). Now one has the outline of an
oration, specifically, Thomas Hedley's celebrated speech in the 1610 Parliament against
Impositions. He named these three causes as his topics, demonstrated the arguments that flowed
from each, and then assembled the resulting points into a definition of the common law as "a
reasonable usage, . . . approved time out of mind ... to be good and profitable for the
commonwealth." Thomas Hedley, Speech of June 28, 1610, in Proceedings in Parliament 1610,
ed. Elizabeth Reed Foster (New Haven, 1966), 2:170-76. Hedley told his listeners that he would
not consider the fourth of the Aristotelian causes, the efficient cause. For another example of
an author employing topics to generate a legal argument, see John Dodderidge's use of
etymology, the Aristotelian four causes, genus, effects, and adjuncts to generate an essay on
"arbitrement" (arbitration). Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 166-90.
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obtaining among the parts.17 9 Most important, for my purposes, the
topical tradition provided mechanisms for retaining and transmitting
English law-most prominently, commonplacing and "method."
"Commonplaces"-topics or "places" applicable not only to a single
subject but to any subject (such as genus and species)-fulfilled two
important functions in humanist pedagogy.18 ° Used to invent ar-
guments, they served, in Walter Ong's coinage, as "analytic com-
monplaces." By contrast, "cumulative commonplaces" compiled
quotations on important subjects (loyalty, duty, friendship) under
headings.181 These became a centerpiece of Renaissance education
in the form of commonplace books.182 Lawyers urged students and
practitioners to fill commonplace books with collections of legal points
and authorities arrayed under alphabetical headings (account,
burglary, novel disseisin, and so on). The secret of a good com-
monplace lay in the choice of proper headings. One had to know
when to select narrow or broad ones, when to divide or conflate, so
as to organize best the law's mass of specifics.183 This intense
concern with finding the right headings for containing particulars also
characterized legal treatises from the mid-sixteenth century on-
179. William Fulbeck's Direction (1600) demonstrated the process of "analysis" (breaking
down). It placed on the dissection table part of the celebrated description of fee simple land
tenure offered in Thomas Littleton's Tenures (1481). Fee simple, Littleton wrote, was a lawful
or pure inheritance that, among its incidents, could descend down generations but not ascend.
According to Fulbeck's analysis, fee simple stood as a species of the genus "inheritance," a
genus that also contained fee tail. "Pure" and "lawful" constituted differences between fee
simple and alternative tenures, thereby isolating the species for definition. "Pure" reminds us
that a fee simple was an inheritance without limitation, distinguishing it from the restrictions of
the fee tail. "Lawful" meant "rightful" and excluded fee simples by disseisin. To note that a fee
simple may descend but not ascend was to identify an adjunct or property internal (or necessary)
to the tenure. The point of this "analysis" was to express in the vocabulary of the topics (genus,
species, adjuncts) the logical relationships latent in Littleton's definition. Fulbeck, Direction
(1600), 229-33. See also Fulbeck's analysis of the Prior of Merton's Case. Ibid., 239-52. On the
theory and practice of analysis and genesis, see Shaller, "English Law," 63-65, 180-89, 192-94.
180. Unlike a "common" place, a "particular" place yielded arguments only about a given
subject such as physics, ethics, or geometry. Richard Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory (London,
1972), 29.
181. Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (New York, 1982),
110-11; id., "Oral Residue," 36-38. Francis Bacon made a similar distinction, dividing "invention"
into "preparation" (essentially Ong's cumulative commonplaces of stored-up arguments) and
"suggestion," the marks or places that "excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge
as it has formerly collected." Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning (1605), in Works, 3:389-
91.
182. Renaissance educators did not invent commonplacing. Medieval scholars regarded the
written commonplace as an expression of their image of the trained memory-a structured and
inventoried set of "bins" into which one put information. Carruthers, Book of Memory, 33-34,
174-76. The humanists, however, elevated it to a central place in their pedagogy, and the form
proliferated.
183. For but one example among many, see "Commonplace Book" [MS c.1600], MS G
R29.31, Yale University, Beinecke Library, Law School Deposit. The author not only broke the
book into "divisions," but gave each section a division number, so that the first heading was
"division 1," the second "division 2," and so on. He placed a tabula divisionis at the front of the
work.
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wards."8 Treatise writers translated the humanist aspiration for
"reduction to method" into a call for "apt division," using wholes and
parts, genuses and species, causes and effects, and other topics to
accurately map the law in the service of effective teaching and
retention .185 However much they differed in detail, the so-called
"methodical" treatises after 1550 offered variants of the same formula:
defining terms, selecting organizing classes, and breaking them into
subclasses ready to receive particulars.
The impact of Renaissance humanism and the topical tradition on
early modern lawbooks has been an abiding concern of the last
generation of legal historians.86 I wish to explore the subject from
a different vantage point, asking how humanist pedagogical reforms
reoriented the relationship of legal text and memory after 1530. To
begin with, what was new? Renaissance lawyers viewed topical legal
literature as reminders to participants in an ongoing oral tradition and
as written safeguards of otherwise fleeting remembered law. But did
not medieval legal literature do likewise? Bracton, Fleta, and the
184. William Staunford's exposition of the criminal law made explicit the shared
indebtedness of commonplacing and methodical treatises to the topical tradition. The title of the
work reads in full (in English translation): The Pleas of the Crown, Divided into Many Titles and
Commonplaces, by Which a Man Will More Readily and Fully Find Anything That He Seeks
Touching the Said Place (1557). See Shaller, "English Law," 257. William Sheppard also likened
titles to commonplaces. William Sheppard, The Touchstone of Common Assurances (1648), A4.
Much early modem English legal literature bore a structural similarity to the commonplace.
It employed headings (which might be a topic, a proposition of law or a maxim) followed by a
list of authorities, sometimes huddled in groups defined by the source from which they were
cribbed ("Nota que Dyer..."), sometimes one following the other disjointedly. See, e.g, John
Kitchin, Le Court Leet et Court Baron (1581) (part II on the court baron); Richard Crompton,
L'Authoritie et Jurisdiction des Courts (1594); Bacon, "Maxims" [MS 1597], in Works, 7:313-87;
Ashe, Promptuaries (1614); A Manual, orAnalecta. Being a Compendious Collection Out of Such
as Have Treated of the Office of Justices of the Peace (1641); Edmund Wingate, Statuta Pacis;
or, Perfect Table of All the Statutes Which Concern the Office of a Justice of Peace... Faithfully
Collected, and Alphabetically Digested Under Apt Titles (1644); id., Justice Revived; Being the
Whole Office of a Country JP Briefly, and Yet More Methodically and Fully than ever Yet Extant
(1644); John Clayton, Topics in the Laws of England (1646); William Style, Regestum Practicale:
or, the Practical Register (1657).
185. I have borrowed the image of "mapping" from Shaller, "English Law," 63, 173, 344.
"Apt division" is from Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 106. William Staunford, for example, urged
lawyers to adopt the titles of Fitzherbert's Abridgment as organizing categories that, through
careful division, could yield "certain principles, rules and grounds" able to "digest," "order" and
"dispose" the myriad points of English law. William Staunford, An Exposition of the King's
Prerogative Collected Out of the Great Abridgement of Justice Fitzherbert [MS 1548] (1567), Aiv.
186. See, e.g,, Wilfrid Prest, "The Dialectical Origins of Finch's Law," Cambridge Law
Journal 36 (1977): 326-52; Peter Stein, "Continental Influences on English Legal Thought, 1600-
1900," in La Formazione Storica del Diritto Moderno in Europa (Florence, 1977), 1105-25;
Shaller, "English Law"; Louis A. Knafla, "The Influence of Continental Humanists and Jurists
on English Common Law in the Renaissance," in Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Bononiensis, ed.
R.J. Schoeck (Binghamton, N.Y., 1985), 60-71; David J. Seipp, "The Structure of English
Common Law in the Seventeenth Century," in Legal History in the Making, ed. W.M. Gordon
and T.D. Fergus (London, 1991), 61-83; C.P. Rodgers, "Humanism, History and the Common
Law," Journal of Legal History 6 (1985): 129-57; Richard J. Terrill, "Humanism and Rhetoric
in Legal Education: The Contributions of Sir John Dodderidge (1555-1628)," Journal of Legal
History 2 (1981): 30-44; Neustadt, "The Making of the Instauration," 29-62.
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author of "Glanvill," after all, hoped their treatises would preserve
law through writing "to posterity forever." The "scholar" in the
Dialogue of the Exchequer (MS c.1179) implored the "master" to put
his learning in writing "lest it should die with you."' 87 E.W Ives has
aptly described the yearbooks of the fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries as "extensions of the memory of the legal profession,"
enabling lawyers and judges to "move readily from memory to reports
and back again, without distinction."'" Even the topical or-
ganization of Renaissance legal literature had antecedents in the latter
Middle Ages. Lawyers made commonplaces and abridgments in the
fifteenth century. Littleton's Tenures (1481) and Readings on statutes
employed divisions for expository clarity.
What, then, was distinctive about Renaissance legal literature?
Scale, theory, and ambition to reform mnemonic design. Champions
of topical organization saluted their predecessors-in particular,
Littleton and Bracton. But works of "apt division" were rare amid the
larger bulk of "unmethodical" late-medieval yearbooks, writ commen-
taries, and pleading primers. Renaissance lawyers used topical or-
ganization on a far greater scale, making central and routine what had
been exceptional and episodic. More importantly, they set out to
facilitate the flow of legal information between text and memory (in
both directions). To some extent, of course, all lawbooks commit
knowledge to memory, rely on memory to flesh out what the text
discusses. But Renaissance lawyers consciously designed topical legal
literature to do those things and praised it for achieving those ends.
Improving the process became an important challenge in the legal
culture, and bettering memory a recommendation for lawbook design.
These were among the stated benefits of "apt division" and of
"genesis" and "analysis."' 89 Topical organization, it was said, created
187. Henry de Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England, trans. Samuel E. Thorne
(Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 2:19; Fleta, ed. H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, Selden Society
Publications 99 (London, 1983), 2-3; G.D.C. Hall, ed., The Treatise on the Laws and Customs
of the Realm of England Commonly Called Glanvill (Oxford, 1993), 3; Richard Fitz Nigel,
prologue to Dialogus de Scaccario; The Course of the Exchequer, trans. and ed. Charles Johnson
(Oxford, 1983), 5.
188. E.W. Ives, "The Purpose and Making of the Later Year Books," Law Quarterly Review
89 (1973): 69-71.
189. Numerous legal writers linked organization under "certain heads" and method to better
remembrance. A partial list includes: Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 106, 225-26, 116 ("[Ilt is good
for him [the student] to have great care of preserving and continuing his memory, and therefore
it is a profitable course under titles to digest the cases of the law"); Ashe, "Observations," in
Promptuaries (1614) ("First, peruse the general titles of the book, and endeavor to have them
always in memory: so shall you through their variety the sooner attain to the thing you desire.");
Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 20 (to improve memory, use and keep a method and
"analyze the matter with all his parts and incidents which we do desire to remember"); John
Clayton, dedication to Topicks in the Laws of England (1646) (Clayton recorded maxims "in the
most familiar way of our books' expression, which is in various languages," for this "brings what
we have read in our books quickest to our apprehensions"); Shepherd, Touchstone (1648), A4-
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an outline map capable of receiving new information into an
expandable structure suitable for absorption into memory. 90 Well-
chosen "heads" (or categories) also inspired the recollection necessary
for building arguments. A general "analytic" commonplace such as
genus or cause served, in the words of the logician Thomas Wilson,
as a "resting corner of an argument, or else a mark which gives
warning to our memory what we may speak probably, either in one
part, or the other, upon all causes that fall in question."'91 The
"heads" of legal literature played this role. In this sense, these
"heads," "grounds," "generals," and "divisions" that collated
authorities for ready use in commonplaces, abridgments, and
methodical treatises were also topics of invention, providing a set of
categories (names of writs and crimes, listings of courts, types of
actions and processes, principles and maxims) to pull on Dodderidge's
chain of recollection. As Francis Bacon observed, topics of invention
do not discover the new so much as "recover or resummon that which
we already know ... So as, to speak truly, it is no invention, but a
remembrance or suggestion, with an application. '" 192 Bacon charac-
teristically thought about how to make them better remembrancers.
He refused to "digest" his book of maxims into a "certain method or
order ... through coherence and relation into other rules," because
"delivering of knowledge in distinct and disjointed aphorisms, does
leave the wit of man more free to turn and toss, and make use of that
which is so delivered to more several purposes and applications." '193
According to its proponents, then, topical legal literature enriched and
sped the "cycling" of knowledge between text and memory, serving
as a more effective transmission belt than the yearbooks, writ
A5; Style, Regestum Practicale (1670 ed.), 10; Shaller, "English Law," 272-74 (discussing John
Hanmer, "Le Title de Assise en parte: reduce au methode, et digeste per sections &
subdivisions" (MS 1598)).
190. Edmund Wingate's "Advertisement" in The Body of the Common Law, 3d ed. (n.d.,
after 1655) boasted that a student who treasures up "in his memory the common places of law
held forth in these tables, together with their coherence and dependance one upon another, may
be thereby furnished in all the general and necessary titles of law, whereunto he may aptly refer
any case he meets with, especially having also before hand, by perusing the treatise at large,
acquainted himself with the definitions, distributions, affections, rules, and examples, respectively
belonging to each several title." For a representative use of "heads" as the markers on an
outline map, see T.W., The Clerk of Assize, Judges-Marshall and Cryer: Being the True Manner
and Form of the Proceedings at the Assizes (1660). T.W. presupposed that local officials had
forgotten the proper style of assizes during the interregnum and needed instruction. After pages
of step-by-step instruction in how to run an assize-the cryer says such and such, the jury stands
here-the manual notes on page 31: "And many other things may happen in execution of this
business which time and observation will make perfect. In the mean time you must take these
as the heads."
191. Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (Princeton, 1956),
24 (quoting Thomas Wilson, The Rule of Reason (1551)).
192. Bacon, Advancement of Learning (1605), in Works, 3:389-90.
193. Bacon, "Maxims," in Works, 7:321.
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commentaries, and pleading primers.94 It introduced into legal
literature a mnemonic technology better than the ad hoc techniques
of the latter Middle Ages. This technology turned serendipity into
system.1 95
Alongside its practical legacy in lawbook organization, the topical
tradition and the educational reforms of Continental legal humanism
brought into English legal thought conflicts over the best pedagogical
method. The changing pool of students recruited into the Elizabethan
and early-Stuart Inns, increasingly drawn from humanist-influenced
grammar schools and the universities, were ready to stage their sedate
and derivative local version of the "Method Wars" raging in
European intellectual life. 96 These students had been exposed to
debates over the relative advantages of syllogistic and topical logics,
of Aristotle and his Renaissance competitors, such as the French
logician Peter Ramus.'97 The firm commitment of jurisprudential
writers to methodical organizational by the latter sixteenth century
raised the stakes.198 A minor rivulet of Ramism militant flowed
194. My image of "cycling" is indebted to Walter Ong, who observed: "Writing served
largely to recycle knowledge back into the oral world, as in medieval university disputations, in
the reading of literary and other texts to groups, and in reading aloud, even when reading to
oneself." Ong, Orality and Literacy, 119. "Cycling," however, means something more than Ong's
point conveys. It refers to a deliberate, reflective strategy for moving information between text
and memory.
195. Mary J. Carruthers has explored the memorial training offered by medieval grammar,
logic, and rhetoric, drawing her evidence primarily from scholastic practice. "The fundamental
principle," she writes, "was to 'divide' the material to be remembered into pieces short enough
to be recalled in single units and to key these into some sort of rigid, easily reconstructible
order." Mary J. Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture
(Cambridge, 1990), 7. Her work suggests the continuities between scholastic and humanist
memorial training. To sustain the contrast I have drawn between medieval and early modern
legal literature, which places discontinuity in the foreground, I need to make explicit two
limitations of my argument: (1) The vastly greater importance of topical organization to early
modem legal literature relative to its late-medieval antecedents does not imply as sharp a divide
in learned culture generally. I confine my argument to legal writing; (2) I have contrasted early
modem lawbooks to those produced in the fourteenth through early sixteenth centuries, not to
the treatises of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries such as Glanvill, Bracton and Fleta. My
baseline for comparison is the most homegrown era of English legal writing, the period with the
weakest ties to broader intellectual currents, falling in between the scholastic and clerical
learning of Bracton and the humanist arts training of Fraunce, Lambard, Coke, Bacon, and Hale.
196. About half of the late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart barristers studied at one of the
universities before entering the Inns of Court. Louis Knafla charted the growing percentage of
matriculants who first attended a university as follows: 1561 (13%), 1571 (28%), 1581 (42%),
1601 (49%). Many of the rest obtained humanist arts training in grammar school or through
home tutoring. Louis A. Knafla, "The Matriculation Revolution and Education at the Inns of
Court in Renaissance England," in Tudor Men and Institutions, ed. Arthur J. Slavin (Baton
Rouge, 1972), 241-42, 261 (Table VI); Prest, Rise of the Barristers, 109-12.
On the interest in method among English lawyers, see Shaller, "English Law," 170-220,252-75,
297-10; Prest, "Dialectical Origins," 326-52; Knafla, "Influence of Continental Humanists," 60-71.
On the great concern for method in European thought in the latter sixteenth century, see
Gilbert, Renaissance Concepts, 129, 199, 282-85; Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, 146-246, 282-317;
Ong, Ramus, 228-30, 304.
197. On the importance of Ramus in English universities and intellectual life after 1570, see
ibid., 303-04; Gilbert, Method, 129-44, 200-08; Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, 7, 173-246, 282-317.
198. From the latter sixteenth century, legal writers typically praised methodical organization
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within the ecumenical mainstream of "methodical" lawyers pursuing
the dominant system of legal classification: definition of a term or
area of law (often with a brief glance at etymology), followed by
division and subdivision into component elements.199 This general
program required selection among competing organizational
strategies. A "man can hardly tell which to choose," wrote William
Fulbeck, arching his eyebrows.2°  When breaking a legal category
and apologized for its absence. See, e.g., Ferdinand Pulton, preface to Abstract of Penal Statutes
(1579), Aiii; Theloall, preface to Le Digest des Briefes (1579), iiv; Lambard, Eirenarcha [1581],
Aiiv; Dalton, Country Justice (1622 ed.), [4] and [9]; Coke, First Institute (1628), 235b; id.,
preface to Reports, pt. 1 [1600], xxix; id., preface to Reports, pt. 4 [1604], iv, x-xi; Dodderidge,
English Lawyer (1631), 20, 190, 258; Clayton, Topics (1646); "Directions" (MS c.1648), fol. 245;
Hawke, preface to Grounds (1657), A3; Phillips, preface to Principles of Law, (1661), A2-A3;
id., Studii, 2d ed. (1667), 32-37, 124. Even the Jesuit controversialist Robert Parsons's program
for returning England to Catholicism discussed the advantages of bringing method to law.
Robert Parsons, Memorial for the Intended Reformation of England, printed as The Jesuit's
Memorial for the Intended Reformation of England Under the First Popish Prince [1596]
(London, 1690), 242-43.
After 1590, law writers labored hard to put the word "method" in their titles. To cite but a
few examples: John Hanmer, "Le Title de Assise en parte: reduce au methode, et digeste per
sections et subdivisions" (MS 1598), MS 76, Harvard Law Library Rare Book Room, discussed
in Shaller, "English Law," 272-74; Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631); T.E., The Laws
Resolution of Women's Rights... A Methodical Collection (1632); Edmund Wingate, Justice
Revived; Being the Whole Office of a Country JP Briefly, and Yet More Methodically and Fully
than Ever Yet Extant (1644). The printer of the 1611 edition of Henry Swinburne's Treatise of
Testaments and Last Wills decided that "method" had not stood out sufficiently on the title page
of the 1590 edition. He set the word in a larger point and centered it on its own line, giving it
a typographical promotion from chorus to headliner. Compare the 1590 and 1611 editions of
Henry Swinburne, A Brief Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills ... No Less Delightful, as well
for the Rareness of the Work, as for the Easiness of the Style, and Method. The title page of the
1653 translation of John Kitchin's Le Court Leet (1581) bestowed on the author a posthumous
honor unclaimed in the original edition: enlistment in the ranks of the "methodically learned."
John Kitchin, Jurisdictions: Or, The Lawful Authority of Courts Leet, Courts Baron... (1653).
Turning from advertising to substance, jurisprudential writers provided samples of their ideal
methods in operation. Fraunce provided elaborate Ramist logical epitomes for a selection of
Virgil, the Earl of Northumberland's Case in Plowden's Reports, and a section of Staunford's
Pleas of the Crown. Fraunce, Lawyer's Logic (1588), 120r-151v. Fulbeck demonstrated on the
Prior of Merton's Case his method of "analysis," the breaking down of cases and fields of law
into subordinate propositions through the use of topical logic. Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 235-52.
John Dodderidge presented a twenty-five page miniature treatise on "arbitrement" as a model
of how topical logic could elucidate the "causes and consequences" of a title of law. He explored
its definition and description; etymology; material, formal, efficient and final causes; genus;
effects; consequents; and so on. Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 166-90.
199. Ramists enjoyed elevating their master over rivals, sometimes with a polemical,
proselytizing edge. Ramus's translator, Roland Macllmaine, boasted that the "natural
method ... is able to bring more profit. . . than ... study in Plato and Aristotle." Roland
Macllamaine, "Epistle to the Reader," in The Logic of the Most Excellent Philosopher P. Ramus,
Martyr [1574] (New York, 1969), 14. Abraham Fraunce lauded Ramist dialectic over com-
monplacing, preferring the "law to be rather logically ordered, than by alphabeticall breviaries
torn and dismembered." Abraham Fraunce, The Lawyer's Logic (1588), 119b. The "loathsome
tossing of an A.B.C. abridgment" brought ad hoc incoherence. Id., 57a-b. But Fraunce's style
of Ramism militant made little headway. Legal writers preferred a less truculent methodological
syncretism. They fused Ramist with Aristotelian logic as a supplement to, rather than
replacement of, commonplacing. Lawyers here followed the dominant tendency among English
logicians between 1590 and 1640, which was to combine Ramist and scholastic elements. Howell,
Logic and Rhetoric, 282-85.
200. Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 221.
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into subcategories, should one split it into two parts, following
Ramus's preference for bipartite division, or choose as many divisions
as seem convenient?2. When using topics of invention to explain
the nature and incidents of a legal category through "genesis" (as in
Dodderidge's work-up of "arbitration"), should one follow Ramus and
begin with the efficient cause or follow Aristotle and begin with
matter and form?2 2 When should one reason from universals to sin-
gulars, and when the reverse?2. 3 When abandon method altogether
and display knowledge in aphorisms?2"
But to call these merely "organizational strategies" is to underplay
their importance. Behind the topical tradition stood the reputations
of humanist educators such as Erasmus, Rudolph Agricola, Philip
Melanchton, and Peter Ramus, and behind them the authority of
Cicero, Galen, Plato, and Aristotle. To assemble a legal commonplace
or study a methodical treatise was to invoke implicitly the intellectual
authority of these luminaries by way of the philosophical justifications
for humanist pedagogy. This added to Renaissance English legal
literature a theoretical tinge absent in the yearbooks, writ commen-
taries and pleading manuals of a more local, insular intellectual
tradition. Selecting between different methodologies invited lawyers
to compare the merits of Aristotle and Ramus, Plato and Cicero,
positioning them, however obliquely, in the European "Method
Wars." Ramus, murdered in France's Saint Bartholomew's Day
massacre and a favorite of Reformed divines, appealed
disproportionately to Puritans. Aristotle, as a symbol of medieval
intellectual life, inspired the allegiance of traditionalists and Protestant
"church papists." Enthusiasm for Franqois Hotman and Jean Bodin
revealed sympathy for a liberal course of legal study drawing on logic,
rhetoric, philology, and history and against the suspicious remnant in
the Inns of Court.20 5 Choices about method signaled philosophical
201. Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 95; Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 235. Bacon attacked
Ramus's "one and only method" for slicing knowledge into ill-fitting dichotomies that "force it
out of its natural shape." Bacon, translation of "De Augmentis," in Works, 4:448.
202. Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 181.
203. Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 222-23.
204. Aphorisms, Francis Bacon wrote, "representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to
inquire farther; whereas methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were
at furthest." Bacon, Advancement of Learning (1605), in Works, 3:403-05; id., "Maxims" (MS
1597), in ibid., 7:321. Bacon rejected the search for the "right" method preoccupying many
sixteenth-century humanists in favor of assessing the relative advantages of competing methods
in different contexts. See id., "De Augmentis," in ibid., 4:448-52; Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon:
Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge, 1974), esp. 5-15.
205. John Dodderidge set out and rebutted the stock criticisms of the suspicious remnant.
Dodderidge, The English Lawyer (1631), 55-65. Satires represented lawyers as disdainful of
liberal studies. The fictional Sir Ignoramus in a 1614 Cambridge University comedy mocked his
clerk Museus for studying logic. George Ruggle, Ignoramus: A Comedy, trans. Robert
Coddrington (1662 ed.), 24-25, 55.
Ross
59
Ross: The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1998
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 229
allegiances and made legal pedagogy more theoretically self-conscious
than had been true a century before amid the yearbooks and writ
commentaries.
In particular, debates over method implicated mnemonics. Ramists
treated the very assembling and arrangement ("collocation") of a field
of knowledge as a form of memory training. Their epitomes were
"classifications-for-recall," Walter Ong has observed, "so that working
with them [was] of itself working with a memory device. ' '2' Ramists
styled their master's "method" as the "best art of memory., 20 7 In
boasting so confidently of the mnemonic benefits of their classification
system, the Ramists were like every other Renaissance peddler of
method, only more so.2 °8 If better methods helped memory more
than middling ones, the quests for the superior method and for the
superior mnemonic went hand in hand. In the interest of superior
remembering, Fraunce championed Ramist method over Aristotelian
logic and commonplacing. Dodderidge and Fulbeck favored or-
ganizing law from general principles down toward particulars rather
than the reverse. 20 9 "Method" did not only signify a template for
organizing knowledge. It also referred to the prosaic details of
learning law-what books to read in which order, how to assemble
commonplaces. Here, too, givers of advice praised their programs of
study for strengthening memory. The search for the best method,
then, prompted and also depended upon comparative judgments
about mnemonics.
Lawyers' rejection of the "Art of Memory" offers a glimpse of how
this search proceeded. A technique of classical rhetoricians set out by
Cicero, Quintilian, and the anonymous author of the Ad Herennium,
the Art taught its adepts to commit to memory a series of "places,"
essentially bounded mental spaces such as the rooms of a house.
These "places" received "images" encoding in visual shorthand the
speech, argument, or information to be recalled. The images served
as "forms, marks or simulacra." Rhetoricians recommended using
active images of unusual beauty, deformity, humor, prurience, or
206. Ong, Ramus, 213.
207. Ong further noted that memory, "which had commonly been a ... separate part of
rhetoric," was absorbed by the "dialectic or logic in the 'method' which will grow out of the
Ramist topical apparatus." Ong, Ramus, 213, and 184, 194, 280; see also Howell, Logic and
Rhetoric, 148.
208. On the connection of method and memory, see Kelley, Human Measure, 209; Gilbert,
Method, 66, 142.
209. Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 20.
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whimsy, as these stuck in the mind better.10 Suppose one needed
to invent images to remind oneself of the operations of "invention"
and "disposition" in topical logic. A "hunter pursuing a hare" and "an
apothecary arranging his boxes" would do, suggested Francis
Bacon.2 11 By moving through the places in sequence, viewing the
images as prompts to recollection, the practitioner of the Art remem-
bered what he needed in the right order.
Advocates and merchants of the Art identified lawyers as a natural
constituency and clientele. 12 Tutors taught it in London, home of
the Inns of Court. George Buc listed both mnemonic and legal
training in his survey of the varieties of learning offered in that
city.213 Yet lawyers shared the growing Elizabethan and early-Stuart
distaste for the Art. This was a legacy of Erasmus's skepticism about
it, which informed later humanist thought, overlaid with denunciations
210. Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago, 1966), 2-10. The anonymous author
of the rhetorical work Ad Herennium explained that "the places are very much like wax tablets
or papyrus, the images like the letters, the arrangement and disposition of the images like the
script, and the delivery is like the reading." Ibid., 6-7 (quoting Ad Herennium).
211. Francis Bacon, translation of bk. 5 of De Augmentis, in Works, 4:437. The English
rhetorician Thomas Wilson gave this example of the Art: "My friend, whom I took ever to be
an honest man, is accused of theft, of advoutry [e.g. adultery], of riot, of manslaughter, and of
treason. If I would keep these words in my remembrance and rehearse them in order as they
were spoken, I must appoint five places, the which I had need to have so perfectly in my
memory as could be possible. As for example, I will make these in my chamber: a door, a
window, a press, a bedstead, and a chimney. Now in the door I will set Cacus the thief, or some
such notable varlet. In the window I will place Venus. In the press I will put Apitius, that
famous glutton. In the bedstead I will set Richard the Third, King of England, or some like
notable murderer. In the chimney I will place the blacksmith [Robert Smyth, leader of the 1549
rebellion], or some other notable traitor. That if one repeat these places and these images twice
or thrice together, no doubt though he have but a mean memory, he shall carry away the words
rehearsed with ease." Thomas Wilson, The Art of Rhetoric [1560] (University Park, Pa., 1994),
238, 300.
212. William Fulwood, the translator of Gughelmo Gratarolo's The Castle of Memory (1573),
thought lawyers could benefit from the Art, as he explained in a doggerel introduction:
How can the Judge just judgement geeve
except hee call to minde
The matters hanging diversly,
the truth therby to finde?
How can the Lawyer pleade his cause,
before the Justice seat:
If hee his clients matters shall
at any time forgeat?
Guglielmo Grataraolo, The Castle of Memory (in Italian), trans. William Fulwood (1573), Aiii-
Av.
Another verse of Fulwood's memorable poetry reminds us:
What profits it most worthy things
to see, or else to heare:
If that the same come in the one,
and out at the other eare?
Ibid.
213. George Buc, "The Third University of England or A Treatise of the Foundation of All
the Colleges ... in London," in Annales; or A General Chronicle of England, ed. John Stow
(1631), 1087. The 1645 library inventory of Simonds D'Ewes records an "ars memorativa."
Andrew G. Watson, ed., The Library of Sir Simonds D'Ewes (London, 1966), 201 (entry 866).
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by Ramist and Protestant educators put off by its seeming uselessness
and affinity for salacious and grotesque images.2 14 "Barren and
burdensome," said the lawyers against the Art, "little less than
dangerous and destructive to natural memory," clumsy, convoluted,
inferior to care, repetition, and method as mnemonics; and even if
successful, only an "ostentation prodigious" for remembering piles of
names and verses instead of helping with business. 15 It was unfor-
tunate for the Art's reception that its central value to classical
rhetoricians, organizing lengthy oratorical setpieces, meant little to
common lawyers, generally speaking briefly and "on the sudden" in
response to opponents' arguments. The Art's association with
mnemonic tricks did not help. Cyrus saluting all the soldiers of his
army by name, Seneca repeating two thousand names in the same
order as spoken to him: These earned the attention of legal education
manuals down into the eighteenth century but at the cost of presen-
ting the Art as a form of legerdemain on the wrong side of the divide
between the "vain" effects of rhetoric and the solid, if homely, matter
of the law. 216 The migration of the Art over the sixteenth century
out of the mainline of humanist thought toward Hermetic and occult
borderlands further marked it as peripheral to a legal profession still
ambivalent about syllogisms and Aristotelian causes and
categories.217
But if the Art of Memory found few friends in the bar, lawyers
seized on the mnemonic advantages of another classical inheritance:
the "golden chain" of learning. The image of a "chain" had figured
214. Yates's marvelous work traces the Renaissance transformation of the medieval
interpretation of the Art, the growing opposition of mainline humanist and Protestant opinion
to the Art, and its migration into Hermetic currents of thought. Yates, Art of Memory, 127-28,
231-42, 260-61, 266-86. English-language publications approving of the Art included Wilson, The
Art of Rhetoric, 233-41; Gratarolo, Castle of Memory; John Willis, The Art of Memory (1621);
see generally Howell, Logic and Rhetoric, 85-89, 103-04, 317, 341.
215. Phillips, Studii (1662), 16-17; Bacon, Advancement of Learning (1605), in Works, 3:398-
99; Fraunce, Lawyer's Logic (1588), 118a; Hawke, preface to Grounds (1657). John Dodderidge
preferred a "true art memorative, not out of foreign precepts, or by the help of imaginary places,
but out of the nature of memory itself," that is, from good study techniques and methodical
organization of information. But he recognized the "great facility" of the Art of Memory if used
properly. Compare Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 17, 23.
216. The examples of Cyrus and Seneca appeared in Joseph Simpson, Reflections on the
Natural and Acquired Endowments Requisite for the Study of the Law (1764), 7. For their origins,
see Yates, Art of Memory, 16, 41. Lawyers frequently contrasted the superficial frivolity of
rhetorical flourishes to the unadorned and weighty (if rude) substance of the law. For
representative expressions of this prejudice, which coexisted with respect for rhetoric as a tutor
of proper elocution and for the topical rhetoric tradition, see Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 52-54;
Coke, preface to Reports, pt. 3 [1602], xlii; ibid., pt. 6 [1607], xvii; Phillips, Studii, 19-24, 31-32;
Barbara Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, 1983),
251 (discussing Matthew Hale).
217. As Yates explained, "Renaissance Hermetic man believes that he has divine powers;
he can form a magic memory through which he grasps the world, reflecting the divine
macrocosm in the microcosm of his divine mens." Yates, Art of Memory, 172.
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since classical antiquity in two metaphors for organizing learning that
early modern lawyers combined. The rhetorician Quintilian described
the places and images of the Art of Memory as "linked one to
another like dancers hand in hand, and there can be no mistake since
they join what precedes to what follows." '218 As Mary Carruthers
observed, "the language that describes the formation of associations
as 'hooking' material to other things leads to a metaphor of recollec-
ting as fishing; as one pulls up one's line, all the fish on one's hooks
come with it." Fishing and dancing share the notion of linkage
commonly conveyed through the metaphor of the "chain" of memory,
most prominently in the active process of Aristotelian "recollection,"
where one association pulled upwards the next in the search for half-
buried knowledge.219  Dodderidge used this image," as did
Coke.221
Lawyers also invoked the "golden chain" of Homer that connected
the various arts and sciences "horizontally" with each other and
"vertically" with the divine mind. "The partitions of knowledge,"
Francis Bacon observed in the Advancement of Learning (1605),
are like branches of a tree that meet in a stem, which has a
dimension and quantity of entireness and continuance, before it
come to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs;
therefore it is good, before we enter into the former distribution,
to erect and constitute one universal science, by the name of
Philosophia Prima, primitive or summary philosophy.
22
Taken at its highest cosmological level of abstraction, the golden
chain preserved divinely ordered and mutually dependent harmony
among the arts, as the closely related concept of the "great chain of
being" did for the angels and corporeal creatures in God's plenitude
of creation.223 All things "above and below, formed one system,"
218. Carruthers, Book of Memory, 61-62 (citing Quintilian, Institutes, book XI, ch. 2, § 20).
219. Ibid.
220. Dodderidge, English Lawyer, 16.
221. Coke, First Institute (1628), 394b.
222. Bacon, Advancement of Learning (1605), in Works, 3:346. See also Robert McRae, "The
Unity of the Sciences: Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz," in Roots of Scientific Thought: A Cultural
Perspective, ed. Philip P. Weiner and Aaron Noland (New York, 1957), 390-97. James VI of
Scotland (later James I of England) commented: "But since all Arts and sciences are linked
every one with other, their greatest principles agreeing in one (which moved the poets to fain
the nine muses to be all sisters) study them, that out of their harmony, ye may suck the
knowledge of all faculties." James VI, Basilikon Doron [1599], in Political Works, 39.
223. In book eight of the Iliad, Zeus forbad the gods from interfering in the Trojan War,
daring them to pit their strength against his by pulling on a golden chain. Through successive
reinterpretations, the golden chain came to mean, according to the fifth-century Neoplatonist
Macrobius, "'a connection of parts, from the Supreme God down to the last dregs of things,
mutually linked together and without a break. And this is Homer's golden chain, which God,
he says, bade hang down from heaven to earth."' Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being
(Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 63 (quoting Macrobius). See also Emery E. George, H6lderlin and
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argued a favorite text of Bacon and other lawyers, Cicero's De
Oratore, "and were linked together in strict union by one and the
same power,.., for there is no order of things which can either of
itself, if forcibly separated from the rest, preserve a permanent
existence, or without which the rest can maintain their power and
eternal duration., 224 To Christians, God was Cicero's "one and the
same power." Being the "God of order, not of confusion," wrote
Dodderidge, He
continued the innumerable variety of particular things under
certain specials; those specials under generals, and those generals
again under causes more general, linking and conjoining one
thing to another, as by a chain, even until we ascend unto
himself, the first, chief and principal cause of all good things.
And this is what which Plato out of Homer, was wont to call
Jupiter's golden chain.2z
Dodderidge's invocation of legal "method"-particulars arranged
under specials, specials under generals-suggests how lawyers used
the golden chain to assuage anxieties loose in their profession. Was
the common law a disorganized heap of writs, cases, and pleading
tricks, a thing of shreds and patches, as unfriendly clients, civilians,
university scholars, and divines claimed? No, for like any other body
of knowledge, it stood connected to the other arts and sciences, and
thence to God. The principles of the law grew out of the "root, and
fountain of other ... sciences," wrote Michael Hawke. All sciences
were "the issue of one womb descending from the same intellect, and
are by nature so linked and chained together." '226
the Golden Chain of Homer (Lewiston, 1992), 42-44; C.A. Patrides, Premises and Motifs in
Renaissance Thought and Literature (Princeton, 1982), ch. 2. For a definition of the "great chain
of being," see Lovejoy, Great Chain, 59-66. Roger Tisdale, The Lawyer's Philosophy: or Law
Brought to Light. Poetized in a Divine Rhapsody or Contemplative Poem (1622), Blv,
(identifying the golden chain with the great chain of being (see margin heading: "Homers golden
chain: God, Angels, stars, elements")).
224. Cicero, De Oratore, bk. 3, ch. 5, trans. J.S. Watson (Carbondale, 1970), 197-98.
225. Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 236-37. See also Waterhouse, Fortescutus Illustratus
(1663), 117-18 ("God has so connected things in nature, that they depend on him, and from him
on each other.... Thus knowledge is perfected by understanding the principle, whence all things
arose, God's power, goodness, wisdom, manifested in nature's order and efficacy. The causes
final, or end, wherefore God reduced them to the position they are in, and has given them a law
which they cannot disobey without rebellion and apostasy, that is, his glory and praise, for which
they are, and were all created. And thus to know to the least punct of our duty, as rational
creatures, is that which the Philosopher intends by scire arbitramur, because made up of the
knowledge of causes and principles to the very elements that is somewhat of insight into the
whole Chain of Art and into every link of it.").
The image of the "chain" appeared in legal thought in a third signification, though not
relevant to my purposes here: as a synonym for law's "sinews" or "nerves" holding together the
state. The playwright John Day's character Polymetes termed the law "divine/And I'll compare
it to a golden chain/That links the body of a commonwealthJInto a firm and formal union."
John Day, Law Tricks (1608), lines 167-70.
226. Michael Hawke, Grounds of the Laws of England (1657), 2. Without awareness of the
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Was the common law burdensome to remember, as its students and
critics alike remarked? Yes, but the "horizontal" and "vertical" order
that the golden chain imposed, latent in the law's structure, helped.
Dodderidge made the golden chain the author of method and
coherence, and these of remembrance.227 The lawyer-Ramists made
his implicit strategy explicit, quick to see the mnemonic advantages of
a unifying structure in the golden chain as in their distinctive
"method." Edmund Wingate's Maxims of Reason (1658) viewed
prudent and just laws as
radii and effluxes from the eternal wisdom, having their exemplar
cause and bright idea in God himself. The mediate author of
these is human reason .... and that attempts may be made
without danger, to discover how the vast multitude of
cases, ... are all accountable and reducible to some few theses,
which ... govern and resolve the subordinate miscellany of
queries, and may serve for a clue and conduct, through the
labyrinth of that perplexed variety, saving us the labor of
charging our memories with every particular.2'
Lawyers fused the cosmological and mnemonic senses of "chain"
imagery. They characteristically found in a principle of cosmological
and disciplinary organization an aide mdmoire.
mutual dependence of the "chain of sciences," lawyers might become "perfect in some one title
of the law .... ready and subtle, but not deep or sufficient, no not in that subject which they do
particularly attend, because of that consent which it has with the rest.... Nevertheless I that
hold it for a great impediment toward the advancement and further invention of knowledge, that
particular arts and sciences have been disincorporated from general knowledge, do not
understand one and the same thing which Cicero's discourse and the note and conceit of the
Grecians in their word Circle Learning do intend." Francis Bacon, Valerius Terminus [MS 1603],
in Works, 3:228-29.
227. Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 236-37, 258.
228. Edmund Wingate, Maxims of Reason (1658), A4. Abraham Fraunce told the profession
that "method" was "an ordering of divers axioms already invented," akin to Plato's "vinculum
artis" and to "Homer's golden chain, whereby things are sweetly united and knit so together."
Fraunce, Lawyer's Logic (1588), 114v. See also Henry Finch, Law or a Discourse Thereof (1627),
2 (law "carries with it, and has as it were inclosed in the name and nature of it," those three
Ramist laws of lex veritatis, lex justitiae, and lex sapientiae, the "golden chain of all good
learning."). The Puritan divine William Perkins praised Ramist method over the syllogism as a
mnemonic, as "the golden chain by the comprehension of which the unlimited material of things
will be thus conquered, so that one thing follows most easily from other things." William Perkins
[G.P. Cantabrigiense], Libellus De Memoria Verissimaque Bene Recordandi Scientia (1584), ch.
4 (I have relied on a translation by Vincent Dinoso). Frances Yates argued that Ramus's affinity
for the "golden chain" derived from his ambition to capture in his epitomes the "natural"
dialectical order of the arts, and of the mind. He "extols his true natural dialectic as a kind of
Neoplatonic mystery, a way of return to the light of the divine mens from the shadows." Yates,
Art of Memory, 240, 234.
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Comparison to our own day and to the Middle Ages highlights
important features of the relationship between texts and memory in
early modern law. From today's perspective looking backward,
lawyers' embedding books in an underlying memorial context and
figuring them as reminders of knowledge already shared by the author
and readers appears distinctive. This habit of thought began fading
slowly in the mid-seventeenth century. By the late-eighteenth century,
the coparticipation of text and memory in an intertwined system of
retaining knowledge gave way as books eclipsed oral tradition as the
normatively primary repository of law. Of course, lawyers in 1800
tried to reconcile books and remembered lore as they did two
centuries before and do today. But in moments of conflict where
priorities had to be announced, books, particularly printed ones,
trumped contrary oral tradition as they had not in 1600, when
remembered law was supplementary rather than subordinate and
interstitial. Memory declined into an appendage holding the lawyer's
working legal knowledge that came from text, or when put into text
ascended to a higher level of legitimacy.
From the perspective of the late-Middle Ages looking forward, the
rise of the topical tradition and "method" made the relationship of
lawbooks to memory more philosophically self-conscious, linking it to
the intellectual foundations and disputes of humanist pedagogy. It
introduced a determination to improve "cycling" between text and
memory. It invited lawyers to make comparative judgments about
methods, and hence mnemonics, that signaled philosophical and
disciplinary allegiances (as with Ramism and the Art of Memory). It
helped lawyers see the mnemonic potential of the golden chain. As
the relationship of lawbooks and memory became more theoretically
charged, memory emerged as an increasingly complicated and
intellectually rich problematic in early modern legal culture.
II. WAS THE MEMORIAL CULTURE OF 1600 A CONTINUATION OF
MEDIEVAL PRACTICE? THE PROBLEM OF SPECIOUS NOVELTY
The "memorial culture" of the common law around 1600 was not
a discrete phenomenon-an institution, a doctrine, or an idea (the
"great chain of being"). It resembled a bundle of filaments. It was
made of intertwined but distinguishable strands in the legal cul-
ture-in legal literature and legal education, in "brokering" of custom
and constitutional argument, in antiquarian writing, the Method Wars,
and professional self-definition. Before exploring its implications in
the next Part, an objection suggests itself: Was this memorial culture
new? This Article has seen it as a fresh intellectual configuration (in
part incorporating ancient pieces). Perhaps, though, it lingered as the
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fading remnants of a medieval oral and mnemonic world, wilting in
the shadow of print. Or perhaps it stood for little more than a familiar
litany of classical and medieval mnemonic tricks and clichds. Decay
or continuity-either challenges the presupposition behind the rubric
of memorial culture that problems of memory achieved a growing
salience and theoretical self-consciousness for Elizabethan and early-
Stuart lawyers.
Give the devil's advocate the privilege of speaking first. The rubric
of "memorial culture," he argues, somewhat overgrandly describes a
medieval legacy that early modern lawyers belatedly wrote down and
sometimes printed. Medieval lawyers commonly imagined learning
and invention as a form of remembrance and looked upon their books
as aides m~moire.229 They cited cases and statutes from memory.
They composed mnemonic verses, which survive in notebooks.23°
The law, Church, and universities of the Middle Ages, each mixing
writing and oral tradition, taught similar recollective techniques of
classical provenance. Keep the mind free of distraction, instructed the
Roman orator Quintilian, maintain a good diet and untroubled
digestion, break down long texts into manageable bits, judiciously
divide and arrange subjects so that "the whole concatenation of the
parts" appears "manifestly coherent" and can be recalled through as-
sociation, meditate and meditate again.231 Good advice, said the
medieval Scholastics Thomas Aquinas and Isidore of Seville in
manuscript. Good advice, echoed Edward Coke, William Fulbeck,
Francis Bacon, and John Dodderidge in print. The dependence of
memory on bodily humors, the Aristotelian distinction between
memory and recollection, and the scrutiny of the Art of Memory
occupied Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, and medieval medical
229. See, e.g., Bracton, On the Laws, 2:19; Hall, ed., Treatise on the Laws, 3; Fitz Nigel,
prologue to Dialogus, 5; Ives, "Later Year Books," 69-71. Fritz Kern interpreted medieval
charters, folk-rights and privately produced lawbooks as in effect epitomes "surrounded by and
subordinate to the living legal sense of the community, or the law transmitted by word of
mouth,... never more than a fragment of the whole law which lives exclusively in the breast
or conscience of the community." Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages [1914-1919],
ed. S.B. Chrimes (Westport, Conn., 1985), 158.
The medieval understanding of texts as reminders rather than full representations, as
"recycling" knowledge back into an intellectual world primarily oral, continued with
qualifications into the early modem period. David R. Olson, The World on Paper: The
Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading (Cambridge, 1994), 181-82, 196;
Ong, Orality and Literacy, 119 (recycling); Carruthers, The Book of Memory, 8, 16, 30-31, 111,
256; Woolf, "Speech, Text, and Time," 159-93, 175 et seq. For an application of this point
specifically to early modem lawbooks, see Peter Goodrich, "Specula Laws: Image, Aesthetic and
Common Law," Law & Critique 2 (1991): 233-54.
230. Baker, ed. Catalogue, xxvi-xxix; id., occasional notations on selected manuscripts in
English Legal Manuscripts.
231. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, trans. John Selby Watson (London, 1856), book XI,
ch. 2, §§ 27-42.
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writers as it did John Dodderidge and Francis Bacon.232 The
proliferation of advice and asides about memory in early modern
printed lawbooks suggests no heightened attention to the theme.
Renaissance writers and printers commonly mined inherited medieval
ideas and motifs for salable material. More copies and kinds of ars
memorativa circulated in Shakespeare's day than in Chaucer's; more
Jacobean Englishmen saw visual representations of Dante's cosmology
than did Dante's contemporaries. 233 Far from representing a fresh
intellectual configuration, the elements of memorial culture migrated
from medieval lawyers' conversations into the jurisprudential and
pedagogical works of Coke, Bacon, Fulbeck, Finch, and Dodderidge.
Not the mnemonic techniques and metaphors they elaborated but the
books themselves, and the printing that spread and preserved them,
were new. The construction of a distinctive early modern memorial
culture rests on an insupportable claim of novelty, an illusion of the
sources. Or so the advocate would say.
To be sure, much descended from the Middle Ages-but not
unchanged and not necessarily from lawyers. Did the Scholastics'
Christianized Art of Memory and engagement with Aristotle's,
Cicero's, and Quintilian's mnemotechnics influence the insular
medieval Inns of Court? With the exception of Littleton's Tenures
(1481), legal literature of the fourteenth through the early sixteenth
century shows few traces of the Scholastic techniques of division,
association, and dialectic. Lawyers jotted down mnemonics about their
disorganized learning rather than crafting their lawbooks into "aptly-
divided" remembrancers, the late-Renaissance ambition. As Part I of
this Article observed, Continental pedagogic debates brought a new
philosophical tinge to legal pedagogy. And elements of the memorial
culture of 1600 lacked meaningful medieval antecedents-the bar, as
a collective, styling itself a national remembrancer, the assessment of
immemorial constitutional pedigrees, and the "brokering" of local
remembered law.
Further, and perhaps stronger, evidence comes from Jacobean
lawyers' zeal to find mnemonic advantages and to fret over the
elusiveness of recollection where their late-medieval predecessors,
more deeply reliant on oral tradition, did not. This reverses the
pattern one would expect to see if the early-Stuart profession
inherited a continuous or fading memorial culture. The golden chain's
232. Carruthers, Book of Memory, 7-8, 50, 61-62, 101, 116, 122-23, 148-54.
233. Eisenstein, Printing Press, 79 ("[M]any medieval world pictures were duplicated more
rapidly during the first century of printing than they had been during the so-called middle
ages"); ibid., 125 ("Although books on the memory arts multiplied after printing, the need to
rely on these arts decreased.").
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guarantee of divinely ordained harmony in the arts, for example,
becomes an anchor of memory, its original purposes overlaid,
mnemonicized, so to speak. So, too, with maxims. What purposes did
legal maxims serve? Lawyers cast these "nondisputable" principles as
the skeleton of the law, the foundation to the law's superstructure, the
root to its tree. Maxims gave order to cases, Readings, and "common
erudition," which "elaborated" upon them as Hebrew words grew out
of a limited stock of anterior linguistic roots; they tested legal
authorities for validity, as a touchstone; they suggested the law's final
and efficient causes.234 By the 1630s, maxims took on another office.
Their "prime use," as Michael Hawke explained in his Grounds of the
Laws of England (1657), is
the confirmation of our memory.., for by the observation of
these grounds, he [the reader] will be instructed to remember the
reason of them, by which he shall resolve all doubts of like
degree, as if he had remembered the express cases from which
the same reason and ground is reduced; so as by their brevity
they strengthen us, and corroborate the memory.
235
Law's "reason," its foundation and justification, underwent a similar
metamorphosis or mnemonicization. To Thomas Littleton in 1481,
reason underlay the "certainty and knowledge of the law." 6 By
Coke's time, reason, the "life of the law," had also become a
handmaiden to memory:
[T]hough a man can tell the law, yet if he know not the reason
thereof, he shall soon forget his superficial knowledge, but when
he finds the right reason of the law, and so brings it to his natural
reason .... this knowledge will long remain with him. 7
234. See, e.g., Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum, ch. 8:21-25; St. German, Doctor and Student,
57-59; Anthony Fitzherbert, New Natura Brevium; John Rastell, Terms of the Law; Edward
Hake, Epiekeia, ed. D.E.C. Yale (New Haven, 1953). See generally Peter Stein, Regulae Juris:
From Juristic Rules to Legal Maxims (Edinburgh, 1966), 156, 159-62, 170-76; A.W.B. Simpson,
"The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise," University of Chicago Law Review 48 (1981): 643-44.
235. Hawke, preface to Grounds of the Laws of England (1657). See also on this theme,
Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 260 (without maxims and general principles we need
"charge the memory with infinite singularities," which "is utterly to confound the same");
Wingate, preface to Maxims (1658), A4 (the "vast multitude" of cases are "reducible to some
few theses" that save "us the labor of charging our memories with every particular"); Clayton,
dedication to Topics (1646) (expressing topics, or maxims, in the "various languages" of the law
"brings what we have read in our books quickest to our apprehensions"); William Phillipps,
preface to The Principles of Law Reduced to Practice (1661), A2-A3. Before lawyers praised
maxims as a mnemonic for the law as a whole, they wondered how maxims themselves might
best be remembered. Put them in Latin and keep them short, suggested Francis Bacon and
Henry Spelman. This was the first step in linking maxims to memory. Bacon, preface to
"Maxims of the Law" [MS 15971, in Works, 7:322; Henry Spelman, "Of the Original of the Four
Law Terms of the Year" [MS 1614], in Reliquiae Spelmannianae (1723), 102.
236. Thomas Littleton, epilogue to Tenures [original printing in French, 1481], 319.
237. Coke, First Institute (1628), 183b. See also ibid., 394b ("Ratio est anima legis; for then
are we said to know the law, when we apprehend the reason of the law; that is, when we bring
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Reason and maxims traced a path that the legal culture as a whole
traversed over the sixteenth century. The jurisprudential writings and
lawbook prefaces of such late-fifteenth-century and early-sixteenth-
century figures as John Fortescue, Thomas Littleton, Christopher St.
German, Thomas Starkey, John Hales, and John Rastell focused on
the difficulties of ascertaining and learning the evasive common law.
Lacking the authoritative pronouncement that characterized leges for
the civilian and Scholastic, never compiled in a code or authoritative
Corpus Iuris, complexly intertwined with natural, revealed, customary,
civil and ecclesiastical laws-how was the unwritten common law to
be known? "It already is," was the apologetic answer. Christopher St.
German's doctor of divinity in the first dialogue of Doctor and
Student (1523) asked this fellow dialogist, the student of the common
laws, how lawyers could prove the existence of general customs and
maxims. Not deducible from reason alone, general customs and
maxims "may as lightly be denied as affirmed unless there be some
statute or other sufficient authority to approve them." But they are
"openly known" through common use, the student replied, so "it
needs not to have any law written thereof. For what needs it to have
any law written that the eldest son shall inherit his father, or that all
the daughters shall inherit together as one heir?"238 The statutory
compiler Ferdinand Pulton recommended publishing and declaiming
aloud Parliamentary Acts, because they were new or easily over-
looked interventions into a law otherwise accessible, at least potential-
ly, to ordinary persons. The governors of England have always
intended that "those laws which the finger of God has written in the
heart of man, or nature infused into him upon his first creation, or
reason, the only cognizance of mankind instilled into his breast, or
which the ancient maxims and customs of the realm, the very ground
of all our common laws have instructed him, be not to any English-
man having the clear use of synderesis, wholly unknown." 9
Most of these authors, though, were less interested in asserting that
the law was already understood and accessible than in advancing a
the reason of the law so to our own reason,.... as we can neither lose it,... and will direct us
(the learning of the law is so chained together) in many other cases. But if by your study and
industry you make not the reason of the law your own, it is not possible for you long to retain
it in your memory."); Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 11, 13 ("[T]here is nothing in the law which may
not be reduced unto some universal theorem, which may easily be conceived and remembered,
because it is general"); Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 19, 240,268 ("Every particular case
has his several circumstance. Circumstances are singular, and hardly retain in memory. ...
Wherefore when the case is out of memory, and the circumstances thereof quite forgot, the
reason yet remains, and is had in memory."); Phillips, Studii (1667 ed.), 140, 181 82.
238. St. German, Doctor and Student (1523), 69-71.
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program for making it so. Fortescue's maxims and general principles
offered a thumbnail sketch of the law's architecture as Littleton's
"reasons and arguments" marked out for the profession the surest
road to "certainty." St. German insisted that only familiarity with the
common law's multiple, intertwined "grounds" of reason, custom,
maxims and statutes opened it to understanding. Thomas Starkey
advanced a humanist program of codification and replacement of
"barbarous" law French by purified French or Latin. John Hales and
early law printers like John Rastell called for ordering and distributing
the law "in writing, to the intent the people might know what they
ought to do and not hang in one man or in few learned men's
heads."2 a In their effort to promulgate and bring order to an elusive
common law, whether in a critical, apologetic or pedagogic spirit,
these writers paid little attention to the problems of remembering the
law that so afflicted their successors. By the standards of Coke and
Davies, Finch and Bacon, Fraunce and Dodderidge, Fulbeck and
Wingate, their jurisprudence seems remarkably uncurious about
remembrance-and in a legal culture only lightly sprinkled with print.
The first volume of Coke's immensely influential Reports (1600)
opens with a pronouncement, rehearsed in a 1581 dedication to his
patron Lord Buckhurst, that suggests the turn in legal culture this
Article has set out to analyze:
Nothing is or can be so fixed in mind, or fastened in memory, but
in short time is or may be loosened out of the one, and by little
and little quite lost out of the other .... I have often observed,
that for want of a true and certain report, the case that has been
adjudged standing upon the rack of many running reports
(especially of such as understood not the state of the question)
has been so diversly drawn out, as many times the true parts of
the case have been disordered and disjointed, and most common-
ly the right reason and rule of the judges utterly mistaken.
Hereout have sprung many absurd and strange opinions....
Therefore ... I allow not of those that make memory their
storehouse, for at their greatest need they shall want of their
store.241
240. Littleton, epilogue to Tenures [1481], 319; John Hale[s], "Oration in Commendation of
Laws" (c.1540); on the early law printers' campaign for popular legal knowledge, see Ross,
"Commoning of the Common Law"; John Rastell, preface to Expositiones Terminorum Legum
Anglorum (c.1525). Thomas Elyot stands as a partial exception to this generalization. Elyot
noted that lawyers in the Inns of Court employed memory, a part of the art of rhetoric, to recall
their pleas at mootings. Elyot, Book Named the Governor (1531), 66.
241. Coke, preface to Reports, pt. 1 [1600], xv-xvii; id., Letter Dedicatory to Lord Buckhurst
[MS 1581], MS Misc. 361, Lincoln's Inn.
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Let Coke's quotation revive in the reader's attention the evidence so
far presented in this Article describing the lineaments of the law's
memorial culture around 1600. The point of this Part was to show that
it was not always there. If legal culture became "mnemonicized" over
the latter sixteenth century, why did it happen? And with what
political and intellectual consequences?
III. WHY EMPHASIZE MEMORY? GREATER BURDENS, CHANGING
EXPECTATIONS, AND FORENSIC ADVANTAGES
Again, our memory, register of sense,
And mould of arts, as mother of induction,
Corrupted with disguis'd intelligence,
Can yield no images for man's instruction:
But-from stained wombs-abortive birth
Of strange opinions, to confound the earth.
-Fulke Greville, "A Treatise of Humane Learning" (1633)242
Lawyers around 1600 may have emphasized memory for a practical
reason: they had more to remember. John Baker has described in rich
detail how sixteenth-century procedural innovations fed an increasing
stream of "points of law" to a Tudor bench newly willing to decide
rather than defer them.243 Parliament's growing statutory production
and the common law's expansion into manorial, commercial, and tithe
disputes increased the burden by century's end and increased it in a
legal culture encouraging and expecting the citation of particular
authorities alongside general principles and "reason."
Yet this can be only the beginning of an explanation. For legal
cultures identify and define as well as respond to practicalities. They
treat the assuaging of anxiety, the preservation of dignity, and the ap-
propriation of advantageous intellectual and political terrain as
matters of great practicality. The growing pile of things to remember
was but one reason for the prominence of memory talk in the
profession, one influence on its form and ambitions.
Consider, for example, William Lambard's description of judicial
records as "memorials" that bear witness to proceedings. A
straightforward enough definition this was, identifying the practical
use of records-and then Lambard added:
242. Fulke Greville, "A Treatise of Humane Learning," in The Works... of Fulke Greville,
ed. Alexander B. Grosart (1870), 2:11.
243. Baker, "English Law and the Renaissance," 471-76.
74
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol10/iss2/1
1998]
The Latin men use recordor when they will signify, to keep in
mind, or to remember, in which sense the poet [Virgil] said, Si
rite audita recordor [if I recall what I heard rightly].2
Was this a hard-to-resist humanist adornment drawn from Lambard's
literary commonplace book? Perhaps, but Abraham Fraunce repeated
it in a similar context, as did John Dodderidge and Edward Coke
decades later.245 This suggests that Virgil's Aeneid provided more
than decoration.
Aeneas's father spoke the quoted line when recounting the voyage
of the Trojan race from their birthplace on Crete to found Troy.
Later defeated by the Greeks, the Trojans laid the groundwork for
Rome, according to that city's mythology. The nations of early
modern Europe told parallel stories tracing their origins to Aeneas's
band of exiles. The English variant, given canonical expression in the
twelfth century by Geoffrey of Monmouth and still very much alive
in early modern England, held that Aeneas's great-grandson Brutus
settled Britain. Like his great-grandfather Aeneas and his distant
ancestors, the builders of Troy, Brutus sailed on a journey of
foundation. He gave laws in Greek to the ancient Britons,
inaugurating an unbroken stream that flowed into the common law,
the records of which were at the heart of legal memory.246 These
records were a national resource, like Aeneas's father recalling rightly
the early history of a people. The extended memory of legal records
and their professional interpreters stood, by analogy, where Aeneas's
father had stood in the Trojan world of oral tradition and oracle.
Never directly stated by Lambard, allusion and etymology (record
from recordor) hinted at the lawyers' elevated role in the politics of
national remembrance.
Lambard's interweaving of prosaic definition (records remember
things) with politically charged historical referents demonstrates that
the profession's intense discussion of memory around 1600 was a
244. Lambard, Eirenarcha (1581), bk. 1, ch. 13:70; Virgil, Aeneid, 3:107.
245. Fraunce, Lawyer's Logic (1588), 64b; Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 72-73; Coke,
Third Institute (1644), 71a.
246. Geoffrey of Monmouth, The History of the Kings of Britain, trans. Lewis Thorpe
(London, 1966), 71-74; A.M. Young, Troy and Her Legend (Pittsburgh, 1948), 57-58; Thomas
D. Kendrick, British Antiquity (London, 1950); S.K. Henninger, Jr., "The Tudor Myth of Troy-
novant," South Atlantic Quarterly 61 (1962): 378-87; Hugh A. MacDougall, Racial Myth in
English History; Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons (Hanover, 1982), 7-50; Richard F. Hardin,
"Humanism and History at the Inns of Court: John Ross of the Inner Temple," Res Publica
Litterarum: Studies in the Classical Tradition 1 (1978): 101-12. On Brutus as the founder of the
laws of the ancient Britons, which were in Greek, see "Origins of the Laws of England" [MS late
sixteenth century], Harleian MS 4317, fol. 4v, British Library; Coke, preface to Reports, pt. 3,
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cultural discourse as well as a straightforward response to the problem
of remembering a growing, more highly particularized law. A cultural
discourse-but as answer to what? The related concepts of memory,
oral tradition, and unwrittenness thrust upon the bar a set of
intellectual difficulties and political embarrassments requiring
containment or deflection. They also promised forensic advantages.
The interplay of these contestations engendered a cultural discourse
of memory and directed its ambitions.
Begin with the variety of ways in which memory and unwrittenness
became more anomalous and irksome categories by the early
seventeenth century. Even had the burden of remembering the law
been no worse in 1600 than 1500, the changing expectations of late-
Elizabethan lawyers would have inclined them to regard memorial
and oral transmission as less a given than a problem. A growing
percentage of matriculants to the Elizabethan Inns of Court first
attended the universities. Schooled in dialectic, taught to cherish clear
definition and organization, imbued with the Ciceronian call to reduce
law to an art, they arrived to confront with dismay a rudely arrayed
heap of almost infinite particulars.247 Sir Henry Spelman recalled
that upon his admission to Lincoln's Inn in 1598, "I found a foreign
language, a barbarous dialect, an uncouth method, a mass which was
not only large, but which was to be continually borne on the
shoulders; and I confess that my heart sank within me."248 The
contending pedagogic methods informing lawbook design and study
techniques made disorder and forgetfulness their foe, underscoring the
centrality of remembrance as they provided ways of improving it.
Civilians and university dialecticians unfavorably compared the
disarray of the common law to the greater system of their own
disciplines at a time when the Method Wars had firmly linked system
to mnemonic advantage.
These intellectual currents flowed through the profession as printed
lawbooks were slowly displacing the oral and aural learning exercises
of the Inns. Though the Tudor system of case-putting, mootings, and
Readings did not decline sharply until after the Restoration, printed
books were claiming a greater share of students' attention by the early
seventeenth century.249 The orally and mnemonically attuned
247. On the Ciceronian call, see Gilbert, Method, 95-96.
248. Prest, Inns of Court, 142 (quoting Spelman).
249. Ibid., 124-36; David Lemmings, Gentlemen and Barristers: The Inns of Court and the
English Bar, 1680-1730 (New York, 1990), 75-109; Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 6:481-
83; Mirow, "Readings on Wills in the Inns of Court, 1552-1631," 27 (arguing that around 1600,
Inns of Court readers "perhaps modified the aim of their readings and began to produce
readings to be read by their audience rather than heard.... A manuscript of Sherfield's 1624
reading of over 150 folios even includes an index. This post-1600 type of reading was seemingly
produced for written or printed transmission, rather than oral instruction, and no doubt had an
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learning exercises assumed not just the legitimacy but the centrality
of memory as a source and carrier of law. As students gradually
withdrew into printed instruction, they received less implicit education
in the normality of remembered law and more in the primacy of text.
Printed lawbooks that justified their existence by attacking "slippery
memory, which seldom yields a certain reckoning," drove the lesson
home." ° By the early seventeenth century, as the press was
redistributing law between a published foreground and a manuscript
and oral background, lawyers routinely alluded to the assumed
prominence of printed law, whether or not they approved of the
phenomenon. "Ancient terms or years, after the example of Lit-
tleton," wrote Coke, "are to be cited and vouched for confirmation of
the law, albeit they were never printed."'2 5' Early modern legal
publishing did not discredit remembered law or break the intertwined
printed, manuscript, and oral system of conveying the common law.
But as it allowed the gradual withdrawal of students from collective
oral and mnemonic instruction and promoted the elevation of printed
law to a hierarchically superior position, it began the long process of
marking oral tradition and remembered law as peripheral, anomalous,
and problematic.
Publishing also undermined the profession's ability to prune law
and legal interpretations by desuetude, cultivated forgetting, and
social pressure. As anthropologists and historians have argued, writing
fixes law in place in a way that oral traditions do not. Oral legal
systems undergo, in the words of Jack Goody and Ian Watt, a
"structural amnesia," a "homeostatic process of forgetting or
transforming those parts of the tradition that cease to be either
necessary or relevant." '252 Building on the insights of Goody and
Fritz Kern, M.T. Clanchy observes that the remembered law of
eleventh century England was
flexible and up to date, because no ancient custom could be
proved to be older than the memory of the oldest living wise
man. There was no conflict between past and present, between
important place in the history of the common law treatise.").
William Fulbeck set out a program of reading for novices, focusing on printed books. Fulbeck,
Direction (1600), 68-74. The provision of reading lists became central to legal educational advice,
especially after the Restoration. See, e.g., Phillips, Studii (1667), 97-123, esp. 97 ("The means of
this study are books"); Hale, preface to Rolle's Abridgment (1668), in Collectanea Juridica, 1:277;
Enchiridion Legum (1673), 83-88.
250. Coke, preface to Reports, pt. 1, xxv.
251. Coke, First Institute (1628), 249b.
252. Goody and Watt, "The Consequences of Literacy," 67, 30, 57. In oral societies, the
adjustment of legal norms in response to internal or external forces "is imperceptible because
norms have only a verbal, an oral existence, so that rules that are no longer applicable tend to
slip out of the memory store." Goody, The Logic of Writing, 139; see also ibid., 136-37.
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ancient precedents and present practice. Customary law "quietly
passes over obsolete laws, which sink into oblivion, and die
peacefully, but the law itself remains young, always in the belief
that it is old." Written records, on the other hand, do not die
peacefully, as they retain a half-life in archives and can be
resurrected to inform, impress or mystify future generations. 253
The thickening of printed instruction in the Inns of Court around
1600 appears, at first glance, as another surge forward in the process
Clanchy identified. While this was true, the full impact of printing
only becomes clear when one keeps in mind its influence on the social
organization of learning in the Inns of Court. In 1500, novices
depended greatly on senior practitioners, who as a group carried the
law within themselves, owning manuscripts and embodying oral
tradition. Instruction in tradition by oral and aural methods
constrained unorthodox legal interpretations. The teenaged
matriculants in the Inns faced correction in discussion from older men
who controlled promotion, dispensed smiles and frowns, and
pronounced on the promise of newcomers. 254 Novices lacked the
countervailing textual authority to oppose an instructor's experience,
presumptive command of "common erudition," and psychological
pressure.
By 1600, printed lawbooks allowed a greater measure of individual
and small-group study. Books opened up a space for the cultivation
of innovative or "deviant" interpretations. One could appeal to them
against an instructor's opinions and stares of disapproval. As
Elizabeth Eisenstein has observed of scientific training, print placed
before students a greater diversity of materials, highlighting contradic-
tions and suggesting new lines of analysis. Unlike manuscript
transmission, which allowed for redaction and pruning of texts during
each round of copying, legal publishing put out standardized texts that
remained "fixed." These were cheaper, more widely available, and
accessible through markets rather than through patrons' selective
lending.255 More thoroughly than manuscript, print undermined the
253. Clanchy, From Memory, 296, (citing id., "Remembering the Past and the Good Old
Law," 55 History (1970): 172, and Kern, Kingship, 179).
254. Simpson, "The Common Law," 359-82.
255. Anthropologists and historians have argued that the movement from oral to written to
printed transmission of knowledge increases awareness of contradiction and anomaly. According
to Jack Goody, "contradiction takes on a different dimension when the text is available as an
instrument of comparison. This is because contradictions become 'obvious' and 'exact' when
placed side by side .. " Goody, Logic of Writing, 163; Goody and Watt, "Consequences of
Literacy," 48-49. J.H. Baker noted that "the existence of printed books ... drove some of the
readers to forsake sound common learning and indulge in the flights of fancy for which Coke
was to castigate them." Baker, "The Inns of Court," 282. On the importance of print "fixing"
text, and on the relatively greater intellectual independence that apprentices enjoyed in print
rather than oral/chirographic pedagogical regimes, see Eisenstein, Printing Press, 101-02, 113-24,
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"structural amnesia" that had continually consigned bits of law to the
forgotten. Francis Bacon implicitly recognized this dynamic in
proposing that the press supply the remedy to the ill it helped create.
Bacon advised reprinting records, charters, yearbooks and judicial
decisions, leaving out obsolete law, frivolous questions, repetitious
points, and antinomies. Overruled cases "season the wits of students
in a contrary sense of law ... [I]dle queries, which are but seminaries
of doubts and incertainties, . . . were better to die than to be put into
the books."256 In sum, then, the students of 1600, in comparison to
their predecessors of a century before, could develop or learn about
a greater range of doctrines and interpretation while experiencing
fewer informational and psychological constraints and less intensive
early acculturation into orthodoxy.2 7 Did this tilt toward invention
over constraint, this development of a more expansive, ragged, and
disharmonious tradition to be remembered, contribute to the anxiety
about recalling the law?
Even more directly, a variety of critiques of "tradition" in early
modern England put pressure on a law taught "by tradition as well as
by books., 258 The Protestant assault on Catholic Tradition in the
name of Scripture was the most potent and analogically disturbing of
these, particularly since lawyers uncomfortably often were figured as
ersatz "papists." The priest-controversialist "N.S." prefaced his anti-
Protestant tract Pseudo-Scripturist (1623) with a dedication to the
judges of England. Considered "objectively" (as Marxists used that
word, for the purpose of ideological transposition), the common
lawyers' interpretive commitments appeared "Catholic." Did not
lawyers acknowledge the impossibility of a self-defining and complete
law, as Catholics did for Scripture, and so insist on the necessity of an
''external" interpreter and a corpus of unwritten traditions? Did not
lawyers restrict the prerogative of judging to publicly appointed
experts rather than open it to "every private man," however con-
vinced of his "revealing spirit"? Did not lawyers know that the laws
cannot "prove themselves" but require a professional tradition to
identify them?259
689.
256. Francis Bacon, "Proposition Touching Amendment of Laws" [MS 1616], in Works,
13:68-69.
257. Though far afield in subject matter, Robert Cover's "Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,"
Harvard Law Review 97 (1983): 4-68, has helped me think about this problem. To borrow
Cover's vocabulary, the social and technological changes in legal education between 1500 and
1640 fostered the profession's "jurisgenerative" capabilities while eroding its countervailing
"jurispathic" restraints.
258. Davies, preface to Irish Reports [1615], in Works, 2:254-55.
259. N.S., "Epistle," in The Pseudo-Scripturist (1623), [6]-[11.
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The hermeneutical fellowship that N.S. found between the priest
and the judge no doubt horrified the bar-and not simply out of anti-
"papist" prejudice. The association of legal and Catholic tradition
invited the redirection of Protestant tropes of denunciation. Like
Catholics, lawyers manipulated tradition to support whatever positions
they fancied, charged James I. Papists "allege scriptures and will
interpret the same. The Judges allege statutes and reserve the
exposition thereof to themselves. '' 2' Both Catholic and legal
tradition decayed over time, a weakness of "unwritten" knowledge
("unwritten" here signifying not the purely oral but the absence of an
authoritative textual expression like Scripture or a code). "What
hazard the truth is in when it passes through the hands of report,"
wrote Richard Hooker:
how maimed and deformed it becomes .... How miserable had
the state of the Church of God been long ere this, if wanting the
sacred Scripture, we had no record of his Laws but only the
memory of man receiving the same by report and relation from
his predecessors? 261
Yet if suspicion of oral tradition began in religious polemic, it did
not end there. As D.R. Woolf, Adam Fox, and Andy Wood have
shown, seventeenth-century antiquaries, heralds, judges, and historians
together became increasingly suspicious of remembered knowledge.
By 1700, Woolf concludes, the written record had "elbowed oral
tradition aside, marginalizing it as an acceptable historical
source." 262 Members of the Royal Society read in their Transactions
a "mathematical" estimation of the rate of decay of oral transmis-
260. James I made this statement at a conference of judges, divines and civilians in 1608.
Roland G. Usher, "James I and Sir Edward Coke," English Historical Review 18 (1903): 669
(citing Julius Caesar's notes, Lansdowne MS 160, fols. 423-24). Francis Bacon warned that judges
who stray from "jus dicere" into "jus dare" arrogate an authority like the Church of Rome,
"which under pretext of exposition of Scripture does not stick to add and alter, and to
pronounce that which they do not find, and by show of antiquity, to introduce novelty." Bacon,
"Of Judicature," in Essays (1625), in Works, 6:506. See also Fulke Greville, "A Treatise of
Monarchy" [MS c. 1600-1610], verse 270, in The Remains: Being Poems of Monarchy and
Religion, ed. G.A. Wilkes (Oxford, 1965), 102; Samuel Butler, Characters and Passages from the
Note-Books, ed. A.R. Waller (Cambridge, 1908), 396.
261. Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity [1594], ed. John Keble, R.W.
Church, and F. Paget (Ellicott City, 1994), bk. 1, ch. 13:266.
262. D.R. Woolf, "The 'Common Voice': History, Folklore and Oral Tradition in Early
Modern England," Past and Present 120 (1988): 26-52, 47; Fox, "Custom, Memory," 110-11; id.,
"Aspects of Oral Culture and its Development in Early Modern England" (Ph.D. diss.,
Cambridge University, 1992), 330-49, esp. 336 and 348; Andy Wood, "Custom, Identity," in The
Experience of Authority, 249-85.
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sion.263 Matthew Hale's post-Restoration History of the Common
Law hastened to insist that leges non scriptae were not
only oral, or communicated... merely by word. For all those
laws have their several monuments in writing, ... and without
which they would soon lose all kind of certainty.2"
The common law was a tradition because it was "unwritten," a lex
non scripta, in contrast to the "written" laws of statute, Scripture,
codes, the Corpus Iuris Civilis, and the Corpus Iuris Canonici.
265
This designation compromised the forensic position of lawyers. Soon
after the crystallization of the royal courts, the twelfth-century author
of "Glanvill" appeared troubled by the distinction between written
and unwritten laws made by Justinian's Institutes.266 "Although the
laws of England are not written, it does not seem absurd to call them
laws ... for this also is a law, that 'what pleases the prince has the
force of law.' For if, merely for lack of writing, they were not deemed
to be laws, then surely writing would seem to supply to written laws
a force of greater authority than either the justice of him who decrees
them or the reason of him who establishes them., 267 Glanvill's worry
grew more pressing after the Reformation set England's customary lex
non scripta against Rome's canon law and the written civil law of
Catholic rivals France and Spain. The polemics disputing who enjoyed
the "better" law put pressure on the common law's point of vul-
nerability: being unwritten, was it as dignified? "Our law," complained
Thomas Williams in a 1558 Reading, "has been by some persons of
late days vilified and condemned, in regard that it is not a certain law
digested into great volumes, like the civil Law, nor used in any other
country."2" In his farewell address to Gray's Inn, Christopher
263. [A member of the Royal Society], "A Calculation of the Credibility of Human
Testimony," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 21 (1699): 359-65, esp. 364 ("And
therefore if oral tradition ... be supposed to be credible, after twenty years, at 19/20ths of
certainty, or but 9/10ths, or 4/6ths; a written tradition may be well imagined to continue, by the
joint copies that may be taken of it ... during the space of a 100, if not 200 years; and to be
then credible at 100/101ths of certainty .... It is plain that written tradition, if preserved but by
a single succession of copies, will not lose half of its full certainty, until seventy times a hundred
(if not two hundred) years are past; that is, seven thousand, if not fourteen thousand years.").
264. Matthew Hale, History of the Common Law of England (1713), ed. Charles M. Gray
(Chicago, 1971), 16, 44.
265. Common lawyers, civilians and canonists alike drew on a wide variety of texts as well
as on professional convention. The contrast between an "unwritten"common law and the variety
of written legal systems mattered less in day-to-day transmission of law than in political and
ideological scuffles over legitimation and dignity.
266. Justinian, Institutes, book I, tit. 2.
267. Prologue to The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly
Called Glanvill, ed. G.D.G. Hall (Oxford, 1993), 2. Bracton acknowledged that English laws
were not written leges, but derived from usage and custom.
268. Thomas Williams, preface to The Excellency and Preeminence of the Law of England
Above All Other Human Laws in the World. Asserted in a Learned Reading upon the Statute of
35 H. 8 Cap. 6. Concerning Trials by Jury of Twelve Men [MS 1557 or 1558] (London, 1680).
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Yelverton paused to pout: though the common law "be not written as
the laws of the Romans were, yet are they not inferior to theirs." '269
But more was at stake than sinking into a lower stratum in the
taxonomy of European legal systems. Citing Glanvill's tepid defense
of the common law's honor-"it does not seem absurd to call them
laws"-Chancellor Ellesmere suspected that the debate itself
weakened "the ground and principles of all government." It
threatened to overthrow the law, he puffed, and then added more
reasonably, "or at least to cast an aspersion upon it, as though it were
weak and uncertain., 27
0
Dignity aside, could a lex non scripta do its work as well as a lex
scripta, for instance, set boundaries around power? Aristotle had
asked whether a polis should trust to written law or to the discretion
of a wise magistrate.27' Early modern jurisprudes and divines who
came out for written law pointed to its very "writtenness" as
important in restraining the will and whims of rulers, an emphasis
encouraged by sixteenth-century Continental apologists for the
"written reason" of Roman law against its local and customary rivals.
A written law, they said, was a stable and certain law-more easily
found than the natural law, whose dictates original sin obscured;
public, shared, and less variant than custom and men's "reason";
susceptible to far slower degeneration over time than oral law. Had
not the Romans' Twelve Tables dampened their troubles? Had not
Solon's laws brought peace to factious Athens? But as a lex non
scripta, the common law might prove a weaker bulwark against
overbearing rulers, a fear that its widely perceived uncertainty in
private law adjudication only encouraged. By the early seventeenth
century, these suspicions gained strength as the Stuart kings prevailed
on the great test cases of impositions, imprisonment (the Five Knights'
Case), and ship money.272 Disappointed royalists, meanwhile, turned
The anonymous author of "The Origin of the Laws of England" [MS late sixteenth century],
Harleian MS 4317, fol. 2v, British Library, assured his readers that the laws of England were
written.
269. Christopher Yelverton, The Farewell Address of Sir Christopher Yelverton to the
Honorable Society of Gray's Inn on Becoming Queen's Serjeant and Leaving the Society in 1589
[MS 1589] (London, 1882), 21.
270. Lord Chancellor Ellesmere [Thomas Egerton], "The Speech of the Lord Chancellor of
England" (1608), in Knafla, Tracts of Ellesmere, 216.
271. Aristotle, Politics, bk. 3, ch. 15, 1286a-b, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard
McKeon (New York, 1941), 199-200.
272. Hale[s], "Oration in Commendation of Laws" (c.1540); Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 15-20;
Bulstrode, preface to Reports, pt. 3 (1659); Henry Bullinger, "Of the Office of the Magistrate"
(1559), in The Decades of Henry Bullinger, ed. Thomas Harding, Parker Society Publications 7
(Cambridge, 1849), 341-42; Gerald Strauss, Law, Resistance, and the State: The Opposition to
Roman Law in Reformation Germany (Princeton, 1986), 34-35, 69, 92; James Q. Whitman, The
Legacy of Roman Law in the German Romantic Era: Historical Vision and Legal Change
(Princeton, 1990), 28; Conrad Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-1629 (Oxford,
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the topos against perceived common law obstructionism. The judges,
complained Archbishop William Laud,
have liberty to retain more in scrinio pectoris than is fitting; and
which come a little too near that "arbitrary government" so
much.., found fault with: whereas there is no kingdom... that
has a settled government, but it has also a text, or a corpus juris
of the laws written, save England.273
Lex non scripta appeared retrograde as well as ineffectual given the
prevalence of evolutionary stories tracing the progress of law from
oral to written stages. The different versions of these narratives
agreed in their terminus: writing. Lord Chancellor Ellesmere argued
in Calvin's Case that the common law and civil law had moved along
a similar path away from oral usages. Born in customs whose "force
does not begin or hang suspended from writing," they generated
books that encapsulated, but did not authorize or empower, the
foundational usages. Solidification in text brought convenience and
"constancy in memory." Ellesmere minimized the honor that writing
supposedly won the lex scripta by highlighting, or inventing, a
common developmental trajectory with England's lex non scripta.
John Fortescue described princes transforming customs and the law
of nature into "something of the nature of statutes" through written
promulgation. Henry Spelman thought that the reception of Chris-
tianity prompted early European kingdoms using oral law to put their
constitutions into writing. All three accounts assumed that progressive
legal evolution aimed at the written. Even more troubling, Ellesmere's
and especially Spelman's observations rested on a Continental legal
humanist tenet that they did not adopt but implicitly called to mind:
that the movement from unwritten custom to written law represented
growth from barbarism toward civility.274
King's Bench Justice John Dodderidge assumed a trajectory toward
the written text in legal literature. He portrayed law reports as
gradually superseding the "natural reason" more important in the
early days of the common law. The "artificial" reason of the law was
"but the imitation of nature," a distillation over time of the "natural"
deductions from "causes, effects, parts, consequents, mischiefs, and
1979), 348-49.
273. William Laud, The History of the Troubles and Trial of... William Laud [MS 1641]
(1694), reprinted in id., The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, William Laud, (New
York, 1975), 4:399.
274. Ellesmere, argument in Calvin's Case (1608), in Tracts of Ellesmere, 217-18; Fortescue,
De Laudibus, 37 (Chapter 15); Spelman, "Of the Original of the Four Law Terms" [MS 1614],
in Works (1723), 102-03; Donald R. Kelley, Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship:
Language, Law, and History in the French Renaissance (New York, 1970) 133, 303-04. See also
Meric Casaubon, A Treatise of Use and Custom (1638), 107-09.
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inconveniences." Natural reason played a continuing, if diminishing,
role in the interstices of the thickening tradition of artificial reason
recorded in case reporters.275
The revelation of divine law to Moses provided the central model
of writing capturing part of an anterior unwritten law. The
Elizabethan poet and courtier Lodowick Lloyd thought Scripture "a
short repetition, and compendious catalogue, expounding unto us the
law of nature" and the moral law.276 Coke, characteristically finding
predecessors through misrepresentation, called Judge Moses "the first
reporter of law., 277 The theologian Richard Hooker supposed that
the long-lived early patriarchs who walked close to God lived by His
moral law, passed down by oral tradition. God "often [put] them in
mind of that whereof it behooved them to be specially mindful."
Their short-lived descendants needed "means more durable to
preserve the laws of God from oblivion and corruption"-the revealed
Scripture.278 The Fall from Eden stood ultimately responsible for the
mind's porousness, besotting the memory along with the other
faculties in the corruption of original sin. The Fall recurred continual-
ly in legal writing as elsewhere, sometimes with great disproportion
between "Adam's trespass" and its quotidian effects. William West
invoked postlapsarian forgetfulness as the reason for bills, notes,
indentures, legal instruments, and, ultimately, for his formulary, Sym-
boleography.279 Protestant celebration of Scripture over wavering
tradition only fed this habit of praising records, whether prosaic forms
or the Old Testament itself, as a defense against the slipperiness of
fallen memory.
In all three of these stories, lex non scripta (whether custom,
"natural reason," or the moral law) remained a legitimate body of
law. In none was it extinguished. But it was anterior. All three were
stories of movement, tracing a developmental trajectory from the
unwritten to the written that cast lex non scripta as antique, in-
completely accessible (as in the natural and moral law), or progres-
sively superseded.
275. Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 261.
276. Lodowick Lloyd, Conference of Divers Laws (1602), 3.
277. Coke, preface to Reports, pt. 6, xv.
278. Hooker, Of the Laws (1594), 1:264-65.
279. Before the Fall, memory was "a strong and sure castle." Now it has become untrustwor-
thy, a "silly ruinous cottage so foresaken and rent in pieces with wind and tempests, that it has
now neither whole door, window, wall nor roof left." William West, Symboleography, bk. 1, sec.
1.
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The deficiencies of unwritten law; the attacks on tradition; print's
disruption of "structural amnesia," of the containment of tradition
through acculturation, and of the normalization of mnemonic
transmission through the learning exercises; and the rising expec-
tations entering the Inns from the universities and the Method Wars:
All heightened sensitivity to remembrance by figuring memory as
problematic. But the concept of memory also became more salient
because of the political, intellectual, and forensic advantages it
brought the profession.
The cluster of meanings surrounding lex non scripta-unwritten,
oral, and memorial--did lawyers important services. As with so much
else in the multivalent, chameleon-like early modern common law, the
unwritten and the memorial assumed not an absolute but a relational
importance, apparent only in reference to a particular problem or
forensic challenge.28 Most obvious to the modern reader on account
of its perpetuation in jurisprudence was the valorization of unwritten,
judge-made common law over statute and code. Henry VIII's
Parliaments underscored the power of statutes to achieve fundamental
legal and constitutional change. The break from Rome, the construc-
tion of a legally autonomous church polity, and the Statutes of Wills
and Uses stood out as the most notable examples. The post-Refor-
mation statute's proven ability to cut through broad swatches of
common law doctrine tempted critics and reformers to try. Lawyers
devised strategies to contain the newly powerful and prestigious
Parliamentary Act. They followed Continental civilians in elaborating
maxims of statutory construction that restrained through interpreting:
affirmative statutes do not destroy common custom; statutes in
derogation of the common law should be strictly construed.81 And
they praised unwritten, judge-made common law over the written laws
of statute, code, royal proclamation, and civilian Corpus Iuris through
a series of flattering dichotomies. "Written" law was more accessible
to the layman, seemingly more "certain" but rigid and clumsy in
regulating the unexpected case, reflecting the wisdom of only one
generation or drafter. Unwritten judge-made or customary law was
more difficult to locate but flexible, ever adjusting core principles to
new social and legal challenges, focused on the particular, embodying
280. Indeed, as contemporaries often remarked, the meaning of "common law" was itself
relational. Depending on one's forensic needs, it might mean the law of the royal courts (as
against the law of the prerogative tribunals, the church, the manors, and so forth); or judge-made
law (as against statute or code); or the common customs of the realm (as against the particular
customs of localities, corporations, and associations); or the law of England (as against the law
of France or Spain).
281. Samuel E. Thorne, ed., A Discourse upon the Exposition and Understanding of Statutes,
with Sir Thomas Egerton's Additions (San Marino, 1942), 30, 51; Ian MacLean, Interpretation
and Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law (New York, 1992), 181-86.
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the collective wisdom of the many generations who had purified
it.2  For the next four hundred years, variants of these oppositions
echoed through common law apologetics, revived by threats of
unpalatable reform through statute, codification, or proclamation.
Most of the perceived advantages of unwrittenness, however, long
ago fell out of common law jurisprudence, concerned as they were
with early modern disputes. The unwrittenness of the common law,
for instance, helped support the myth of an immemorial English
constitution. The appearance of French as a language of the law two
centuries after the Norman Conquest raised awkward questions for
the immemorialist position. Did not the advent of French suggest that
the Conqueror imposed Norman laws on England or, at the very least,
that the Conquest marked a decisive discontinuity in English legal
history? The unwrittenness of the common law offered a way around
this difficulty. Unlike a lex scripta, the central texts of lex non scripta
did not constitute the law so much as reflect an underlying tradition.
The lex non scripta existed "beneath" or "behind" the form and
language of its textual expression, allowing it to pose more easily as
continuous, without discernible origin, speaking successively to the
outside world in Saxon, Latin, French, and then English. 3
Critics of common law provisions or the system as a whole tried to
show inconsistency with the natural law or popular mores as a
strategy of delegitimation. How head off the tactic? The very
unwrittenness of the common law invited its Elizabethan apologists to
play up its role as the general custom of the realm over its role as the
custom of the royal courts. Sifted over the centuries, its "incon-
venient" provisions discarded, the common law as general custom
answered the needs and "genius" of the English people in the way a
written statute, code, or proclamation embodying the wisdom of one
generation or one promulgator never could.' The natural law was
another lex non scripta, and John Davies used its unwrittenness to
suggest alignment with the common law. Like William Fulbeck before
him and John Brydall after, he identified the common law as "com-
mon custom of the realm.., recorded and registered nowhere but in
the memory of the people." 5 The natural law derived its authority
282. A Brief Discourse Declaring and Approving the... Customs of London (1584), 6-7;
Davies, preface to Irish Reports (1615), in Works, 2:255; Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631),
241-42; Hedley, Speech of June 28, 1610, in Proceedings, 2:173-80; Sommerville, Politics and
Ideology, 91-92.
283. Edward Coke, Le Reading Del Mon Seignior Coke Sur. . . Finibus Levatis [MS 1579-
1580] (London, 1662), 3; Whitelocke, Memorials, 3:271.
284. Davies, Works, 2:252; Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 173; A Brief Discourse, Declaring and
Approving the Necessary and Inviolable Maintenance of the Laudable Customs of London (1584),
3-7; John Selden, Ad Fletam Dissertatio (1647), ed. D. Ogg (Cambridge, 1925), 165 (the common
law was "immemorially fitted to the genius of the nation").
285. Davies, Works, 2:252; Fulbeck, Direction (1600), 173 ("the bare memory of man is the
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and rules from God rather than an authoritative text, residing "only
in the heart of man. 2 6 Davies deemphasized the jurisprudential
commonplace about the disparate origins of natural and common law
(in God, and in custom or judicial interpretation, respectively) in
order to underscore their common habitation in "unwritten"
repositories (memory and the heart, respectively). Their mutual status
as lex non scripta supported Davies's otherwise unproven conclusion
that the common law came "nearest to the law of nature, which is the
root and touchstone of all good laws."
Unwrittenness served as not only a jurisprudential bridge linking
common and natural law, but as a temporal bridge, connecting
England's legal system to Sparta's. Borrowing a hint from the
civilians' Institutes and from Plutarch's life of Lycurgus, lawyers
identified Sparta as the model of unwritten law, in contrast to the
Athenian devotion to written law. 7 To partisans of lex scripta's
superiority over lex non scripta, common lawyers might retort: were
there not equally dignified historical exempla for both systems?
Indeed, through Henry Spelman's fantasy that the Saxons descended
from a Spartan colony, Lycurgus's lex non scripta became not only a
model for, but an ancestor of, the common law.28 By invoking
Lycurgus, common lawyers implicitly claimed for their own lex non
scripta the virtues that unwrittenness were thought to have given the
Spartan laws: a sparseness that avoided overelaboration and prolixity;
and stability over time, understood as resistance to innovation
(meaning degeneration).289
register of customs"); John Brydall, Speculum Juris Anglican4 or, A View of the Laws of
England, as They are Divided into Statutes, Common Law and Customs (1673), 49.
286. Davies, Works, 2:253. Classification of common and natural law as lex non scripta did
not turn on their literal unwrittenness, Indeed, Davies acknowledged the importance of legal
literature and lawyers as remembrancers of the common law, and he suffered from no shortage
of books on the natural law. Ibid., 2:250-51, 275, 278-79. By likening the lex non scripta of the
common law to "traditio in the ecclesiastical sense, an esoteric and authoritative knowledge
handed on to the side of any manuscriptural or printed textual custody," and by seeing legal
texts as a "representation ... mark or trace" of a normatively prior oral tradition, Peter
Goodrich has insightfully helped explain how Davies could consult and write legal texts while
insisting that the common law was an unwritten corpus held in memory. Goodrich, Languages
of Law, 84-85, 116-23 ("[L]egal writing had always to be approached as a representation, as an
equivocal sign of hidden depths"). On this theme, see also Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood, 63-
104, esp. 87-88.
287. Institutes, book I, tit. 2, 10. See, e.g., Yelverton, Farewell Address, 21-23.
288. Ibid., 21-22; Francis Bacon, "A Proposition Concerning the Compiling and Amendment
of the Laws of England" [MS 1616], in Works, 13:67; Enchiridion Legum (1673), 42-43; Spelman,
"Of the Original of the Four Law Terms," in Works, 102-03. Bulstrode Whitelock and William
Hudson likened the common law judges, masters of the lex non scripta, to their ancestors, the
Druids, the oracles of the unwritten law of the Britons. Whitelocke, Memorials, 3:49 (1649);
William Hudson, "A Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber" [MS c.1621], in Collectanea
Juridica, 2:1.
289. It was a commonplace in Renaissance political thought to praise Spartan laws for
resisting corruption over time. See, e.g., Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. Harvey
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The appropriation of Sparta also directed attention to why Lycurgus
insisted on maintaining an unwritten law: to compel citizens to know
it by heart, the better to inculcate virtue and obedience.29 °
Memorizing law did not simply retain information, an alternative to
reading it in a public posting or searching for it in texts. Memorizing
had a deeper meaning. It suggested the taking of law into a person's
spirit, an interiorization, which political writers termed the
cornerstone of obedience and orderly living. God's finger wrote the
natural law on the hearts of men and women. But how was positive
law to be internalized? Chapter 11 of Deuteronomy provided the
repeatedly invoked archetype of legal pcedeia: Write the law on the
doorposts and the gates to lay it up "in your heart and in your soul,"
teach it "when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by
the way, when thou liest down, and when thou risest up. ' 291 The
statutory compiler Ferdinand Pulton invoked Deuteronomy to favor
publishing laws and reading them aloud at assizes, quarter sessions,
and leets; concurrent methods to "imprint [them] into our
memory., 292 The clergyman Thomas Sutton charged judges, and by
extension subjects, with the responsibility of Israelite magistrates: that
law, "once written in tables of stone," be "firmly and plainly written
in the fleshly tables of your hearts., 293 The very dependence on
memory and oral tradition implied by the unwrittenness of common
law promised, on the precedent of Lycurgus's Sparta, a greater
measure of valued interiorization than a lex scripta.294 "It was a
common saying," Christopher Yelverton told Gray's Inn as he left to
become Queen's Serjeant, "that the Athenians were always writing of
C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago, 1996), 10.
290. Plutarch, "Lycurgus," in Plutarch's Lives, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (New York, 1928),
241-43. The young Hobbes made the connection when writing in a soon-to-be abandoned
humanistic vein in "A Discourse of Laws." He likened the unwritten strands of the common law
to Lycurgus's ordinances, "public, and better known" because "engraven in the memory of his
citizens." Thomas Hobbes, "A Discourse of Laws" [MS c.1620], in Three Discourses: A Critical
Modern Edition of Newly Identified Work of the Young Hobbes, ed. Noel B. Reynolds and
Arlene W. Saxonhouse (Chicago, 1995), 118.
291. Deut., 11:18-20 (King James Version).
292. Ferdinand Pulton, "Preface Dedicatory," in An Abstract of all the Penal Statutes (1579).
293. Thomas Sutton, Jethro's Counsel to Moses: Or, a Direction for Magistrates. A Sermon
preached at St. Savior's in Southwarke, March 5, 1621 before the honorable judges (London,
1631), 27.
294. Michael Warner has written insightfully of how New England Puritans hoped that print
might internalize values and ideas among readers. Warner, The Letters of the Republic, 19-23.
Internalization stood as an ideal not only for New England Puritan printing (the focus of
Warner's fine work), it also appeared in early modern discussions of religious edification,
familial and political loyalty, and civic and legal education, whether the transmission of
knowledge proceeded through print, manuscript, or oral media. Printing offered a newly
attractive method of securing an ancient dream variously expressed as the "digestion" of ideas
into the body, writing upon the heart, or the joining of the message with the soul.
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laws, but they never kept any, but the Lacedaemonians never writ
laws, but always kept them.
29 5
Within the confines of the legal guild, the problem of transmitting
law was less one of political and moral inculcation than personal
mnemonics. If they wished, lawyers could draw the lesson from
Lycurgus and from Plato's Phaedrus that writing weakened
remembrance.2 96 Star Chamber attorney William Hudson, for
example, transposed Plato's attack from writing to print in the course
of criticizing legal publication. The common lawyers of the past, he
wrote, refrained from publishing their arguments and meditations,
honoring "one of Lycurgus' maxims, or their ancestors' Druids'
prescripts, mandare memoriae, et disciplinae potius quam scriptis [it is
better to commit to memory and training than to writings]." '297 In
practice, lawyers did not often disparage print or writing as an
inevitable incursion upon memory. But Lycurgus and Plato's Phaedrus
stood as reproaches to be answered and as topoi to be invoked against
unpalatable legal literature. Perhaps the figuring of commonplaces,
abridgments, and case reporting as aides m~moires (as prompts rather
than substitutes for memory) combined with the depiction of English
law as a whole as lex non scripta, muted Plato's challenge, familiar to
all educated Englishmen.
The widely perceived distinctions and defects of the law-equality
and liberty, expense and prejudice-have a magnetic force in legal
cultures. They attract projects and twist debating points. One connects
one's own proposed changes or arguments to the law's regnant values
and ties one's opponents' schemes to law's leading vices. Around
1600, uncertainty was such a magnet. Reformers and critics repeatedly
accused the common law of uncertainty, "the principal and most just
challenge that is made to it," admitted Francis Bacon.298 Memory
was pulled into the debate over certainty in three different ways. First,
the law's lamentable uncertainty supposedly caused unsteady
recollection. By "reason of the confusion in the [law's] particulars,
there being no dependency of one case upon another," wrote the
anonymous author of "Directions for the Orderly Reading of the
Law," "it cannot but disheart[en] the understanding, overharry the
295. Yelverton, Farewell Address, 22-23.
296. Plato, Phaedrus, 275a.
297. Hudson, "Star Chamber," 2:1. Following Caesar, Englishmen believed Druids to be the
judges and teachers of law in the oral society of the ancient Britons, their learning never put into
writing. See, e.g., Julius Caesar, "De Bello Gallico" and Other Commentaries, bk. 6, §§ 13-14,
trans. W.A. Macdevitt (London, 1923), 118-20; William Camden, Britannia, 2:li, lxxiii; id., "Of
the Diversity of Names of this Island," in Hearne, ed., Curious Discourses, 1:90-91; id., "Mr.
Jones His Answers to Mr. Tate's Questions," in ibid., 1:128-29; Selden, "Notes upon Fortescue's
De Laudibus Legum Angliae," in Works, 3:1889.
298. Bacon, "Maxims of the Law" [MS 1597], in Works, 7:319.
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memory, and leave confused and indeterminate knowledge of the
subject matter., 299 Second, reversing the causal arrows, an overbur-
dened memory fostered belief in the uncertainty of law. 3°° Third, the
porousness of memory opened space for, depending on perspective,
errors, fancies and alternative legal understandings. John Manwood
hoped his printed treatise would "revive in memory" the forest laws.
In their absence, "for want of the knowledge of these laws, many fond
opinions of unlearned men, mere vanities and conceits, are taken and
holden for law., 31 Coke's first Report blamed the "storehouse" of
memory for conjuring "absurd and strange opinions."3 2
This conventional association of memory with uncertainty allowed
"methodizers" and authors of published lawbooks to represent and
justify their works as mere responses to the weaknesses of memory.
Depicting printed lawbooks as the extension and solidification of
memory by technological artifice disguised their forensic and political
interventions. This especially appealed to men like Manwood and
Coke who were interested in overwriting competing traditions. To
further the Crown's revival of its forest jurisdiction, Manwood set the
"ancient and learned prerogative laws" against the "vanities and
conceits" of "unlearned men." One is unsure whether the ruthless
Coke delighted more in excising the words of his jurisprudential
enemies or his brother judges from the Reports, published "for the
help of ... memory. 30 3 The custodial masquerade also reassured
lawyers ideologically attached to speech over print. Coke's Reports
again:
And let not those that heard the arguments themselves uttered
viva voce, with the countenance and gesture of living men in the
seat of justice in open court, fear that when they shall read them
privately in a dead letter, it will want much of the former
grace.3"
Representing lawbooks as a salve to the uncertainty of memory
reduced the figurative gap between print and oral discourse. It
299. "Directions for the Orderly Reading of the Law" [MS c.16481, Rawlinson MS C207, fol.
263, Bodleian Library.
300. "To adhere therefore and wholly to respect particular cases, without any observation
of the general rules and reasons, and to charge the memory with infinite singularities, is utterly
to confound the same, a labor of unspeakable toil and wherein we shall never free us from
confusion, but engender in our selves, that wrong opinion which many have (amiss) entertained,
that there is nothing certain in our laws." Dodderidge, English Lawyer (1631), 260.
301. Manwood, Laws of the Forest, [5]-[6]
302. Coke, preface to Reports, pt. 1, xv-xvii.
303. Ibid., xxvi-xxvii, xxviii-xxix. Opponents as diverse as Chancellor Ellesmere, Francis
Bacon and the Jesuit controversialist Robert Parsons attacked Coke's disingenuousness. See
Knafla, Tracts of Ellesmere, 128-29, 148-49.
304. Coke, preface to Reports, pt. 10, xxiii.
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deflected attacks in the name of living speech over written or printed
[read "dead"] letter, a trope familiar from Christian theology, Plato's
Phaedrus, and common lawyers' celebration of courtroom testimony
over mute documentary evidence (the civilians' specialty). 0 5
The importance of memory and "unwrittenness," which distin-
guished the common law from the various kinds of lex scripta, was an
ideological posture as well as an acknowledgment of the lack of an
authoritative corpus. The need of common lawyers to justify not only
the content but the dignity of their law against the slurs of royalists,
civilians, university scholars, country gentry, merchants, and divines,
meant that lex scripta and lex non scripta, writing and oral/memorial
tradition, opposed each other as ideal-typical constructs in debate as
they worked together in practice. Unorganized, unfindable, uncertain,
unsteady, primitive: These charges battered the unwritten common
law. Defense of this lex non scripta proceeded through loud
proclamation of its contrary virtues of flexibility, particularistic
precision, rationality in harmony with divine and natural law, and
"copiousness," that analogic richness latent in its core principles.3"
Lawyers also came to appreciate the cultural work that unwrittenness,
oral tradition, and memory did, often through connotation and
indirectly: as a bridge to the natural law, the Spartans, and the Druids;
as a predicate for interiorization; as a helpmeet to the ancient
constitution; as an allusion to Plato and the living image of discourse;
and as an apologia for falsely modest printed lawbooks pushing
unwelcome law out of mind. A remembered law had its advantages.
IV. CONCLUSION: LAWYERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE
CUSTODIAL MOMENT
Although many of the topics in this Article have been singly
explored by historians-Ramism and "methodical" treatises, im-
memorialist political argument and tithe litigation, antiquarianism and
the Art of Memory-their shared participation in memorial culture,
taken as a configuration, is novel. But it was precisely their
305. Anxieties about freezing living speech in print ran deeper among ministers than lawyers.
See D.F. McKenzie, "Speech-Manuscript-Print," in New Directions in Textual Study, ed. Dave
Oliphant and Robin Bradford (Austin, 1990), 87-109.
306. On "copiousness," see Charles M. Gray, "Reason, Authority, and Imagination: The
Jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke," in Culture and Politics from Puritanism to the Enlighten-
ment, ed. Perez Zagorin (Berkeley, 1980), 25-66.
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intertwining within a configuration that revises our understanding of
the history of communications and of English legal culture.
First, the simultaneous decline of memory as a carrier of knowledge
alongside its growing salience and complexity within a memorial
culture of many parts challenges the "stage theory" of legal com-
munications." 7 The disparate trajectories of memory did not move
along a single axis through a series of stages, from oral tradition to
writing, print, and electronics. The years around 1600 cannot be
described under a single rubric capturing a linear process, such as "the
decline of the oral" or "the advent of print culture." Indeed, print
played a particularly complicated double role, at once slowly
superseding memory while helping engender memorial culture.30 8
Second, the roles and programs implicit in each strand of memorial
culture drew strength from the other strands. Lawyers could more
easily pose as manufacturers of immemorialist pedigrees in
constitutional argument when they also engaged in local memory
brokering and envisioned legal literature and legal education in such
strongly mnemonic terms. The enhanced theoretical attention devoted
to memory in legal education made more sense when barristers
presented themselves as national political remembrancers, stressed
their expertise in assessing remembered customs in tithe and copyhold
disputes, and valorized cultivated memory of law as a distinction
between themselves and their attorney and solicitor rivals.
Indeed, memorial culture laid the groundwork for the peculiar
calling of Anglo-American lawyers that Tocqueville classically
described, so familiar that one does not inquire after its history: The
bar upholds "the traditionary fabric" while adapting it "to the changes
that time operates in society," all the while disclaiming "any desire for
innovation."3 9 English medieval lawyers before 1530 were doing this
in practice. But their jurisprudential self-understanding-specialists in
the course of the royal courts and in a professional "common
erudition" and "reason"-allowed little room for its ideological
expression as a social and political role. By the eve of the Revolution,
the bar's emergence as a remembrancing order, its local memory
"brokering," the embrace by some of its members of legal humanist
historicist sensibility (Egerton's "leges temporis"), and the denial of
307. See the introduction to this Article for some representative scholarly examples.
308. Recall that print reoriented legal education to make memory a problematic category,
particularly as its increasing scale and diversity around 1600 began to make it appear not only
a supplement but a plausible alternative to oral and chirographic transmission. The press made
available a standardized corpus of authorities and finding aids that fostered a citation-specific
style of legal argument, increasing the individual lawyer's mnemonic burden as it relieved the
profession of some of its collective memorial work. It also disseminated the "raw materials" of
legal antiquarianism and legal-historical political argument.
309. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America [1835] (New York, 1945), 1:288.
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significant change by others spinning immemorial pedigrees: All these
elements of memorial culture prepared the way for the profession's
public embrace of its role as a mediator between memory/tradition
and present exigencies. Memorial culture did not invent the bar's
superintendence of traditionalism in the service of change so much as
it engendered consciousness of the process as a distinctive and worthy
public calling, a consciousness that rested upon the bar's articulated
commitment to the sustenance and manipulation of memory.
Third, and most importantly, the construct of memorial culture
offers a new storyline to organize early modern English legal history
by identifying a "custodial moment" in jurisprudence.31 This
moment was particular to a time and place, to English common
lawyers in the Elizabethan and early-Stuart years. Continental jurists
trained in Roman law, by contrast, appealed to the "written reason"
of the Corpus Iuris to set aside customs, earning suspicion as
centralizers and agents of autocracy, as "modernizers." '' Theirs was
not a legal culture emphasizing its custodial credentials. Continental
civilians did not legitimate their law by upholding its customary
origins, or put themselves forward as experts in brokering local
remembered law and assessing immemorial constitution(s), or invent
praise for a partly oral legal tradition not reducible to books.312 Nor
was memorial culture the complicated, multivalent construct this
Article depicts, intrinsic to lawyering in England's precedental system,
spanning the latter Middle Ages as well as the eighteenth century.
For all the importance of memory as a carrier of law before the
middle sixteenth century, the conditions that gave rise to memorial
culture had yet to arise or to press hard. Before then, the profession
had only begun to confront humanist agitation over "method," the
multiple educational and forensic ramifications of printing, im-
memorialist political argument and politicized legal antiquarianism,
and local memory brokering. Sustained jurisdictional and disciplinary
conflict emerged in the latter sixteenth century as the common law cut
back on prerogative, ecclesiastical, and civilian tribunals under the
banner of immemorial right and flattered itself as a national civic
tutor, an alternative tradition of learning beside the universities and
the church. The Elizabethan years also saw the spread of an "his-
toricist" sensibility that unflattened time as it ascribed the existence
of institutions and doctrines to interests and "conveniences" as well
310. The introduction to this Article collects some of the storylines used to organize early
modern English legal history and cites representative scholars participating in each.
311. Strauss, Law, Resistance, and the State, 24-25.
312. Civilians who criticized precedent as a source of law identified as one of its faults its
residence in the memorial tradition of practitioners. Robert Wiseman, The Law of Laws: Or, the
Excellency of the Civil Law Above All Human Laws Whatsoever (1664 ed.), 38-42, esp. 42.
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as antiquity and "reason." Together these developments fostered a
custodial moment in legal culture. It grew out of an enhanced
attention to legal mutability, contingency, and loss (sometimes
expressed through its extreme effacement in immemorialist ar-
gument); a realization of print's challenges to memory's service as a
repository; a confidence that memory lay at the heart of European
intellectual life and politics (in the Method Wars and the historicist
turn of customary constitutionalism); a participation in the assessment
and deployment of remembered law, particularly in its variegated
local forms; and an enjoyment of the political and dignitary ad-
vantages won by constituting the bar as a remembrancing order. In
other words, the valorization of custody arose out of an enhanced
awareness of its advantages-and its negations.
After the Revolution, and more expeditiously in the eighteenth
century, the conditions supporting memorial culture faded. The
Elizabethan and early-Stuart lawyers' leadership of antiquarian studies
passed to the church and the universities after the Restoration. The
declining usefulness of antiquarianism in political and religious
legitimation drove it to the margins of intellectual life by the middle
of the eighteenth century.3 13 The ancient constitution traced a
similar arc. At once central and contested in pre-Revolutionary
political argument, it receded in importance after the Restoration and
particularly after the Glorious Revolution. The moments when ancient
constitutionalism flared up with particular vigor-as in the Whig
rebuttal to Robert Brady in the 1680s and in Lord Bollingbroke's
attacks on Robert Walpole in the 1720s-should not obscure that the
ancient constitution had come to occupy less space on the palette of
political argument.314 The "decay of genetic theories of politics and
of fundamental law," R.J. Smith has observed, "meant that the
historical debate on the English Constitution tended to decline from
one of right to one of illustration. '315 Appeals to social contract,
natural right, civic virtue, "convenience," interest, and a post-Glorious
Revolution "modern constitution" did not require lawyers to
formulate and dissolve immemorial pedigrees, lessening the value of
313. Antiquarianism as a field of study lived its heroic age in the seventeenth century. Parry,
Trophies of Time; David Douglas, English Scholars, 1660-1730, 2d ed. (London, 1951), esp. 272-
81.
314. Of course, contrasting evolutionary and ancient constitutionalist accounts of English
legal history continued to appear in legal literature and political forensics throughout the
eighteenth century. Compare William Bohun, Institutio Legalis; Or, An Introduction to the Study
and Practice of the Laws of England (1708), v, with Fortescue, preface to Reports. The ancient
constitution (modified) underwent a revival in Blackstone and Burke. Pocock, Ancient
Constitution, 370, 379-82
315. R.J. Smith, The Gothic Bequest: Medieval Institutions in British Thought, 1688-1863
(Cambridge, 1987), 41.
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the profession's power to distill historical narratives out of legal
records. 3
16
By 1800, "method," at least in the law, was no longer an academic
battlefield for the followers of Ramus, Aristotle, and Plato. The
dissipation of legal Ramism undermined interest in displaying a
"natural order" of knowledge in the universe and the mind as the key
to superior mnemonics. Legal method settled into a synonym for
subdivision and lightly theorized "good organization., 317 The close
imbrication of lawbooks and memory captured in the image of
"cycling" broke down in the eighteenth century. Lawbooks
represented themselves less as promptuaries for an underlying legal
tradition than as the primary repositories of law, an intermediate step
on the way to a positivist constriction of law to statutes and cases
officially promulgated through text. Maxim compilations did not boast
of their mnemonic advantages as their seventeenth-century forebears
so insistently had.318  Legal educators continued to recommend
commonplacing but largely abandoned the physiological and
psychological explorations of remembrance of John Dodderidge,
William Fulbeck, Francis Bacon, Edward Coke, and William Phil-
lips.
319
316. In response to Lord Bollingbroke's deployment of the ancient constitution to attack
Robert Walpole, the Robinarch's defenders in the 1720s and 1730 argued that the Whig regime
embodied a "modem constitution" purged of absolutist excesses and made secure by the
Glorious Revolution. Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in
the Age of Walpole (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 127-36. On the fate of post-Restoration ancient
constitutionalist argument, see the following in addition to Pocock and Smith: James Conniff,
"Reason and History in Early Whig Thought," Journal of the History of Ideas 43 (1982): 397-416;
Martyn P. Thompson, "A Note on 'Reason' and 'History' in Late Seventeenth Century
Thought," Political Theory 4 (1976): 491-504; Robert Willman, "Blackstone and the 'Theoretical
Perfection' of English Law in the Reign of Charles II," Historical Journal 26 (1983): 47-48;
David Resnick, "Locke and the Rejection of the Ancient Constitution," Political Theory 12
(1984): 97-114; Reid, "Ancient Constitution."
317. For this latter, colloquial sense of "method" and "methodize," see, for example, Richard
Burn, The Justice of the Peace, and Parish Officer, 2d ed. (1756); William Blackstone, Commen-
taries on the Laws of England [1765] (Chicago, 1979), 1:4; "An Essay on Method," Monthly
Review 3 (1806): 120-24.
318. For the seventeenth-century "mnemonicization" of maxims, see my discussion in Part
II of Hawke, Grounds of the Laws of England (1657); Wingate, Maxims of Reason (1658);
Clayton, Topics in the Laws of England (1646); Phillipps, The Principles of Law Reduced to
Practice (1661). For the eighteenth century, see Richard Francis, Maxims of Equity (1727); The
Grounds and Rudiments of Law and Equity, Alphabetically Digested: Containing a Collection of
Rules and Maxims (London, 1749); Thomas Branche, Principia Legis et Aequitatis (1753).
319. These authors are discussed in Subsection I.C.1. The eighteenth-century tradition of
legal educational advice abandoned mnemonic pointers, retained commonplacing and subdivision
without the philosophical accoutrements of Elizabethan and Jacobean Method, and was
concerned above all with providing reading lists. Examples include Roger North, "Discourse on
the Study of the Laws" [MS c.1700-1730], in Hoeflich, Gladsome Light, 15-33; Thomas Wood,
"Some Thoughts Concerning the Study of the Laws of England in the Two Universities (1708),
in ibid., 34-53; Thomas Reeve, "Lord Chief Justice Reeve to His Nephew Containing
Instructions for the Study of the Law," [MS c.1730], in Collectanea Juridica, 1:79-81; Lord Ash-
burton, "Letter to a Gentleman of the Inner Temple, with Directions for the Study of the Law"
[MS 1779], in A Treatise on the Study of the Law... Written by... Lords Mansfield, Ashburton,
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Eighteenth-century jurisprudence offered a less congenial home to
custodial rhetoric. The dread of innovation in laws, a potent political
commonplace around 1600, invited pious intonation of continuity as
a strategy of reassurance. Coke's boldest rulings crept forward behind
a mask of string citations and newly coined ancient Latin maxims.
When possible, advocates of law reform within the bar acknowledged
dominant prejudices by casting their programs as modest responses to
necessity-purging, restoring, or recompiling rather than innovating
and preserving ongoing traditions. Bacon defended his "Proposition
Touching Amendment of Laws" (MS 1616) as "rather matter of order
and explanation than of alteration. "320 The laws grow diseased with
age, wrote Matthew Hale; they need "due husbandry," or they "will
die of themselves, like trees that want pruning," choking with ivy.32'
Eighteenth-century legal culture evidenced greater comfort about
innovation. To reflect glory on the "present happy Establishment," a
"new Magna Carta may be formed (or, at least, the old one largely
improved)," implored Christopher Tancred when offering a potpourri
of modest substantive and procedural amendments.322 Historical nar-
ratives and reform programs committed to "legal modernization"
became more prominent in the century after the English
Revolution.323 The prescriptive implications of evolutionary theories
of legal development supported this modernizing confidence. A strand
of seventeenth-century jurisprudence, represented most notably by
Thomas Egerton, Henry Spelman, John Selden, and Matthew Hale,
viewed current English law as an historical product, the result of
incremental but continuous change. Selden and Hale famously likened
English law to the Argonauts' ship: the same at the end of their
and Thurlow [1797] (Buffalo, 1974), 55-69. Artificial memory made only sporadic and brief
appearances. See Richard Grey, Memoria Technica, 3d ed. (1737), 159 (method of remembering
the year and chapter of statutes); Joseph Simpson, Reflections on the Natural and Acquired
Endowments Requisite for the Study of the Law (1764), 6-8 (notes but does not advocate Art of
Memory).
320. The "entire body and substance of law shall remain, only discharged of idle and
unprofitable and hurtful matter." Bacon, "Proposition Touching Amendment of Laws" [MS
c.1616], in Works, 13:66-67.
321. Though Hale recognized the need to reform the laws themselves, and not just "abuses"
and "excrescences," his overall tenor was cautious. Let "nothing be altered that is a foundation
or principal integral of the law; for these ... ought not to be touched, lest the whole fabric
should be endangered." Amendment of laws "is a choice and tender business" to be undertaken
"warily." Matthew Hale, "Considerations Touching the Amendment or Alteration of Laws" [MS
c.1660], in A Collection of Tracts Relative to the Law of England ed. Francis Hargrave (1787),
249-89, esp. 253, 266-69, 272.
322. Christopher Tancred, An Essay for the General Regulation of the Law and the More
Easy and Speedy Advancement of Justice (London, 1727), 10-11.
323. I have borrowed the phrase "legal modernization" from David Lieberman, "Property,
Commerce, and the Common Law: Attitudes to Legal Change in the Eighteenth Century," in
Early Modern Conceptions of Property, ed. John Brewer and Susan Staves (London, 1995), 144-
58, esp. 147-48 and 152.
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voyage as at the beginning, "though there remained little of the old
materials but the chine and ribs of it."324 Though varying in their
political agendas, these seventeenth-century writers charted how
English law had come to be what it was. Eighteenth-century
evolutionary theorists, in particular the Scots Lord Kames, David
Hume, and Adam Smith, brought to the fore a related issue: Based
on the course of historical development, what was law becoming and,
by inference, how should one advance it? They identified four
economic stages-hunting, herding, agriculture, and com-
merce-through which societies evolved, each with correlate legal
systems.325 Like Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, which greatly
influenced them, they reinforced curiosity about how legal systems
responded to economics, religion, and popular manners, redirecting
interest from the historical mapping of legal traditions to the
explanation of form and evolution. This subordinated recollection to
causation.
Descriptive in charting sociolegal progress over millennia, their
vision was implicitly prescriptive as well. For it placed a grand
historical narrative at the service of law reform understood as the
elimination of the obsolete and rude. In focusing on legal adjustment
to socioeconomic change, it undermined the value of tradition as
authority.326 In moralized Enlightenment rhetoric, reform purged
law of inherited "barbarities" in the pursuit of "refinement" and
"civilization." In functionalist terminology, reform closed lags between
law and the mores and interests of England's latest stage as a
''commercial society," most noticeably in Lord Mansfield's
refashioning of the common law to accommodate merchant practice.
Where early-seventeenth-century critiques of custom viewed it as an
obstacle to religious and moral reformation, mid-eighteenth-century
ones cast it and its auxiliary, memory, as allies of anachronism.
Impatient reformers could tar memory as an antitype to
"improvement" and "modernization." Reading the rule in Shelley's
324. Hale, "Amendment," 258; id., The History of the Common Law of England, ed. Charles
M. Gray (Chicago, 1971), 40; Selden, "Notes upon Sir John Fortescue," 19-20. On Egerton, see
Knafla, Tracts of Egerton, 48-50; on Selden and Hale, see Harold J. Berman, "The Origins of
Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale," Yale Law Journal 103 (1994): 1651-1738; on the
sixteenth-century French legal humanist roots of this style of thought, see Kelley, Foundations
of Modern Historical Scholarship.
325. They did not see law emerging from immutable divine and natural commands or
immemorial custom.
326. J.W. Burrow, A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past (Cambridge,
1981), 23 (quoting John Millar's An Historical View of the English Government from the
Settlement of the Saxons in Britain to the Revolution of 1688 (1812), 4:305: "The blind respect
and reverence paid to ancient institutions has given place to a desire of examining their




Ross: The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1998
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 229
Case restrictively as a lamentable "clog" to the free movement of
property requisite in a "commercial country," King's Bench Justice
Willes observed: "[I]f the law could invariably adhere in all cases to
the technical expressions," it "would become a mere matter of
memory instead of being a system of judgment and reason. 3 27
Willes's language suggests how memory could be put down as an
antithesis to reason as well as to modernization. The Elizabethan
methodizers had hoped to introduce system and dialectic into legal
mnemonics, to enlist reason in the improvement of remembrance.
William Jones's An Essay on the Law of Bailments (1781) suggests the
new spirit:
[I]f law be a science,.., it must be founded on principle, and
claim an exalted rank in the empire of reason; but, if it be merely
an unconnected series of decrees and ordinances, its use may
remain, though its dignity be lessened, and he will be the greatest
lawyer, who has the strongest... memory.328
Custodianship of the law became a more contested ideological stance
in this jurisprudential climate.
The custodial moment in jurisprudence, then, was an in-between
stage, resting on political, educational, and intellectual foundations
peculiar to Elizabethan and early-Stuart England. Committed to
preservation, it was not preserved through the eighteenth century.
Engaging time beyond memory, it was not immemorial.
327. Case of Perrin and Blake (K.B., 1770), in Hargrave, Collectanea Juridica, 297, 301. On
Scottish four-stage theorists, see Peter Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea (Cambridge,
1980), 18-50. On the importance of "legal modernization" in eighteenth-century jurisprudence,
see David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-
Century Britain (Cambridge, 1989), esp 73, 88-98, 122-27, 144-75. Lieberman's "Property,
Commerce, and the Common Law," 154, led me to Judge Willes and Perrin and Blake.
328. William Jones, An Essay on the Law of Bailments [1781] (New York, 1978), 123-24.
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